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Abstract
The unifying theme of this dissertation is the growing importance of pharmaceutical
products in health care and in society more broadly. The first two chapters use
structural and reduced-form models to study the effects of various policies on the
choice and utilization of prescription drugs. The third chapter surveys the empirical
literature on the competitive effects of a class of pricing arrangements used in the
pharmaceutical and many other industries.
Chapter 1. One of the criticisms leveled against direct-to-consumer advertising
of prescription drugs is that it overemphasizes the use of pharmaceuticals at the ex-
pense of other forms of treatment. In “Choice of Depression Treatment: Advertising
Spillovers in a Model with Complementarity,” I study how antidepressant TV ads
affect demand for psychotherapy. Antidepressant advertising can increase demand
for therapy if the products are complements or if advertising has spillover effects.
To disentangle the different channels, I develop a discrete-choice demand model that
allows for complementarity between products, advertising spillovers, and flexible un-
observed preference heterogeneity. Individual-level panel data on treatment choices
and price variation allow me to separately identify complementarity and correlated
preferences, whereas the average price of TV advertising, used as an instrument,
identifies the causal effect of antidepressant ads on demand for each product. The
results indicate that even though antidepressants and psychotherapy are substitutes,
drug advertising increases demand for therapy through a spillover effect. Allowing for
time-invariant and time-varying unobservables that can be correlated across products
critically affects the estimated degree of complementarity and advertising elasticities.
Chapter 2. While prescription drugs have enabled the cost-effective treatment of
a myriad of diseases, many pharmaceuticals come with potential for abuse. The grow-
ing use of opioid medications for chronic pain led to widespread misuse, addiction,
and skyrocketing overdose death rates. In “Did Plain-Vanilla Prescription Drug Mon-
itoring Programs Reduce Opioid Use? Evidence from Privately Insured Patients,” I
explore whether prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) with no registra-
tion or use mandates were effective in reducing the utilization of opioid prescription
drugs. Exploiting the staggered introduction of such programs between 2008 and
2010, I use difference-in-differences to estimate their causal effect on the number of
prescriptions, days supply, and dosage per capita. Based on data from privately in-
sured adults, the estimation results reveal that PDMPs successfully reduced opioid
utilization, especially of high-dosage prescriptions. A battery of robustness checks
suggests that the estimated effects are caused by the PDMPs and not by confound-
ing factors such as broader trends in health care, attrition, out-of-state purchases, or
other anti-opioid policies.
Chapter 3. The assumption that buyers pay the same price for each unit of the
good they purchase underlies many economic analyses. However, linear pricing is one
of many pricing arrangements used in practice. In “Empirical Evidence on Conditional
Pricing Practices: A Review,” Julie Holland Mortimer and I review the existing
empirical studies on the competitive impact of conditional pricing practices (CPPs),
under which the price of a product may depend on a quantity, share, bundling, or
other requirement. Examples of CPPs include all-units and loyalty discounts, full-
line forcing contracts, and exclusivity arrangements. A common thread unifying the
empirical literature is that CPPs often have both procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects and that their net effect may depend on the details of the arrangements and
the characteristics of the markets in which they are used.
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Chapter 1
Choice of Depression Treatment:
Advertising Spillovers in a Model
with Complementarity ∗
1.1 Introduction
Direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising of prescription drugs on television has been
controversial since its deregulation in 1997. One of the various criticisms leveled
against this type of promotion is that it overemphasizes the use of pharmaceutical
products at the expense of alternative treatment options.1 In the context of depres-
sion, psychologists have expressed concern over the declining use of psychotherapy in
∗Truven Health Analytics, through its Dissertation Support Program, generously made avail-
able for the purposes of this dissertation the Truven Health MarketScan® Commercial Claims and
Encounters Database. Copyright © 2016 Truven. All Rights Reserved. Truven Health was not
involved in preparing the results in this paper in any way. I am solely responsible for any errors.
1Ventola (2011) outlines the arguments for and against DTC advertising of prescription drugs.
1
depression treatment and pointed to antidepressant DTC ads as one of the reasons.2
I study how antidepressant TV advertising affects demand for psychotherapy.
There are two possible channels: complementarity or substitutability between treat-
ment options and spillover or business-stealing effects of advertising. If drugs and
therapy are complements because they work better together, an increase in drug ads
will increase demand for therapy. However, it is also possible that antidepressant
advertising has a spillover effect by encouraging individuals to seek treatment, which
can boost demand for therapy even if the products are substitutes. To disentangle the
channels through which advertising operates, I develop a discrete-choice model that
captures the key features of demand: complementarity, spillovers, and unobserved
heterogeneity in preferences.
The model presents two identification challenges: separating complementarity
from unobserved correlated preferences and identifying advertising spillovers. The
first challenge arises from the fact that a relatively large share of patients may choose
to take drugs and therapy either because they like both options for reasons unrelated
to how well the two work together (unobserved correlated preferences) or because the
products provide a greater benefit when taken in combination (complementarity). In
addition, time-varying health shocks that boost demand for all treatment options can
also make it seem that patients tend to choose drugs and therapy together relatively
more often and falsely suggest that they are complements.
To separately identify complementarity from unobserved correlated preferences,
I use two sources of identification. The first is individual-level panel data. The
2Nordbal (2010) discusses various possible causes of this trend.
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intuition is that if drugs and therapy are complements, individuals will buy them in
combination relatively more often than either one alone. I combine this with health
plan level variation in prices. If demand for drugs and demand for therapy move in
the same direction in response to an exogenous change in the price of either one, the
products are complements; if they move in opposite directions, they are substitutes.
Identifying advertising spillovers typically requires separating own and cross effects
when two products are advertising at the same time: if demand for both products
increases, this can be rationalized by strong effects of own advertising and weak
business-stealing of rival advertising or weak own effects and weak spillovers of rival
advertising. This necessitates having two instruments to separately identify own and
cross effects.3 In the case of depression treatment, however, therapists are typically
sole proprietorships that do little mass advertising. Thus, the only products that
are advertised on TV are antidepressants, which significantly simplifies the problem.
To alleviate concerns about the endogeneity of drug advertising, I use a cost-based
instrumental variable.
I use two main sources of data. Individual-level panel data of treatment choices,
prices, and patient demographics come from the Truven Health Marketscan® Com-
mercial Claims and Encounters Database for the period 2008–2010. The Kantar
Media Ad$pender database provides monthly advertising expenditures and counts of
national and local TV ads for antidepressants.
3In general, one needs at least as many instruments as endogenous variables. I consider the effect
of aggregate branded antidepressant advertising on demand for generic drugs, branded drugs, and
therapy, and need a single instrumental variable. With more instruments, it is possible to study own
and cross effects for each product. Shapiro (2018) and Sinkinson and Starc (2019) are two papers
that successfully estimate business-stealing and spillover effects at the product level.
3
My model allows for complementarity as well as time-invariant and time-varying
unobserved preferences that can be correlated across products. It extends Gentzkow
(2007) by allowing for multiple markets and time periods and accommodating es-
timation of own and spillover advertising effects using linear instrumental variable
methods. To estimate the model, I follow an approach that combines individual and
market-level data similar to the one in Berry et al. (2004) (micro-BLP) and Goolsbee
and Petrin (2004).4 Estimation proceeds in two stages. The first estimates the pa-
rameters on individual-specific observables and the distributions of the unobservables
using maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) while “concentrating out” bundle-market-
time fixed effects.5 I assume that the time-varying health shocks follow a Markov chain
and use a technique from the literature on Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) to signifi-
cantly simplify the calculation of the likelihood. I then use simulation to approximate
integrals over the time-invariant unobserved preferences. Because advertising effects
are not separately identified from the bundle-market-time fixed effects, the second
stage of the estimation projects the recovered fixed effects on ads and market and
time effects. To estimate the causal effect of advertising on demand for generic drugs,
branded drugs, and psychotherapy, I use the average price of a 30-second TV ad spot,
adjusted for ratings, as an instrument.
The results indicate that antidepressants and psychotherapy are substitutes on
average, although there is substantial variation across time and space. The degree of
substitutability increases slightly over time. In some markets, drugs and therapy are
4To avoid the estimation problem arising from the presence of observed zero market shares, I
adopt a Bayesian procedure similar to the one in Li (2019).
5“Bundle” is defined as any single- or multiproduct depression treatment option.
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complements.
The fact that drugs and therapy are substitutes would imply that, in the ab-
sence of spillovers, an increase in antidepressant advertising decreases demand for
psychotherapy. However, the results show that there are strong advertising spillovers
that make the net effect of drug ads on demand for therapy positive: on average, a 10
percent increase in advertising leads to a 0.093 percent increase in demand for ther-
apy. The same change in advertising also leads to a 0.050 percent positive spillover
on demand for generics and a 0.076 increase in demand for branded drugs.
The conclusions depend critically on allowing for advertising spillovers and flexi-
ble unobserved heterogeneity. Assuming that drug advertising only affects the utility
of antidepressants implies that its effect on therapy is negative. Not allowing for
correlated preferences leads to the erroneous conclusion that drugs and therapy are
complements on average, but has a relatively small effect on the demand elasticity
with respect to advertising. Assuming that the time-varying unobservables are un-
correlated across products also leads to estimates that suggest that the products are
complements, and results in much larger demand elasticity with respect to advertis-
ing.
The paper contributes to two strands of economic literature: on the effects of
prescription drug advertising and on discrete-choice models with complementarity.
Using TV market borders as a source of exogenous variation in advertising expo-
sure, Shapiro (2019) estimates that antidepressant ads increase depression treatment
initiation and improve labor market outcomes by lowering absenteeism. He finds a
positive but insignificant effect of drug ads on the use of therapy. Although seemingly
5
contradictory to my findings, this result may be due to the fact that most counties
at TV market borders are rural and have few psychotherapy providers.6
A few papers find that DTC ads for one drug can have spillover effects on other
drugs, but they do not consider the effects on non-drug treatments. Shapiro (2018)
uses the TV market border strategy to establish that antidepressant TV ads have
a spillover effect on demand for rival products and strong market expansion effect
for the category of antidepressant drugs as a whole. Sinkinson and Starc (2019) use
the variation in TV advertising of anticholesterol drugs induced by the U.S. election
cycle and a regulatory action to find that branded drug ads steal share from other
advertising branded drugs but have a spillover effects on non-advertised drugs and
market expansion effect on the product category overall.
Other papers have documented that direct-to-consumer advertising can encourage
an initial doctor visit or treatment initiation, which is a possible channel for the
spillover effect that I find (Hosken and Wendling, 2013; Jayawardhana, 2013; Iizuka
and Jin, 2005). Few papers have addressed the complementarity or substitutability of
antidepressants and psychotherapy. Berndt et al. (1997) find that higher copayments
for therapy are associated with higher use of antidepressants, suggesting that the two
treatment options are substitutes. Butikofer et al. (2019) explore the effects of the
2007 FDA black box warnings on antidepressants and find that they led to a decline in
use of antidepressants and psychotherapy, which is consistent with complementarity.
I also contribute to the literature on discrete-choice demand models with comple-
6Ellis et al. (2009) document that rural, low-income counties have the lowest number of mental
health professionals per capita.
6
mentarity. In a study of the welfare effects of the entry of the online version of The
Washington Post, Gentzkow (2007) estimates a model with complementarity and un-
observed correlated preferences and establishes the conditions under which the model
is identified. I extend his estimation procedure and build on his identification results
by addressing the identification challenge that arises if time-varying shocks are cor-
related across products. Other papers that employ discrete-choice demand models
that allow for complementarity are Ershov et al. (2018), Grzybowski and Verboven
(2016), Song et al. (2017), and Wakamori (2015).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides background
information about depression, its treatment options, and advertising. Section 1.3
describes the data used in the paper. Section 1.4 develops the demand model and
discusses the identification challenges, while Section 1.5 explains in detail how I take
the model to data. Section 1.6 interprets the results of the estimation, and Section
1.7 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Setting
Depression is a mental health disorder characterized by a variety of symptoms includ-
ing feelings of deep sadness, loss of interest in activities previously enjoyed, suicidal
thoughts, and bodily and cognitive changes that affect everyday functioning. De-
pending on the severity and duration of the symptoms, it can be diagnosed as major
depressive disorder (MDD), persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia), or “other” de-
7
pressive disorder.7 Depression affects roughly 10% of the adult U.S. population in any
12-month period.8 In addition to personal suffering, it exacts a substantial economic
toll. Greenberg et al. (2015) find that in 2010 the incremental economic cost of major
depression was $210.5 billion, including $99 billion in direct medical costs, $9.5 billion
in suicide costs, and $102 billion in workplace costs.
There are two main treatment options for depression: pharmacotherapy and psy-
chotherapy. Pharmacotherapy involves the use of prescription drugs, called antide-
pressants, that target chemicals in the brain that control mood and stress. While
antidepressants can improve the symptoms of depression, they often have undesirable
side effects. Psychotherapy, or talk therapy, encompasses a variety treatment tech-
niques that can be administered by a psychiatrist, psychologist, psychiatric nurse, or
a social worker. The most widely used are cognitive-behavioral, interpersonal, and
problem-solving therapies. The goal of these treatments is to help patients change
negative thinking patterns, identify factors in their lives that contribute to their de-
pression, and react better to stress.
The medical literature provides evidence that both antidepressants and psychother-
apy can be effective in treating depression (Cuijpers et al., 2009; DeRubeis et al., 2008;
Friedman et al., 2006). For mild to moderate depression, either treatment option can
achieve the desired results (Croghan et al., 1998). As the severity of the disorder in-
7American Psychiatric Association (2013). The “other” depressive disorder category includes
cases that meet some but not all criteria for any disorder in the depression category.
8Prevalence estimates vary based on data source and criteria used. Brody et al. (2018) report a
12-month prevalence of MDD of 8.1% for the period 2013-2016, which is in line with the prevalence
from 2007 to 2012. National Institute of Mental Health (2017) reports 12-month prevalence of
dysthymia of 1.5%. Prevalence rates of other depressive disorders are not available either because
of data limitations or because it is often incorporated into a broader definition of depression.
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creases, treatment guidelines encourage the use of both antidepressants and therapy
(Silverman et al., 2015; Crismon et al., 1999). There is some evidence that drugs and
therapy work better together. However, the evidence is not sufficient to conclude that
they are complements in the health production function, in the sense that using one
increases the incremental benefit of using the other.
While both antidepressants and psychotherapy are effective treatments for de-
pression, only antidepressants are advertised on TV. Since 1997, when regulations
regarding prescription drug advertising on television were relaxed, pharmaceutical
companies have increased their TV ad expenditure significantly. Between 1998 and
2009 ad expenditure increased from $1.2 to $4.5 billion. This type of advertising
directly to patients has attracted a lot of controversy. Arguments in favor of DTCA
claim that it informs patients about existing treatment options, encourages them to
contact a health care provider, reduces stigma associated with certain conditions,
improves adherence to prescribed treatment, and encourages competition between
pharmaceutical companies. The arguments against are that ads misinform or present
a partial picture of the benefits and risks of the advertised drug, overemphasize drug
treatment at the expense of alternative options, encourage inappropriate prescribing,
and increase drug prices. As a result, policy makers have proposed a variety of actions
toward prescription drug DTCA including an outright ban, removing its preferential
treatment in corporate taxes, or stronger regulation.
In the context of depression treatment, psychologists have observed that the share
of people diagnosed with depression who use psychotherapy has declined at the ex-
pense of antidepressants. Nordbal (2010) notes that between 1997 and 2008 30 percent
9
fewer patients received psychotherapy. While there could be multiple reasons for the
decline, including introduction of antidepressants with fewer side effects, changing
preferences and treatment styles, increased share of health maintenance organiza-
tions that put limits on the amount of therapy patients can receive, one of the alleged
reasons for the decline is antidepressant DTC advertising. The purpose of this paper
is to shed some light on these claims.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 TV Advertising Data
Advertising data come from Kantar Media’s Ad$pender database. This data source
keeps track of advertising expenditures for more than three million products through
multiple marketing media, including television, radio, newspapers, magazines, out-
door, and online. For TV advertising, it provides monthly-level dollar expenditure
and number of 30-second advertising segments (or slots). The data are available both
at the national (network and cable TV) and local (spot TV) level. Local TV advertis-
ing is available for the 101 largest designated market areas (DMAs), the geographical
definitions of TV markets.
The total ad expenditure on the class of antidepressant drugs for the 2008–2010
period is $655 million.9 In stark contrast to antidepressants, psychotherapy is not
9The biggest spenders are Cymbalta, Pristiq, Effexor, Abilify, and Seroquel. Abilify and Seroquel
are antipsychotics that were later approved for the treatment of depression as well. I include their ad




Figure 1.1: Antidepressant TV Advertising Intensity, National and Local
Notes: Advertising expenditures per 100 TV households for antidepressant prescription drugs at the
national level (dashed line) and at the local level for each of the 270 MSAs (solid lines).
To combine national and local ads into a single measurement of advertising in-
tensity, I calculate the ad expenditure per 100 households with a TV set.11 Total
ad intensity in a DMA is the sum of national ad expenditure divided by the number
of TV households nationwide (in hundreds) and local ad expenditure divided by the
number of TV households in the local market. This is the variable I use for advertising
throughout this paper. Figure 1.1 shows national and local advertising for the period
of interest. There is very little advertising activity in 2008, but it picks up in 2009
and 2010. Although national ad intensity is higher for most of the time period, there
10The closest category is “Mental Health & Chemical Dependency Clinics,” which is predominantly
composed of substance abuse clinics and rehabilitation centers. While some of them may provide
treatment for depression, including psychotherapy, the focus of the ads is most likely on substance
abuse. Furthermore, the total ad expenditure for this category is only 3% of the ad expenditure on
antidepressants.
11Number of TV households is the unit that ratings company Nielsen often uses in its market size
calculations. As of 2010, the United States had a population of 309 million and 115 million TV
households for a 2.7 conversion factor from dollars per capita to dollars per TV household.
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is substantial variation at the local level, which makes the estimation of advertising
effects possible.
1.3.2 Medical and Prescription Drug Claims Data
Data on patient demographics, diagnoses, medical and prescription drug claims, and
prices come from the Marketscan Commercial Claims and Encounters Database,
which tracks individuals enrolled in employer-provided insurance plans from a conve-
nience sample of large companies. The data cover 395 metropolitan statistical areas
(MSAs) for the years 2008 through 2010. Because I am interested in the effect of
advertising, I use only the 270 MSAs that can be matched to the 101 DMAs in the
Ad$pender dataset.12
From the available data, I select individuals who were continuously enrolled for
the full three-year period and had complete insurance plan type and demographic
information. My sample includes only covered employees because employment infor-
mation for spouses and dependents is unavailable.13 I further subset the sample to
individuals 18 years of age or older as of January 2008 who were not pregnant dur-
ing the time period because depression treatment patterns for these subgroups are
different.
Table 1.1 presents a summary of the demographic information for the 2,565,016
individuals that are in the final sample. There is a mixture of salaried and hourly,
12DMAs are typically centered at large MSA but may include nearby smaller MSAs. For example,
the Dallas DMA includes the Dallas-Plano-Irving and Fort Worth-Arlington MSAs.
13Depression prevalence and treatment is different among the employed and unemployed. By
limiting the analysis to employed individuals I avoid introducing bias from mixing in potentially
unemployed individuals at the expense of the generalizability of the findings.
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union and non-union employees, most of whom are full-time. 44.5% are female.
The average age is 44.6 years. Preferred provider organization (PPO) is the most
widely used type of health insurance plan, followed by health maintenance organiza-
tion (HMO), point-of-service (POS), and consumer-driven and high deductible health
plans (CDHP/HDHP). The sample is geographically representative at the region level.
Table 1.1: Demographics
% %
Female 44.5 Northeast 15.96
Midwest 21.05
Age Group 18-24 3.03 South 37.63
Age Group 25-34 16.76 West 25.36
Age Group 35-44 26.27
Age Group 45-54 32.74 Hourly 27.60
Age Group 55-64 21.20 Salaried 32.16
HMO 27.40 Non-Union 50.49
POS 15.51 Union 18.72
PPO 50.82
CDHP/HDHP 6.28 Full-Time 87.01
Note: Based on 2,565,016 covered individuals. HMO = "Health Maintenance Organization",
POS = "Point of service", PPO = "Preferred Provider Organization", CDHP = "Consumer
Driven Health Plan", HDHP = "High Deductible Health Plan". Employees can be salaried,
hourly, or unknown; union, non-union, or unknown; full-time, early retiree, part-time, or other.
Even though antidepressants and psychotherapy can treat a variety of conditions,
the focus of this paper is on their use in treating depression. For this reason, I iden-
tify individuals diagnosed with three types of depression—major depressive disorder
(MDD), dysthymia, and “other” depression—and analyze their choice of depression
treatment.14 Table 1.2 summarizes the share of the sample that diagnosed with each
14Based on the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Edition, Clinical Modifications
classification system, I use codes 296.2 and 296.3 for MDD, code 300.4 for dysthymia, codes 309.0,
309.1 (brief and prolonged depressive reaction), and 311 (depression not elsewhere classified) as
other depression. I exclude individuals with comorbid schizophrenia, psychotic depression, or bipolar
disorder because both the symptoms of and treatments for these conditions differ substantially from
those for depression.
13
disorder from 2008 to 2010. Overall, between 4.5% and 5.0% were diagnosed with
depression in any given year. This is not inconsistent with an overall depression
prevalence of 10% because around one half of depression cases go undiagnosed.
Table 1.2: Depression Diagnosis Percentages by Year
2008 2009 2010
Major Depressive Disorder 2.04 2.20 2.29
Dysthymia 0.73 0.77 0.79
Depression-Other 1.70 1.88 1.97
Total (any depression) 4.46 4.85 5.06
Note: Based on 2,565,016 covered individuals. All numbers are percentages. Depression-Other
includes depression not elsewhere classified and brief and prolonged depressive reaction.
I assume that each individual makes treatment decisions monthly. For each month,
I record whether the individual chose an antidepressant, therapy, both, or neither.
Because I am examining the effect of advertising at the category level, I aggregate
individual antidepressants into two broad categories: branded and generic.15 If a
90-day supply of a drug was chosen, I assume that it was consumed from the month
of purchase until the month the supply was exhausted. For psychoherapy, I combine
individual, family, and group sessions into one good.
Figure 1.2 shows the share of all individuals that choose generics, branded drug,
and therapy from January 2008 to December 2010. The use of generics increases
steadily over the period; at a slower, pace the use of therapy does too. The share
of branded drugs is relatively stable for most of the time period until it falls in the
second half of 2010.16 There seems to be a sharp increase in the use of both branded
15Only branded antidepressants advertise on TV. Once a generic version of a drug becomes avail-
able, the manufacturer of the branded version almost always stops advertising because its market
share drops sharply. Ellison and Ellison (2011) find evidence that firms strategically decrease ad-
vertising before patent expiration to delay generic entry.
16This is when generic Effexor XR enters the market.
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and generic antidepressants in the first three months of the sample. However, this
is likely because of 90-day drug supplies purchased in October through December
2007, prior to the beginning of the available data. To avoid understating demand for
antidepressants from January to March 2008, I exclude these months from further
analysis.
Figure 1.2: Depression Treatment Product Shares out of All Insured
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Table 1.3: Average OOP Prices for Antidepressants and Psychotherapy by Insurance
Type
2008 2009 2010
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Health Maintenance Organization Plan
Generic Antidepressants 6.98 2.72 6.61 2.91 6.09 2.50
Branded Antidepressants 26.81 9.76 28.19 9.12 30.13 12.68
Psychotherapy 19.70 10.26 19.88 12.13 22.49 11.88
Point of Service Plan
Generic Antidepressants 6.85 2.05 6.98 2.51 6.61 2.20
Branded Antidepressants 24.60 7.84 24.82 8.47 25.16 12.16
Psychotherapy 31.56 18.75 34.01 22.14 33.76 17.62
Preferred Provider Organization Plan
Generic Antidepressants 7.09 1.81 7.01 1.76 6.39 1.50
Branded Antidepressants 26.43 6.49 26.97 6.34 28.60 7.28
Psychotherapy 34.56 18.17 34.15 16.12 34.13 11.95
Consumer Driven/High Deductible Health Plan
Generic Antidepressants 11.26 11.34 11.10 9.97 11.33 8.65
Branded Antidepressants 46.44 35.64 47.25 35.70 51.93 36.59
Psychotherapy 39.53 29.22 38.90 29.87 42.07 27.46
Note: Prices are in USD, per 30-day supply for drugs and per session for psychotherapy.
Table 1.3 summarizes the out-of-pocket (OOP) price variation for branded and
generic antidepressants and psychotherapy. The OOP price is the dollar amount that
the insured patient pays. It may be the full price, if a deductible applies and has
not been reached, or just a copay. Because the focus of the paper is on the effect of
advertising at the product category level, I calculate a price for each product category
by averaging the prices of the component products at the month-state-insurance type
level. Table 1.3 shows that the cheapest treatment option is generic drugs, at around
$6-7 per 30-day supply, while branded drugs and psychotherapy are considerably more
expensive, at around $25 per 30-day supply and $30 per session, respectively. There
is considerable variation around these averages based on insurance plan type, market,
and time.
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Table 1.4: Observed and Bayesian Posterior Mean Market Shares
10th 90th Share
Mean SD Min Pctl Median Pctl Max Zeros
# Individuals 9,589.9 16,922.4 130 482 3,201 27,082.5 154,258 0
Observed Market Shares
Outside Option 0.9637 0.0121 0.9226 0.9481 0.9648 0.9780 1 0
Generic Only 0.0196 0.0087 0 0.0095 0.0185 0.0306 0.0622 0.003
Branded Only 0.0083 0.0036 0 0.0044 0.0079 0.0129 0.0308 0.014
Therapy Only 0.0054 0.0037 0 0.0014 0.0048 0.0102 0.0379 0.054
Generic & Therapy 0.0033 0.0026 0 0.0004 0.0028 0.0065 0.0197 0.097
Branded & Therapy 0.0015 0.0011 0 0 0.0014 0.0029 0.0090 0.179
Bayesian Posterior Mean Shares
Outside Option 0.9585 0.0133 0.9066 0.9404 0.9605 0.9738 0.9921 0
Generic Only 0.0202 0.0086 0.002 0.0101 0.0191 0.0314 0.0621 0
Branded Only 0.0090 0.0038 0.0010 0.0049 0.0084 0.0140 0.0368 0
Therapy Only 0.0061 0.0036 0.0004 0.0024 0.0054 0.0108 0.0388 0
Generic & Therapy 0.0040 0.0025 0.0003 0.0017 0.0034 0.0071 0.0203 0
Branded & Therapy 0.0022 0.0013 0.0002 0.0009 0.0019 0.0037 0.0145 0
Notes: Summary statistics based on monthly data for April 2008–December 2010 for 270 MSAs.
“# Individuals” is the number of people covered by the Marketscan data in an MSA. The Bayesian
posterior mean shares are calculated using the Dirichlet-Multinomial model described in Section
1.5.6.
Table 1.4 provides a summary of the shares of each possible treatment choice at
the MSA-month level. The positive shares of combination treatment with generic
or branded drugs and therapy demonstrate that depressed patients can choose more
than one treatment option in a given month. This cannot be the outcome of a
typical discrete-choice model in which the consumer selects only the product that
provides the highest utility. The model needs to be modified to accommodate choosing
multiple alternatives. Furthermore, it is not possible to determine if the products
are complements or substitutes just by looking at the market shares because of the
confounding effect of unobserved correlated preferences. To determine the degree
of complementarity between products and the effect of advertising on demand, I
propose a discrete-choice model that allows for complementarity, spillover effects,
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and unobserved preference heterogeneity.
1.4 Demand Model
Antidepressant advertising can have a positive effect on demand for therapy for two
reasons. It may boost demand for drugs, which will in turn increase demand for
therapy if the two are complements. Alternatively, it may have a spillover effect on
therapy—by encouraging people to go to the doctor, for example—and raise demand
for it even if the products are substitutes.
To determine the impact of advertising through each channel, I frame the patient’s
choice of depression treatment as a discrete-choice demand model. For simplicity, I
assume that there are three treatment options: outside good (no treatment), drugs,
and therapy, j ∈ {0, D, T}. Even though in reality the decision is made by a patient
and a physician, I assume that their incentives are perfectly aligned and they act as
a single decision maker.17 The individual can choose no treatment, either drugs or
therapy alone, or drugs and therapy in combination, c ∈ {0, D, T,DT}. The demand
system is defined by the following indirect utility functions:
ui0t = εi0t
uiDt = δD + βDADt + νiD + ψit + εiDt
uiT t = δT + βTADt + νiT + ψit + εiT t
uiDTt = (δD + δT + Γ) + (βD + βT )ADt + (νiD + νiT ) + 2ψit + εiDTt
(1.1)
17I will call this decision maker an individual or patient for the rest of the paper.
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All indirect utilities are normalized by the utility of the outside option. The mean
utilities, δD and δT , capture the average desirability of drugs and therapy taken
alone. The model allows for time-invariant preferences, νiD and νiT , time-varying
health shocks, ψit, and idiosyncratic errors, εict. Drug advertising, ADt, enters the
utility of both drugs and therapy.18 A positive coefficient on advertising in the util-
ity of therapy indicates a spillover effect (in utility); a negative coefficient—business
stealing. Spillovers can arise if drug ads encourage patients to see their doctor and
they decide to take therapy, possibly in combination with drugs, to treat their de-
pression. A business-stealing effect is possible if advertising convinces patients that
antidepressants are all they need and discourages them from taking therapy.19
The complementarity parameter, Γ, captures the extent to which drugs and ther-
apy work better in combination than on their own. More precisely, Γ is the amount
by which the added utility of taking one treatment option changes when the other is
taken as well, on average over the idiosyncratic errors εict:
Γ = Eε[(uiDTt − uiDt)− (uiT t − ui0t)] (1.2)
Complementarity can arise if drugs and therapy treat depression better together than
separately or if patients perceive them to do so. If this parameter tends to negative
18The available data do not allow me to distinguish between persuasive and informative effects of
advertising, so I remain agnostic as to which one is present here. Ackerberg (2001) and Ackerberg
(2003) provide a reduced-form and a structural approach to identifying informative and persuasive
advertising.
19In a typical discrete-choice model with substitutes only, a business-stealing effect is present even
if drug advertising does not affect the indirect utility of therapy. In a model with complementarity,
however, if the products are complements, business-stealing is possible only if drug advertising enters
the indirect utility of therapy.
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infinity, the drug-therapy bundle is never chosen and the model becomes a traditional
discrete-choice model with strict substitutes. Gentzkow (2007) proves that in this
type of model if Γ > 0, the products are complements under the usual definition of
complementarity, i.e. demand for one increases when the price of the other decreases
(or its utility increases).20
Many of the factors involved in the choice of depression treatment are unobserv-
able to the econometrician. Time-invariant unobserved preferences are captured by
νiD and νiT . They may reflect patient attitudes towards the two treatment options
that have nothing to do with how effective they are together. If individuals either
dislike antidepressants but like psychotherapy (the “hippie” type) or like drugs but not
therapy (the “pill-lover” type), these preferences will be negatively correlated in the
population. If people either like both or neither, then the correlation in unobserved
preferences will be positive.
Another unobservable variable is whether someone is depressed. Individuals go
in and out of depression over time but do not always get treatment when they are
depressed. While it is reasonable to infer that someone is depressed if they are
diagnosed with depression and are taking antidepressants or therapy, it is unclear
what their mental health state is if they are not diagnosed or getting treatment. This
time-varying, potentially serially correlated, health shock unobservable is embodied
by ψit. When it is in its “depressed” state, it lifts demand for all inside goods. Thus,
it is correlated across products.
20Products are substitutes or independent if Γ < 0 or Γ = 0, respectively. See Samuelson (1974)
for a comprehensive discussion of various definitions of complementarity.
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1.4.1 Complementarity and Correlated Preferences
The fundamental identification problem in this model is that a large drug-therapy
market share can be explained by complementarity between the products or by pos-
itively correlated unobserved preferences. Gentzkow (2007) proposes two solutions:
an excluded variable that shifts the indirect utility of one product but not the other,
and panel data.
The intuition behind the excluded variable approach is simple. If a variable that
affects the utility of drugs but not therapy, such as the price of drugs, increases
exogenously and demand for psychotherapy decreases, then the two products are
complements. With Γ identified, the correlation in preferences is pinned down by the
observed shares for each possible treatment choice in the market.
Identification through panel data exploits within-patient treatment shares. As-
suming that the εict errors are iid extreme value type-1 and integrating them out, it
is straightforward to show that the probability of choosing the bundle relative to the
product of the probabilities of choosing each product alone or in combination is:
siDTt(νi, ψit)[
siDt(νi, ψit) + siDTt(νi, ψit)
][
siT t(νi, ψit) + siDTt(νi, ψit)
]

> 1 if Γ > 0
= 1 if Γ = 0
< 1 if Γ < 0
(1.3)
where sict(νi, ψit) is an individual’s probability of choosing c conditional on the pa-
rameters of the model and the particular values of the unobservables νi = (νiD, νiT )
and ψit. If products are complements, a patient consumes the drug-therapy bundle
21
relatively more often.21 Given a long enough panel and time-varying errors that are
not correlated across products, it is possible to identify complementarity even with
no variation in an excluded variable.
1.4.2 Complementarity and Health Shocks
The crucial assumption in the panel data identification approach is that the time-
varying shocks are independent across products. If they are not and that is ignored,
the correlation in the shocks will be mistaken for complementarity. The situation is
analogous to ignoring correlated unobserved preferences in a cross-sectional setting,
in which case the correlation is also loaded onto complementarity.
Table 1.5 provides an example of the problem that unobserved health shocks can
create. The health shock can take two values, “high” and “low,” and the products are
independent. If it were possible to observe the value of the health shocks and if the
sequence of choices were long enough, I would be able to calculate the individual-
specific ratio in (1.3) and conclude that the products are independent. However, the
health shock is unobservable. If I calculate the ratio in (1.3) based on all observable
data for an individual, I will incorrectly conclude that the products are complements.
21If Dit is the event that patient i chooses drugs alone or in combination with therapy at time t,
and if Tit is defined similarly for therapy, I can rearrange equation (1.3) as Cov(Dit, Tit|νi, ψit) =
Eε(Dit ∩ Tit)−Eε(Dit)Eε(Tit) = siDT − (siD + siDT )(siT + siDT ) > 0 if Γ > 0. Thus, an equivalent
way to express the result in (1.3) is that the within-individual covariance of the events of choosing
drugs and therapy is positive.
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Table 1.5: Identification Challenge with Unobserved Time-Varying Health Shocks
ψit siDT SiD SiT siDT/(SiDSiT )
Low 0.04 0.20 0.20 1





High) 0.10 0.30 0.30 10/9 > 1
Note: siDT , SiD = siD + siDT , and SiT = siT + siDT are individual-specific shares of observed
choices over time, either conditional on a value of the health shock (first two rows) or not (last
row). The last row assumes the number of periods in which the health shock, ψit, is low and
high are equal.
To avoid this pitfall, I allow for time-varying unobservable health shocks, ψit, that
are correlated across products.22 Getting the distributional assumptions for these
shocks is important and puts a caveat to using panel data for identification of com-
plementarity. This puts a greater burden on the excluded variables for identification.
1.4.3 Advertising Spillovers
The model is simplified substantially by the fact that antidepressants are advertised
on TV but psychotherapy is not. This means that there is only one potentially
endogenous advertising variable, and a single instrumental variable will be sufficient
to address this problem. As long as complementarity and unobserved preferences are
separately identified using excluded variables and panel data, it is straightforward to
use an instrument that induces exogenous variation in advertising to determine the
impact of drug ads on demand for drugs, therapy, and the drugs-therapy bundle.
22Gentzkow (2007) includes a news shock, τit, in the empirical specification of his model. He




I generalize the model to handle more than two treatment options and more than one
market, specify covariates, and parameterize the distributions of the error terms. I
then use the fully specified model to derive its likelihood function. Following Goolsbee
and Petrin (2004), estimation proceeds in two stages. The first stage uses maximum
simulated likelihood (MSL) to estimate the coefficients on individual-specific variables
and the parameters governing the distributions of the unobservables. Bundle-market-
time fixed effects are “concentrated out” as in Berry et al. (2004) and Goolsbee and
Petrin (2004), which eases the computational burden substantially. The second stage
uses a two-stage least squares regression of the recovered fixed effects to estimate the
causal effect of advertising.
1.5.1 Generalized Model
In month t, individual i, who lives in metropolitan statistical area (MSA) m, chooses
a depression treatment option from among no treatment, generic antidepressants,
branded antidepressants, and therapy, j ∈ {0, G,B, T}. The possible choices are
all single- and multiproduct bundles except the ones combining branded and generic
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drugs, c ∈ {0, G,B, T,GT,BT}.23 The base utility from a single product j is:
ūijmt = δjm + δjt + βjABmt + ξjmt︸ ︷︷ ︸
δjmt
−αPijt + X̄itθ̄j︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xijtθj
+ψit + νij (1.4)
= δjmt + Xijtθj + νij + ψit
The base utility consists of two parts: market- and individual-specific. Product mean
utility may vary by market and time (δjm, δjt) to allow for different treatment styles
and changing preferences. Branded antidepressants are the only product advertised
on TV. Their advertising, ABmt, can have a direct effect on branded drugs (βB) and a
business-stealing or spillover effect on generics and therapy (βG and βT ). Market-level
demand shocks unobserved to the econometrician, ξjmt, may affect pharmaceutical
companies’ decision how much to advertise in a given market and time period, making
advertising potentially endogenous.
Among the individual-specific components of base utility, OOP price, Pijt, varies
based on the type of insurance plan. Demographics (age, sex, insurance plan type,
employment type, diagnosis; X̄it) can affect each product differently (θ̄j). For exam-
ple, women may have different preferences for drugs and therapy than men.
Individual decisions are also affected by unobservable factors: correlated prefer-
ences (νij) and health shocks (ψit).I assume that the time-invariant unobserved prefer-
ences are distributed multivariate normal with zero mean and unrestricted covariance
matrix, νi ∼ MVN(0,Σ), where νi = (νiG, νiB, νiT )′ and Σ is a 3-by-3 symmetric
23Taking more than one antidepressant at a time is strongly discouraged because of possible








−∞ if healthy (H)
0 if depressed (U)
Healthy individuals have no demand for depression treatment and never purchase
any. Depressed individuals, on the other hand, choose their treatment based on the
indirect utility of all possible choices. This way of modeling is convenient for three
reasons: it is parsimonious; it does not require making arbitrary decisions on which
individuals to include in the analysis and for what length of time; and it captures
the idea that an individual that does not consume depression treatment can be either
depressed or healthy.
The first-order assumption means that the distribution of ψit depends only on its
value in the previous period.25 Thus, the dynamics of ψit can be described by a 2-by-2
24All unobserved preferences, νij , are relative to the preference for the outside option. All elements
of Σ are normalized by variance and covariance terms of the outside option.
25This simplifying assumption makes the model a lot more tractable and allows me to focus on
the estimation of complementarity and advertising effects while still acknowledging the transitory





Hit−1 πHH 1− πHH
Uit−1 1− πUU πUU

The first row of the matrix gives the probability that the health shock is in state H
(πHH) or state U (1−πHH), given that it was in state H in the previous period. The
second row provides the analogous probabilities if the previous state was U .
To complete the specification of the health shock, I need to specify the probabilities
that it is in each state in the initial period. For simplicity, I assume that the Markov
chain is at its stationary (or long-run) distribution for each individual.27 Thus, the
initial-period distribution is πH = (1− πUU)/(2− πUU − πHH) and πU = 1− πH .
With the distributions of the unobservables specified, the conditional indirect
26A matrix is row-stochastic if the elements of each row are between 0 and 1 and sum to 1.
27This assumption is one way to deal with the initial conditions problem, but is likely too strong.
Fortunately, the simplification in estimation that the Markov chain health shock provides does
not depend on it. In future versions of this paper, I plan to relax it by modeling the initial-
state probabilities as a function of initial-period observables, as in Heckman (1981), or by using a
subsample of patients who can reasonably be assumed to be healthy initially, as in Dickstein (2018).
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utility function for each bundle is defined as:28
ui0mt = εi0mt


























= δcmt + Xictθc + νic + 2ψit + εicmt
For each bundle, I include idiosyncratic extreme value type-1 error terms, εicmt, that
are independent across patients, products, markets, and time periods.29 They help
rationalize the observed choices and provide closed-form choice probabilities.
I also allow the degree of complementarity to be different for generic drugs and
therapy and branded drugs and therapy. Given the restrictions imposed, the comple-
mentarity for each market and time period, averaged over the εicmt’s, is:
Γcmt = δcmt −
∑
j∈c
δjmt for c ∈ {GT,BT} (1.6)
It is necessary to allow complementarity to vary by market and month to fit the
observed market shares. Forcing a single average complementarity is easily rejected
28With a slight abuse of notation, I use c to denote a particular choice (singleton or multi-product
bundle) and the set of products that the choice contains.
29The scale parameter of the εicmt terms is set to 1, implying a variance of π
2
6 ≈ 1.64, to identify




This version of the model allows complementarity to vary by market and time but
not by demographics and unobserved preferences. This restriction can be relaxed by
allowing the parameters on the demographic variables (and unobservable preferences
νic) in the multi-product bundle utility functions to be estimated freely. In practice,
relaxing it increases the likelihood at convergence modestly at the expense of a large
increase in the number of parameters to be estimated.
1.5.2 Deriving the Likelihood Function
With the model fully specified, I can calculate individual-level choice probabilities.
Healthy individuals always choose the outside option:30
sHict =

1 for c = 0
0 for c 6= 0
(1.7)
For depressed patients, I analytically integrate out the idiosyncratic error term and








Unfortunately, the likelihood of an individual’s sequence of choices, even condi-
tional on νi, is not simply the product of individual choice probabilities because the
30Superscripts H and U indicate the value of the patient’s health shock, healthy (ψit = −∞) or
depressed (ψit = 0).
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health shocks ψit are not independent over time. To overcome this problem, I need
to integrate out the full sequence of ψit’s for each patient. In theory, this can be
done analytically using the initial state probability and transition probabilities of the
Markov chain. Let ci = (ci1, . . . , ciT )′ be patient i’s sequence of observed choices,
where T is the last time period, and Θ = (δmt, θ,Σ, πHH , πUU) be the parameters
of the model, where δmt is the vector of all δcmt’s. The likelihood of an individual’s
sequence of choices, conditional on νi, is:31









. . . πψiT −1,ψiT s
ψiT
iciT T (1.9)
where πψi1 is the initial probability of being in state ψi1 for patient i, πψi1,ψi2 is the
transition probability from state ψi1 to ψi2, and sψiticitt is the probability of observed
choice cit in state ψit. The sum is over all possible health shock sequences ψi =
(ψi1, . . . , ψiT )
′.
There are 33 months of data, which implies that there are 233, or about 8 billion,
such sequences. Analytically integrating over all of them by brute force is not feasible.
Simulation is an option, but given the length of the panel it will still be computation-
ally expensive and introduce simulation error. Instead, I take advantage of a result
from the statistical literature on Hidden Markov Models (HMMs).32 Using a recursive
relationship, the analytical expression for an individual’s likelihood function becomes




32The name comes from the fact that the unobservable in this type of models is a Markov chain.
The seminal paper in the literature on HMMs is Baum and Petrie (1966). A popular tutorial
is Rabiner (1989). HMMs have been used heavily in speech recognition and genomic sequencing.
Bartolucci et al. (2014) discuss uses of HMMs in economics.
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much simpler.
Proposition. Let f and g stand for any of the values that the first-order Markov
chain ψit can take. Define the joint probability of the observed sequence up to time t
and the Markov chain being in state f at time t, conditional on all observables Xi,
the unobservable νi, and the parameters of the model Θ:
φit(f) = Pr(ci1, . . . , cit, ψit = f |Θ,Xi, νi)










sficitt for f ∈ {H,U} and t ∈ {2, . . . , T }
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.1.
Corollary. The likelihood of an individual’s sequence of choices can be calculated as:
Li(Θ, νi) = Pr(ci1, . . . , ciT |Θ,Xi, νi)
= φiT (H) + φiT (U) (1.10)
Proof. The result follows directly from the Proposition and the definition of φiT (f):
sum the joint distribution over the different values of ψiT to get the marginal distri-
bution, which is the joint distribution of the observed sequence of actions conditional
on observables, νi, and parameters.
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Deriving the likelihood in this fashion is known as the forward algorithm or α-
pass. The result is not new, although it is typically applied to models in which the
probability of the observed outcome is fixed. In my application, the observed outcome
is the result of a discrete-choice model. Conditioning on observables, the unobservable
preference vector, and additional model parameters, the result still holds.






There is no analytical solution of the integral over νi. I simulate it by drawing R = 100
3-vectors νri distributed multivariate normal with zero mean and covariance matrix









With the individual likelihoods taken care of, it is straightforward to calculate the










33In practice, I take iid draws from a standard normal uij , for each j, and calculate νi = Λui,
where Λ is the lower-triangular Cholesky decomposition of Σ such that ΛΛ′ = Σ. To draw the uij ’s,
I follow the modified Latin hypercube procedure proposed by Hess et al. (2006).
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1.5.3 Estimation Stage 1: Maximum Simulated Likelihood
(MSL)
I estimate the parameters of the model by maximum simulated likelihood.34 Instead
of maximizing over the entire parameter space Θ, however, I “concentrate out” δcmt
and maximize over the rest of the parameters, Θ̃ = (θ,Σ, πHH , πUU) as in Goolsbee
and Petrin (2004).35
For a given Θ̃, I find δcmt’s such that predicted bundle shares, scmt(Θ̃, δmt), match
observed shares, sobscmt, for each market and month. Berry et al. (1995) (BLP) prove
that such δcmt’s exist and are unique. I use Goolsbee and Petrin’s nonlinear least
squares optimization approach to estimate the δcmt’s:36




(scmt(δmt, Θ̃)− sobscmt)2 (1.13)
Given a vector of δcmt’s, I use a nonlinear optimization routine to find Θ̃ that max-
imizes the log simulated likelihood in (1.12). The process of finding Θ̃ and δcmt’s
continues iteratively until convergence.
I calculate predicted market-time shares for each bundle by aggregating individ-
ual choice probabilities. Like calculating the individual-level likelihood, calculating
individual-level choice probabilities involves evaluating a multidimensional integral,
which I do by simulation, re-using the random draws already taken. To integrate over
34As explained in Greene (2012), Chapter 15, MSL estimation is not consistent for a fixed number
of simulation draws. For this reason, I experimented with different numbers of draws and found no
substantial difference in the estimates.
35The same approach, but in GMM estimation, is used in Berry et al. (2004).
36With 270 MSAs, 33 months, and 5 non-empty bundles, there are 44,550 δcmt’s. Goolsbee and
Petrin’s approach converges much faster than BLP’s contraction mapping.
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the unobserved health shock, I need the probabilities of being in one of two health
states. They can be calculated using the initial-state and transition probabilities.
The assumption that the Markov chain is in its steady state, however, implies that
the probabilities of being in each state in each period are governed by the stationary
distribution of the Markov chain: πH and πU = 1−πH . Let Imt be the set of patients
in MSA m and month t and Nmt be the number of these patients. The predicted
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Since the healthy type always chooses the outside option, the market shares can be
rewritten as:
s0mt = π






sU,ri0t , for c = 0 (1.15)







sU,rict , for c 6= 0 (1.16)
OOP price varies at the individual level and estimating its effect is part of the
first stage. Typically, there is concern that price is endogenous because firms set
it based partially on demand factors that are unobservable to the econometrician.
This concern is attenuated here because the model includes bundle-MSA-month fixed
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effects. Any product-level unobservables that vary by MSA-month, which are the
typical source of endogeneity, are captured by the fixed effects. The variation that is
left in the OOP is at the insurance plan type. If individuals choose their insurance
plan based on their overall demand for health care and if demand for depression
treatment is not correlated with that, OOP prices will be exogenous, conditional on
the fixed effects.37
1.5.4 Estimation Stage 2: Two-Stage Least Squares
Since I observe advertising at the market-month level, its effect is not separately
identified from the bundle-market-month fixed effects δcmt. However, following Berry
et al. (2004), I project the estimated δcmt’s on advertising, time, and market fixed
effects to estimate the own and any possible spillover or business-stealing effects of
branded drug advertising. Using the definitions of δcmt from equations 1.4 and 1.5, I
set up the regression:
δcmt = δcm + δct + βcABmt + ξcmt for c ∈ {G,B, T,GT,BT} (1.17)
Like OOP prices, advertising is set strategically by firms and may be correlated
with the error term of the model. To address concerns about endogeneity, I construct
an instrument for advertising by calculating the average price for a 30-second TV
37If patients with unobservably high demand for depression treatment select insurance plans with
lower OOP prices, the estimated coefficient on price will be biased in a negative direction. To address
this issue, I plan to re-estimate the model using individuals on a particular plan type (HMO, PPO,
etc.) and use variation in OOPs at the particular plan level (for patients for whom such information
is available). If different plans of a given type are sufficiently similar, this approach will eliminate
the selection bias.
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ad slot in every DMA and month using all TV advertising data in the Ad$pender
database.38 The proposed instrument is relevant because firms have a downward slop-
ing demand for ads.39 It is also excluded as individual choice of depression treatment
is unlikely to be influenced directly by the price of TV ads. Furthermore, given that
antidepressant ads are a small portion of all TV advertising, depression treatment
demand shocks are unlikely to affect the average price of an ad slot. It is possible,
however, that overall viewership may affect the price of a 30-second ad slot and de-
mand for depression treatment by making a single TV ad more effective by reaching a
wider audience. To deal with this threat to identification, I adjust the average ad price
by dividing it by the Nielsen Television Index (NTI) for national broadcast network
television programs.40 This eliminates the variation in prices due to the seasonality in
ratings and leaves variation driven by competition for the limited number of ad slots
and idiosyncratic factors unrelated to demand for depression treatment. Conditional
on the MSA fixed effects and the year and trend time controls I include in the model,
I claim that the adjusted ad price is exogenous to demand for depression treatment.41
38Such an instrument has been used in Murry (2017) in the study of vertical relationships between
car manufacturers and dealers.
39Whether an increase in the price of an ad will increase or decrease a firm’s advertising expenditure
depends on the elasticity of advertising demand with respect to price of advertising. This effect on
expenditure will be revealed in the first stage regression of advertising intensity on the price of a
30-second slot.
40The NTI index is provided by the Television Bureau of Advertising, Inc., at www.tvb.org.
Because it varies monthly but not across markets, I have to assume that overall TV viewership
moves similarly in different markets across the country. Ideally, I would use a market-specific ratings
index.
41Shapiro (2018) and Sinkinson and Starc (2019) propose alternative identification strategies. I
cannot use Shapiro’s DMA border identification strategy because my demand data is at the MSA,
rather than county, level. While using political advertising is possible, the fact that there is hardly
any antidepressant advertising in 2008, when the bulk of the political advertising occurs, means that
political ads will be a weak instrument at best.
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1.5.5 Identification
As the model is quite complex, it is useful to discuss which moments of the data iden-
tify its parameters given the distributional and functional-form assumptions made.
The Markov transition probabilities are pinned down by the observed probabilities
of switching from no treatment to consuming any depression treatment and vice
versa. The fact that individuals spend long periods with no treatment (because they
are healthy) and long periods under treatment (because depression tends to persist)
implies that the probabilities of remaining in each state are high and the probabilities
of switching are low.
The assumption that healthy individuals do not purchase any depression treatment
provides a lot of identifying power because it implies that anyone taking treatment
must be unhealthy. Thus, an individual’s health state is uncertain only in periods
with no depression treatment. For those periods, the Markov assumption helps put
a probability on being depressed.42
Complementarity is identified by price variation and the within-individual share of
the drug-therapy bundle. If demand for drugs moves in the same direction as demand
for therapy in response to a price change, this implies that the two are complements.
The same conclusion can be drawn if individuals purchase the bundle relatively more
frequently than either product alone.
The coefficients on demographics and prices are identified by the co-variation
of these variables and individual-level choices. If women are more likely to take
42Hidden Markov Models are particularly useful in speech recognition exactly because of the
convenience with which the probability of the unobserved state can be calculated. This “decoding”
step is not necessary in the estimation of my model but is useful in thinking about identification.
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antidepressants but equally likely to go to psychotherapy, then the coefficient on the
drugs-female interaction will be positive while the one on therapy-female interaction
will be zero.
The parameters governing transitions, complementarity, and demographic and
price effects imply certain predicted shares for each bundle in each MSA-month.
The extent to which observed shares deviate from the predicted ones identifies the
correlation in unobserved patient preferences. For example, if within-patient shares
imply that the products are substitutes, but the observed share of the drug-therapy
bundle is larger than what the model predicts, this suggests that preferences are
positively correlated.
The variance of the unobserved preferences (relative to the normalized variance
of the idiosyncratic error term), is identified by the dispersion of purchasing patterns
across patients. The presence of patients who always choose drugs but not therapy
and others who always choose therapy but not drugs suggests that variances are large.
If everyone followed the same treatment plan, the variances would be close to zero.
Finally, the effects of branded antidepressant TV advertising are identified by the
covariance between observed choices and the exogenous variation induced by the cost
instrument. If advertising leads to greater probability of purchasing drugs, alone or
in combination, but not of therapy alone, this implies that there is a positive effect
of advertising on drugs but not on therapy.
Functional form and distributional assumption facilitate the estimation of the
model, but are not crucial for identification. Berry et al. (2013) show that a nonpara-
metric nonseparable demand system is invertible under the “connected substitutes”
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condition. This condition requires that goods are weak gross substitutes and that
there are no groups of goods that substitute only among themselves but not to the
outside good. Because a discrete-choice demand model with complementarity can be
framed as a regular discrete-choice model in which the goods are all possible com-
binations of the available products, the condition is satisfied. Given that demand
is invertible, it is identified in the presence of good instruments. Berry and Haile
(2014) provide conditions under which demand is identified with market-level data,
while Berry and Haile (2010) focus on situations in which individual-level data are
available.43
1.5.6 Zero Observed Market Shares
Table 1.4 shows that the number of people covered by the Marketscan data varies
substantially, with as few as 130 in some MSAs. A prevalence of 10% implies that
in such markets there are about 13 depressed individuals. This makes it likely that
some of the treatment options will not be chosen in some months. Indeed, for the
various bundles this happens in 0.3%–17.9% of all MSA-months. Overall, 21.8% of
all MSA-months have at least one zero share.
Estimating the model requires that there are no bundles with zero observed share
in any market and time period.44 Rather than drop MSA-months with zero shares
43Berry and Haile (2016) provide an accessible overview of the identification arguments made in
the three papers cited above.
44In this model, a zero share implies that for this bundle-MSA-month δcmt approaches negative
infinity, which throws off the estimation procedure. In general, models that involve inverting market
shares, such Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995), or estimating product-market(-time) fixed effects,
such as Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) and Berry et al. (2004), require that there are no zero observed
market shares.
39
and potentially introduce selection bias, I use a Bayesian procedure similar to the one
proposed by Li (2019). Abstracting away from the complexity of the individual-level
discrete-choice model, I assume that observed bundle purchase counts in each market
and time period, Kcmt, are the outcome of a multinomial random variable param-
eterized by the number of individuals, Nmt, and the probabilities for each bundle,
pcmt such that
∑
c pcmt = 1. Instead of using the observed market shares, which is
equivalent to using maximum likelihood to estimate the true underlying probabilities,
I use the posterior means from a Bayesian model. I put a weak and uninformative
Dirichlet prior on pmt, which defines the Dirichlet-Multinomial model:45
Kcmt ∼Multinomial(Nmt,pmt) (1.18)
pmt ∼ Dirichlet(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1.19)
Such models are convenient because the Dirichlet distribution is a conjugate prior
to the multinomial likelihood, which means that the posterior distribution is also









45The Dirichlet distribution is a multivariate generalization of the beta distribution and is suitable
as a prior for probability vectors because it is defined on the unit simplex. The prior is weak because
the hyperparameters (the vector of 1’s) are small in magnitude. It is uninformative because it
implies that vector of multinomial probabilities is equally likely. Both of these characteristics of the
prior allow the observed data to be the main determinant of the posterior distribution. A similar
Dirichlet-Multinomial model has been used in Conlon and Mortimer (2019b) in the empirical study
of diversion ratios.
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The posterior mean is strictly positive, which solves the problem of zero shares
and makes estimation possible without discarding any markets or time periods.
1.6 Results
Even with the use of the forward algorithm to avoid simulating the time-varying health
shocks, the model is computationally challenging. To ease the burden, I estimate it
using a panel spanning 33 months for a random subsample of 13,500 individuals from
the 270 MSAs.
1.6.1 Price, Demographics, Distribution of Unobservables
Table 1.6 contains the results from the first stage of the model. These parameter esti-
mates reflect the preferences of depressed patients. By definition, healthy individuals
do not consume depression treatment.
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Table 1.6: First Stage (MSL) Estimates









Female 0.958*** (0.095) 1.106*** (0.142) 1.134*** (0.134)
Age 0.363*** (0.046) 0.132* (0.08) -0.202*** (0.068)
Age2 -0.174*** (0.051) -0.066 (0.058) -0.144*** (0.041)
HMO 0.277 (0.181) -0.254 (0.205) 1.025*** (0.233)
POS -0.229 (0.198) -0.151 (0.219) 1.456*** (0.223)
PPO 0.518*** (0.161) 1.232*** (0.189) 1.779*** (0.212)
Salaried -0.574*** (0.133) -0.114 (0.206) -1.008*** (0.206)
Hourly -1.099*** (0.126) -0.571*** (0.141) -0.706*** (0.116)
Union 1.148*** (0.144) 0.971*** (0.204) 0.784*** (0.178)
Non-Union 1.079*** (0.125) 1.29*** (0.130) 0.841*** (0.103)
Full-Time -0.347*** (0.117) 0.066 (0.137) -0.668*** (0.101)
MDD 0.487*** (0.066) 0.301** (0.117) 0.335*** (0.102)
Depression-Other 0.662*** (0.078) 1.722*** (0.149) -0.589*** (0.135)
Log-likelihood -31,839.5
Observations 445,500
Notes: Bundle-MSA-month fixed effects included. Demographics are interacted with product
dummies, OOP and OOP interactions are not. For the multiproduct bundles (not shown), the
demographic effects equal the sum of the demographic effects on the component single-product
bundles. OOP prices and age are measured in standard deviations ($24.52 and 10.62 years, re-
spectively) and centered around their means ($26.70 and 44.85 years). Employees can be salaried,
hourly, or unknown; unionized, non-unionized, or unknown; full-time, early retiree, part-time, or
“other.” Depression diagnosis can be major depressive disorder (MDD), dysthymia, or depression-
other. The omitted health insurance type is CDHP/HDHP. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Taking advantage of the individual-level data, I allow the price sensitivity to vary
by demographic characteristics. The base group of individuals seems to dislike higher
prices, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. While men and women
are equally price sensitive, older individuals and those who are salaried or unionized
employees seem less sensitive. This could partially be driven by the fact their younger,
part-time or non-unionized counterparts are likely to have lower income, which I do
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not observe. Strangely, patients diagnosed with major depressive disorder seem to
derive greater utility from higher prices. This result should be taken with a grain of
salt. It is likely driven by the fact that depression severity varies unobservably even
within major depression and more severely depressed patients choose more expensive
treatments.46
In addition to the interaction with price, the type of diagnosis affects choice di-
rectly. Patients with MDD have higher demand for all types of treatments, while
those with other forms of depression are more heavily reliant on antidepressants and
less on psychotherapy compared to patients with dysthymia.47
Women use depression treatment more heavily, which has been documented in the
medical literature. Generic and branded antidepressant use increases at a decreasing
rate until around age 56, whereas therapy use is heaviest among 37-year-olds and
decreases away from this age. Relative to hourly workers, salaried ones use more
antidepressants and slightly less therapy, although both groups use less depression
treatment than workers with unknown status. Unionized and non-unionized workers
use approximately the same amount of depression treatments, which is more than
workers with unknown unionization status. Full-time employees fill fewer generic
antidepressant prescriptions and take less psychotherapy compared to (mostly) early
retirees.
Finally, PPO plans are associated with the highest level of depression treatment
usage, although the results cannot tell if this is due to selection or because PPO
46To address this problem, I plan to use more granular diagnosis information, which I am currently
aggregating over.
47The current version of the model assumes that the degree of complementarity does not depend
on the type of diagnosis. This can be relaxed in future versions.
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plans have more generous coverage. HMO, POS, and CDHP/HDHP plans have ap-
proximately the same utilization of generic and branded antidepressants. In terms of
psychotherapy use, PPO is the highest, followed by POS, HMO, and CDHP/HDHP
plans. This can be explained partially by the ease with which patients can access
therapists under each plan—PPO plans do not require a referral from a primary care
physician, whereas POS and HMO plans do.
Table 1.7: Covariance/Correlation Matrix of Unobserved Preferences
Generic Branded Therapy
Generic 8.64 0.34 0.25
Branded 4.06 16.25 0.44
Therapy 2.34 5.51 9.84
Notes: Variance and covariance terms on the main diagonal and below; correlation coef-
ficients—above. All parameter estimates are significant at the 1% significance level.
The estimated covariance matrix of the unobserved preferences for each product,
νij, is in Table 1.7. The variance terms (8.6, 16.3, 9.8 for generics, branded, and
therapy, respectively) are much larger than the normalized variance of the extreme
value type-1 error of 1.64, which suggests that unobservable factors play a much
larger role in the choice of depression treatment than observable characteristics. It
also means that observably similar patients choose radically different treatment plans:
from exclusively pharmacologic to exclusively psychotherapeutic treatment and any-
where in-between. Neither of these results is surprising given how idiosyncratic the
manifestation of depression and the effectiveness of different treatments are.
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Table 1.8: Markov Chain Health Shock Transition
Probabilities and Stationary Distribution






Panel B: Stationary distribution
Healthy Depressed
Long-run share 0.9066 0.0934
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
The positive covariance terms imply that patients tend to either like any two
treatment options or neither. They also suggest that patients see all three treatment
options as somewhat “similar” in the sense that a change in the price of one would
lead to greater substitution to inside bundles than to the outside option compared to
what an IIA logit model would predict.48
The estimated health state transition probabilities, shown in Table 1.8, indicate
that both the healthy and unhealthy states are highly persistent. The probability
of falling into depression, having been healthy the previous month, is 0.18% whereas
the probability of recovery once in a depression is 1.75%. The implied stationary
distribution of healthy and unhealthy people is 90.66% healthy and 9.34% depressed.
The share of depressed is higher than what is actually observed, as reported in Table
1.2, but there is no inconsistency because the former includes both diagnosed and
undiagnosed cases whereas the observed share includes only diagnosed cases. Given
that roughly half of depression cases go undiagnosed, the results are in line with the
48Greater substitution to inside bundles, however, does not necessarily mean that the products
comprising the bundles are substitutes. That is determined by the degree of complementarity.
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medical literature (Williams et al., 2017).
1.6.2 Complementarity
Figure 1.3: Generic-Therapy and Branded-Therapy Complementarity by MSA and
Month
Note: Each point represents a (ΓGTmt,ΓBTmt) pair for a particular MSA-month. The vertical line is
at the mean branded-therapy complementarity (-0.77), the horizontal—at the mean generic-therapy
complementarity (-0.19).
Equation 1.6 defines the market- and time-specific complementarity parameters
for the generic-therapy and branded-therapy combination treatments. Using the es-
timated bundle-MSA-month fixed effects, I calculate the implied complementarities
and plot them in Figure 1.3. If there were a single complementarity parameter for
each multiproduct bundle, the plot would consist of a single point. The wide disper-
sion in the plot suggests that the degree of complementarity varies over markets and
time. The reason for that could be that patients have different preferences, physi-
cians follow different treatment guidelines, or there are idiosyncratic factors that shift
complementarity.
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While both generic and branded antidepressants are substitutes to psychother-
apy on average, there’s substantial variation over product categories, markets, and
time. As indicated by the average complementarity parameters, branded drugs are
more substitutable with therapy (ΓBT = −0.77) than generic drugs (ΓGT = −0.19).
Furthermore, Figure 1.4 reveals the distribution of average (over time periods) com-
plementarity at the MSA level: in 113 out of the 270 MSAs (42%) generic drugs and
therapy are complements; for branded drugs, there are 42 such MSAs (16%).
Figure 1.4: Distribution of Average MSA Complementarity
Figure 1.5 shows that the average complementarity across MSAs decreased over
the 2008–2010 period, which suggests that patients became less likely to take com-
bination treatment over time. If this trend had been going on for a while, it might
partially explain the fall of psychotherapy’s share over time.
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Figure 1.5: Average Generic-Therapy and Branded-Therapy Complementarity Over
Time
1.6.3 Advertising Effects
The first stage of the estimation recovers the bundle-MSA-month fixed effects, which
reveals the average degree of complementarity and its distribution. Advertising ef-
fects, however, are not separately identified from the fixed effects. To estimate the
effects of advertising, I project the estimated δcmt’s on advertising intensity, MSA and
year fixed effects, and a time trend.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) results are presented in Table 1.9. An increase in
advertising intensity is associated with higher utility for branded drugs, lower utility
for generics, and no effect for therapy. Because branded drugs are substitutes with
both generics and therapy, this implies that branded drug TV ads increase demand
for branded drugs overall and decrease it for generics and therapy.
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Table 1.9: Second Stage, OLS Estimates
Generic Branded Therapy G-T Bundle B-T Bundle
δc -2.8545*** -5.8453*** -5.1612*** -8.2096*** -11.7781***
(0.0673) (0.0789) (0.072) (0.0813) (0.0889)
Ads ($/100 TV HH) -0.0026*** 0.0059*** 0.0009 -0.0017** 0.0068***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Time effects Year-Trend Year-Trend Year-Trend Year-Trend Year-Trend
Market FEs MSA MSA MSA MSA MSA
Obs 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. δc is the mean utility for a bundle for the base time period and
MSA. For the multiproduct bundles, the advertising effects equal the sum of the effects on the compo-
nent single-product bundles. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
To address potential endogeneity concerns, I use the average price of a 30-second
TV advertising segment, adjusted for ratings, as an instrument. Panel B of Table 1.10
shows the outcome of the first stage of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure.
The relationship between advertising and the instrument is negative, as expected.
The partial F-statistic of 505 is much larger than conventionally used cutoff points,
indicating that the instrument is strong.
Table 1.10: Second Stage, 2SLS Estimates
Panel A: regression of bundle-MSA-month fixed effects on advertising
Generic Branded Therapy G-T Bundle B-T Bundle
δc -2.8148*** -5.8388*** -5.1303*** -8.139*** -11.7407***
(0.0689) (0.0803) (0.0735) (0.0833) (0.0906)
Ads ($/100 TV HH) 0.0053*** 0.0072*** 0.0071*** 0.0124*** 0.0143***
(0.0025) (0.003) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0033)
Time effects Year-Trend Year-Trend Year-Trend Year-Trend Year-Trend
Market FEs MSA MSA MSA MSA MSA
Obs 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910
Panel B: first stage of instrumental variables regression
Adj Avg Price per Ad -0.0057
Partial F-stat 504.8
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. δc is the mean utility for a bundle for the base time period
and MSA. For the multiproduct bundles, the advertising effects equal the sum of the effects on the
component single-product bundles. The average price per ad is adjusted for TV ratings. ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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The second-stage 2SLS results are in Panel A of Table 1.10.49 The estimates sug-
gest that advertising makes branded drugs more desirable, as in the OLS version.
In the instrumented version of the model, however, there is evidence of advertising
spillovers in utility: advertising significantly increases the utility from generic antide-
pressants and therapy as well. The difference compared to the OLS results suggests
that firms may be advertising more heavily in markets with lower demand, especially
for generics and therapy.
The temptation to interpret the positive advertising coefficients as an indication
that demand for all three products (therapy, generic and branded drugs) increases
in response to higher advertising should be resisted. The overall effect of advertising
depends both on these coefficients and on the degree of complementarity between the
products. Given that generic and branded drugs are substitutes to therapy, if there
were no advertising spillovers in utility but only a positive effect on branded drugs,
an increase in advertising intensity would increase demand for the branded-only and
branded-therapy bundles and decrease demand for the therapy-only, generics-only,
and generics-therapy bundles. Despite the positive effect on the branded-therapy
bundle, the overall effect on demand for therapy would be negative. The presence of
advertising spillovers in utility, however, dampens the substitution away from therapy
and, if the spillover is strong enough, may boost demand for therapy overall.
49I have also estimated the model using three-stage least squares (3SLS), which uses the covariance
in the errors of the equations for each bundle to enhance estimation efficiency. The results are similar,
with slightly smaller standard errors. The downside of 3SLS is that misspecification in one equation
is transferred to the entire system of equations. Because of this, I chose the less efficient but more
robust estimation method.
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Table 1.11: Demand Elasticities with Respect to Advertising
Bundles Elasticity Products Elasticity
Outside Option -0.0053 Outside Option -0.0053
Generic-Only 0.0033 Generic 0.0050
Branded-Only 0.0063 Branded 0.0076
Therapy-Only 0.0061 Therapy 0.0093
Generic-Therapy 0.0147
Branded-Therapy 0.0177
Note: Demand elasticities with respect to branded drug advertising are cal-
culated by averaging individual-level elasticities over patients and time pe-
riods.
Table 1.11 presents the estimated average (over patients and time periods) elas-
ticities for each bundle and each product. They indicate that advertising lifts all
individual inside bundles and, as a result, each product overall. Thus, the advertising
spillovers in utility translate into spillovers in demand as well: even though branded
and generic antidepressants are substitutable with psychotherapy, the overall effect
of advertising is to increase demand for all three of them.
The effect of advertising is positive but modest in magnitude. The estimates
imply that a 10% increase in advertising increases demand for generic drugs, branded
drugs, and therapy by 0.050%, 0.076%, and 0.093%, respectively.50 The share of the
outside option shrinks by 0.053% in response to the same increase in advertising. The
numbers are slightly lower, although largely in line, with other estimates from the
literature.51
50These are contemporaneous effects. Additional specifications suggest that advertising has no
significant lagged effect on branded and generic antidepressants. The advertising effect on psy-
chotherapy, however, persists for an additional month or two.
51Sinkinson and Starc (2019) find that the category of statin drugs expands by 0.13% in response
to a 10% increase in advertising. Shapiro (2018) finds that the outside share in the market for
antidepressants decreases by between 0.08% and 0.23% in response to the same change in advertising.
Caution should be used for these last comparisons since the outside option is defined differently in
Shapiro’s model and mine.
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1.6.4 Importance of Assumptions on the Unobservables
There are three features of the model that are crucial for estimating the correct degree
of complementarity and advertising elasticities: allowing for time-invariant correlated
preferences, time-varying health shocks, and advertising spillovers. I evaluate their
importance by eliminating them from the model one at a time and re-estimating it.
Because advertising is subsumed by the bundle-MSA-month fixed effects, elimi-
nating spillovers does not change the results from the first stage of the estimation.
Thus, the effects of price and demographics on utility, the covariance matrix of the
unobserved preferences, and the Markov transition probabilities remain the same as
in the main specification. It also implies that the average level of complementarity
and the market-time deviations from it are the same as in the main model. The
differences appear in the effect of advertising on utility and especially in the elastic-
ities as shown in Tables 1.16 and 1.17, column (2), in Appendix 1.8.2. The effect of
advertising on branded drugs is somewhat higher than in the main model, although
within a standard deviation from it. The most significant difference, however, is in
the implied elasticities. While the main results suggest that advertising “lifts” all an-
tidepressants and therapy, the model with no spillovers indicates that branded drugs
benefit at the expense of generics, therapy, and the outside option. The results are
driven by the fact that both generics and therapy are substitutes for branded drugs
and even though the branded-therapy bundle benefits from advertising, this effect is
not strong enough to offset the decline in therapy-only and generic-therapy. The fact
that the ad effects on generics and therapy flip in sign underscores the importance of
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allowing for spillovers.
Column (3) in Tables 1.12–1.17 shows the results for a model that allows for ran-
dom coefficients on generics, branded drugs, and therapy but restricts them to be
uncorrelated, while maintaining the other features of the main model. The results
from the MSL estimation are qualitatively similar to those from the main specifica-
tion. The difference in the log-likelihood at convergence is relatively small, which
suggests that allowing for correlated preferences affects the overall fit relatively little.
Most significantly, every single Γcmt is larger than in the baseline model. As a result,
the average level of complementarity increases substantially and implies that therapy
and both types of antidepressants are complements on average. This, however, trans-
lates into relatively modest changes in the estimated average elasticities. In response
to a 10% increase in advertising, demand for generics, branded drugs, and therapy
increases by 0.051%, 0.089%, and 0.097%, which is respectively 2%, 17%, and 4%
higher than the main model.
Finally, column (4) in Tables 1.12–1.17 shows the results from the model in which
there are no health shocks, so that the only time-varying unobservables are the ex-
treme value type-1 error terms, but spillovers and correlated preferences are allowed.
The first stage of the estimation indicates that the correlation in preferences is much
larger than in the main specification. This is expected—the ignored positive corre-
lation in the health shocks is loaded (partially) on the correlation of the unobserved
preferences. The log-likelihood at convergence indicates a significantly worse fit than
the main model. Like ignoring correlation in the time-invariant unobservable prefer-
ences, ignoring time-varying health shocks increases each individual Γcmt, which once
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again leads to the conclusion that drugs and therapy are complements on average.
In this specification, however, there is also a significant increase in the average elas-
ticities—from 6 to 13 times. The reason for this result is that this version of the
model assumes that all individuals in the sample are in the market for depression
treatment whereas the main model estimated a sizeable portion of healthy individu-
als that have no demand for depression treatment. Even though not all individuals
are advertising-marginal, the share that are is much larger. This underscores the
importance of time-varying product-correlated shocks in discrete-choice models with
complementarity that use panel data.
1.7 Conclusion
I study the effect of antidepressant advertising on demand for depression treatment us-
ing a discrete-choice model that allows for complementarity and advertising spillovers.
The model allows for flexible unobserved heterogeneity: time-invariant preferences
and time-varying health shocks, both of which can introduce correlation in utility
across products. To separately identify complementarity from unobserved correlated
preferences, I use panel data on choices and variation in an excluded variable, price.
I estimate the causal effect of advertising by using a cost-based instrument. The
model advances existing discrete-choice models with complementarity by allowing
for advertising spillovers, multiple markets, and endogenous variables; discussing the
threats to identification arising from time-varying, product-correlated unobservables;
and modeling such unobservables in a computationally feasible way.
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The results indicate that branded drug TV advertising increases demand for psy-
chotherapy. This is the outcome of two forces working in opposite directions. First,
drugs and therapy are substitutes, which implies that advertising, which boosts de-
mand for drugs, should decrease demand for therapy. However, advertising has a
spillover effect on the utility of therapy. This spillover effect dominates the substitu-
tion effect for a net positive impact on psychotherapy.
This result has important policy implications. First, providers of psychotherapy,
who feel that antidepressant ads are stealing their patients, need not worry—drug
advertising actually helps them. Second, policymakers that propose banning or cur-
tailing prescription drug ads need to be aware of the unintended consequences of such
actions. Shapiro (2019) shows that antidepressant advertising improves labor market
outcomes and that the benefits far outweigh the costs. This paper sheds additional
light on one of the channels through which the effect occurs.
A direction for future work is to add a supply-side model and study the effects of a
counterfactual ban of prescription drug TV ads. This will require the demand analy-
sis to proceed at the product level, which is possible but will be more computationally
cumbersome. It will also require data on firms detailing, or direct-to-physician adver-
tising, which may be a substitute or complement to direct-to-consumer advertising
for firms.
Another potentially fruitful application of this type of demand model is the study
of the welfare effects of tying and bundling. The effects of these pricing practices
depend both on the degree of complementarity and the correlation and preferences,
which can be estimated with the model I propose.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Proof of the Proposition on Hidden Markov Models
Proposition. Let f and g stand for any of the values that the first-order Markov
chain ψit can take. Define the joint probability of the observed sequence up to time t
and the Markov chain being in state f at time t, conditional on all observables Xi,
the unobservable νi, and the parameters of the model Θ:
φit(f) = Pr(ci1, . . . , cit, ψit = f |Θ,Xi, νi)















= Pr(ψi1 = f)Pr(ci1|ψi1 = f,Θ,Xi, νi)
= Pr(ci1, ψi1 = f |Θ,Xi, νi)
Thus, φit(f) is the joint probability of choosing the observed choice ci1 and being in
health state f at t = 1.
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Pr(ci1, . . . , cit−1, ψit−1 = g|Θ,Xi, νi)×






Pr(ci1, . . . , cit−1, ψit−1 = g, ψit = f |Θ,Xi, νi)
]
sficitt
= Pr(ci1, . . . , cit−1, ψit = f |Θ,Xi, νi)Pr(cit|ψit = f,Θ,Xi, νi)
= Pr(ci1, . . . , cit−1, ψit = f |Θ,Xi, νi)Pr(cit|ψit = f, ci1, . . . , cit−1,Θ,Xi, νi)
= Pr(ci1, . . . , cit−1, cit, ψit = f |Θ,Xi, νi)
Moving from line 2 to 3 is possible because of the first-order Markov assumption.
Moving from line 4 to 5 requires integrating out ψit−1. Moving from line 5 to 6
stems from the assumption that there is no structural dependence in choices—this
assumption, however, is not required for the proof of the proposition and can be
relaxed. The crucial assumption is the first-order Markov assumption.
1.8.2 Alternative Assumptions on the Unobservables
a
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Table 1.12: First Stage (MSL) Estimates - Sensitivities
(1)/(2) (3) (4)
Main/No Spillovers Uncorrelated Preferences No Health Shocks
Est SE Est SE Est SE
OOP -0.206 (0.143) 0.077 (0.141) -0.284*** (0.102)
×MDD 0.721*** (0.083) 1.139*** (0.083) 0.709*** (0.068)
×Depression-Other 0.039 (0.093) -0.034 (0.093) 0.358*** (0.082)
×Female -0.041 (0.101) -0.353*** (0.106) -0.251*** (0.077)
×Age 0.103** (0.048) 0.164*** (0.052) 0.079** (0.038)
×Salaried 0.221 (0.14) 0.002 (0.135) 0.001 (0.091)
×Union 0.283** (0.136) 0.684*** (0.113) -0.22* (0.124)
Demographics×Generic
Female 0.958*** (0.095) 1.169*** (0.139) 1.504*** (0.06)
Age 0.363*** (0.046) 0.502*** (0.063) 0.345*** (0.031)
Age2 -0.174*** (0.051) -0.047 (0.065) 0.222*** (0.032)
HMO 0.277 (0.181) 0.077 (0.19) -0.627*** (0.121)
POS -0.229 (0.198) -0.5** (0.247) -0.86*** (0.13)
PPO 0.518*** (0.161) 0.019 (0.165) -0.057 (0.105)
Salaried -0.574*** (0.133) -0.626*** (0.146) -0.876*** (0.085)
Hourly -1.099*** (0.126) -0.482*** (0.152) -1.424*** (0.089)
Union 1.148*** (0.144) 0.929*** (0.148) 1.132*** (0.104)
Non-Union 1.079*** (0.125) 0.282** (0.119) 0.599*** (0.082)
Full-Time -0.347*** (0.117) -0.512** (0.23) -0.467*** (0.076)
MDD 0.487*** (0.066) 1.022*** (0.065) 2.678*** (0.047)
Depression-Other 0.662*** (0.078) 1.095*** (0.073) 3.489*** (0.066)
Demographics×Branded
Female 1.106*** (0.142) 0.76*** (0.136) 2.942*** (0.108)
Age 0.132* (0.08) -0.355*** (0.076) 0.228*** (0.051)
Age2 -0.066 (0.058) -0.993*** (0.058) -0.057 (0.037)
HMO -0.254 (0.205) 0.062 (0.213) -1.142*** (0.149)
POS -0.151 (0.219) 0.461** (0.229) -0.639*** (0.158)
PPO 1.232*** (0.189) 0.58*** (0.191) 0.931*** (0.131)
Salaried -0.114 (0.206) -1.173*** (0.199) -0.559*** (0.148)
Hourly -0.571*** (0.141) 0.371*** (0.138) -1.046*** (0.101)
Union 0.971*** (0.204) 1.139*** (0.205) 2.419*** (0.161)
Non-Union 1.29*** (0.13) 0.336*** (0.123) 0.821*** (0.092)
Full-Time 0.066 (0.137) -0.262** (0.133) -0.827*** (0.096)
MDD 0.301** (0.117) 1.32*** (0.118) 2.685*** (0.096)
Depression-Other 1.722*** (0.149) 3.04*** (0.156) 4.281*** (0.118)
Demographics×Therapy
Female 1.134*** (0.134) 0.722*** (0.138) 1.616*** (0.098)
Age -0.202*** (0.068) -0.298*** (0.074) -0.483*** (0.049)
Age2 -0.144*** (0.041) -0.36*** (0.044) -0.266*** (0.029)
HMO 1.025*** (0.233) 0.331* (0.193) 0.058 (0.146)
POS 1.456*** (0.223) 1.09*** (0.203) 0.791*** (0.147)
PPO 1.779*** (0.212) 0.893*** (0.182) 0.855*** (0.133)
Salaried -1.008*** (0.206) -0.596*** (0.197) -0.098 (0.129)
Hourly -0.706*** (0.116) 0.268** (0.107) -0.296*** (0.078)
Union 0.784*** (0.178) 0.159 (0.169) 0.044 (0.156)
Non-Union 0.841*** (0.103) -0.366*** (0.102) -0.241*** (0.073)
Full-Time -0.668*** (0.101) -0.465*** (0.109) -1.206*** (0.085)
MDD 0.335*** (0.102) 0.267*** (0.1) 2.042*** (0.086)
Depression-Other -0.589*** (0.135) -0.353*** (0.128) 0.695*** (0.107)
Log-likelihood -31,839.5 -31,927.2 -37,952.4
Observations 445,500 445,500 445,500
Notes: Bundle-MSA-month fixed effects included. Demographics are interacted with product dum-
mies, OOP and OOP interactions are not. For the multiproduct bundles (not shown), the demo-
graphic effects equal the sum of the demographic effects on the component single-product bundles.
OOP prices and age are measured in standard deviations ($24.52 and 10.62 years, respectively)
and centered around their means ($26.70 and 44.85 years). Employees can be salaried, hourly, or
unknown; unionized, non-unionized, or unknown; full-time, early retiree, part-time, or “other.” De-
pression diagnosis can be major depressive disorder (MDD), dysthymia, or depression-other. The
omitted health insurance type is CDHP/HDHP. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 1.13: Covariance/Correlation Matrix of Unobserved Preferences - Sensitivities
(1) Main / (2) No Spillovers (3) Uncorrelated Preferences
Generic Branded Therapy Generic Branded Therapy
Generic 8.64 0.34 0.25 Generic 7.37 0 0
Branded 4.06 16.25 0.44 Branded 0 19.85 0
Therapy 2.34 5.51 9.84 Therapy 0 0 7.98
(4) No Health Shocks
Generic Branded Therapy
Generic 22.03 0.89 0.73
Branded 23.84 32.21 0.76
Therapy 13.59 17.19 15.84
Notes: The first stage of the estimation is the same for the models with and without advertising
spillover effects. Variance and covariance terms on the main diagonal and below; correlation coeffi-
cients—above. All parameter estimates are significant at the 1% significance level.
Table 1.14: Markov Chain Health Shock Transition Probabilities and Stationary Distri-
bution - Sensitivities
(1) Main / (2) No Spillovers (3) Uncorrelated Preferences
Panel A: Transition Probabilities Panel A: Transition Probabilities
Healthyt+1 Depressedt+1 Healthyt+1 Depressedt+1
Healthyt 0.9982 0.0018 Healthyt 0.9984 0.0016
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Depressedt 0.0175 0.9825 Depressedt 0.0159 0.9841
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Panel B: Stationary Distribution Panel B: Stationary Distribution
Healthy Depressed Healthy Depressed
Long-run share 0.9066 0.0934 Long-run share 0.9066 0.0934
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The first stage of the estimation is the same for the models with
and without advertising spillover effects. The model with no health shocks has no transition probabili-
ties and does not appear in the table.
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Table 1.15: Second Stage, OLS Estimates - Sensitivities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main No Spillovers Uncorr. Pref. No Health Shocks
Generic: Ads -0.0026*** -0.0027*** -0.0012***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Branded: Ads 0.0059*** 0.0062*** 0.0073*** 0.005***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Therapy: Ads 0.0009 0.0011 0.001**
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Time Effects Year-Trend Year-Trend Year-Trend Year-Trend
Market FEs MSA MSA MSA MSA
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For the multiproduct bundles, the advertising effects
equal the sum of the effects on the component single-product bundles. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
Table 1.16: Second Stage, 2SLS Estimates - Sensitivities







Panel A: average complementarity
Generic-Therapy -0.1939*** -0.1939*** 0.5424*** 0.6883***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0084)
Branded-Therapy -0.7716*** -0.7716*** 0.7139*** 0.2379***
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0128) (0.0094)
Panel B: advertising effects on each bundle
Generic: Ads 0.0053*** 0.0053*** 0.0039***
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0016)
Branded: Ads 0.0072*** 0.0096*** 0.0076*** 0.0048***
(0.003) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0021)
Therapy: Ads 0.0071*** 0.0068*** 0.0036***
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.002)
Time Effects Year-Trend Year-Trend Year-Trend Year-Trend
Market FEs MSA MSA MSA MSA
Panel C: first stage of instrumental variables regression
Adj Avg Price per Ad -0.0057
Partial F-stat 504.8
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. For the multiproduct bundles, the advertising effects
equal the sum of the effects on the component single-product bundles. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.
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Table 1.17: Demand Elasticities with Respect to Advertising, Sensitivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main No Spillovers Uncorr. Pref. No Health Shocks
Bundles
Outside Option -0.0053 -0.0016 -0.0053 -0.0034
Generic-Only 0.0033 -0.0016 0.0033 0.0642
Branded-Only 0.0063 0.0138 0.0070 0.0797
Therapy-Only 0.0061 -0.0016 0.0057 0.0583
Generic-Therapy 0.0147 -0.0016 0.0142 0.1259
Branded-Therapy 0.0177 0.0138 0.018 0.1414
Products
Outside Option -0.0053 -0.0016 -0.0053 -0.0034
Generic 0.0050 -0.0016 0.0051 0.0654
Branded 0.0076 0.0138 0.0089 0.0805
Therapy 0.0093 -0.0004 0.0097 0.0613
Note: Demand elasticities with respect to branded drug advertising are calculated by averaging
individual-level elasticities over patients and time periods.
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Chapter 2
Did Plain-Vanilla Prescription Drug
Monitoring Programs Reduce Opioid
Use? Evidence from Privately
Insured Patients ∗
2.1 Introduction
This paper estimates the effect of prescription drug monitoring programs without
registration or use requirements, or “plain-vanilla” PDMPs, on the use of opioid pain
medications.1 Multiple such state-run programs were established in the 2000s in
∗Truven Health Analytics, through its Dissertation Support Program, generously made avail-
able for the purposes of this dissertation the Truven Health MarketScan® Commercial Claims and
Encounters Database. Copyright © 2016 Truven. All Rights Reserved. Truven Health was not
involved in preparing the results in this paper in any way. I am solely responsible for any errors.
1I use the adjective “plain-vanilla” to reflect the fact that this type of PDMPs did not have
registration or access mandates, unlike programs that were introduced or modified after 2010. In
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response to the growing opioid epidemic. They collected controlled-substance pre-
scription drug information and provided it to physicians and pharmacists who could
review it before prescribing or dispensing drugs. Because registration into and use
of these programs was optional, many were skeptical of their ability to lower opioid
use and misuse. I fill an important gap in the understanding of PDMPs by carefully
evaluating their effect on opioid utilization.
To measure opioid use, I use the Truven Health Marketscan® Commercial Claims
and Encounters Database for the period 2008–2010. The database contains all medical
and prescription drug claims for individuals with employer-provided health insurance
for a convenience sample of companies. This allows me to study opioid utilization by
working age adults, the population that was hit the hardest by the opioid crisis.2
I take advantage of the staggered introduction of PDMPs in some states but not
others and use the difference-in-differences technique to estimate the causal effect
of these programs on opioid utilization. To minimize the chance that the “treated”
and “control” states have different pre-trends, I select only those states that passed
a law authorizing the creation of a PDMP after 2010. The reason for this choice is
that states that establish PDMPs before and after 2010 are otherwise similar, but
the timing of their PDMPs differs for idiosyncratic reasons. This provides greater
credibility of the parallel trends assumption.
The results of my preferred specification indicate that, despite their use being
addition to mandates, later PDMPs were augmented with the ability to send unsolicited reports to
health care providers, more frequent data reporting, improved user interface, and integration with
electronic health records, among other features (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016).
2Jones (2013) notes that the opioid overdose death rate in 2010 was the highest among 45-54
year-olds, closely followed by 35-44 and 25-34 year-olds. The overdose death rate among those
younger than 18 or older than 65 was much lower.
63
optional, plain-vanilla PDMPs were successful in reducing opioid utilization. On
average, these programs lowered the number of prescriptions per capita by 2.8%, days
supply per capita by 3.8%, and morphine milligram equivalent (MME) per capita by
8.3%. The numbers suggest that although PDMPs brought about a relatively modest
decrease in the number of prescriptions, they were more successful in lowering the
intended length of treatment and the intensity of treatment. These findings are
important from a public-health point of view because pills from prescriptions that
provide a longer-term supply are often diverted, fuelling drug misuse, and because
high-dosage prescriptions are more likely to lead to overdose (Dowell et al., 2016a).
I perform a variety of robustness checks to make sure that the results are not
caused by a confounding factor. First, parallel trends tests do not reveal differ-
ences in the trends of treated and control states prior to the introduction of PDMPs.
Second, falsification tests are consistent with PDMPs having no effect on outcomes
they are not supposed to affect, namely, non-controlled substance prescription drugs
and medical procedures unrelated to alcohol or drug abuse. These findings suggests
that the results were not caused by broader health care trends that were different in
treated and control states. Third, the fact that the Marketscan data track all pre-
scription drug claims of an employee, regardless of the state in which they were filled,
alleviates concerns that out-of-state purchases may bias the results. Fourth, I show
that various other anti-opioid policies, such as laws governing pain clinics, access to
naloxone, and the use of marijuana for medical purposes, are not confounding the
difference-in-differences analysis.
Fifth, I carefully study the effect that attrition has on my estimates. Attrition oc-
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curs naturally in the Marketscan dataset because it tracks individuals only for as long
as they work for one of the companies contributing data. If attrition is correlated with
unobservable determinants of opioid use and if these unobserved determinants change
differently in treated and control states, this may bias the difference-in-differences re-
sults. To address such concerns, I include demographics as covariates in my main
specification to control for the changing composition of the sample. I also run a sen-
sitivity test using only individuals who do not attrit for the entire three-year period.
The estimated PDMP effects are similar to those of the main specification. However,
to further analyze whether attrition is biasing the estimation, I estimate a Cox pro-
portional hazards model that shows that even though heavy users of opioids attrit
more, they do not attrit more in states and time periods with active PDMPs. Based
on the results of all attrition-related sensitivities, I conclude that attrition is unlikely
to bias my main results.
The following subsection surveys the findings and shortcomings of the existing
literature on PDMPs. Section 2.2 provides a brief history of the opioid epidemic and
PDMPs. Those familiar with this history can skip to Section 2.3, which describes
the data and the main patterns in it. Section 2.4 describes the identification strategy




This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of PDMPs on opioid uti-
lization and health outcomes by providing credible causal estimates of the effect of
“plain-vanilla” PDMPs. Many of the prior studies of these programs are correlational
in nature and their findings vary significantly. Meara et al. (2016) and Brady et al.
(2014) find no association between PDMPs and opioid utilization, whereas Reifler
et al. (2012), Moyo et al. (2017), Rutkow et al. (2015), and Bao et al. (2016) find
a negative association between PDMPs and prescription rates and, in some cases,
dosage per prescription. With respect to health outcomes, findings are even more
dispersed: Paulozzi et al. (2011) find no correlation between PDMPs and opioid-
related overdose deaths, Li et al. (2014) find a positive correlation, and Patrick et al.
(2016) find a negative one.3 Mallatt (2017) and Yarbrough (2018) provide two studies
that use difference-in-differences to estimate the causal effect of PDMPs among Med-
icaid and Medicare beneficiaries, respectively. Both studies find negative effects on
opioid prescribing rates but do not distinguish between plain-vanilla and augmented
PDMPs, which leaves the question of the effectiveness of the earlier PDMPs open.
There is stronger evidence on “augmented” PDMPs. PDMP Center of Excellence
(2014) and Pew Charitable Trusts (2016) summarize the evidence on the effectiveness
of PDMPs overall as well as that of aspects of PDMPs such as prescriber registra-
tion and use mandates, delegation, data timeliness, and sending unsolicited reports
to stakeholders. Mandatory registration and use requirements have attracted the
3Haegerich et al. (2014) and Finley et al. (2017) provide surveys of the existing literature on
PDMPs and note that most of the studies are correlational and fail to credibly identify a causal
effect.
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most attention. Using difference-in-differences analyses, Dowell et al. (2016b), Buch-
mueller and Carey (2018), Haffajee et al. (2018), Ayres and Jalal (2018), Wen et al.
(2017), and Wen et al. (2019) show that “must-access” PDMP significantly reduce
opioid prescription rates.4 In addition, these studies find causal evidence that manda-
tory access requirements lead to reductions in doctor and pharmacy shopping, opioid
misuse, inpatient and emergency room visits, and overdose deaths for a variety of
populations, including those covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance.5
Focusing specifically on health outcomes, Grecu et al. (2019), Pardo (2017), and Guy
and Zhang (2020) find that PDMPs with mandatory use clauses lead to significantly
lower opioid abuse, inpatient stays, emergency department visits, and opioid-related
deaths.
Bao et al. (2018) provide further evidence that augmenting PDMPs with policies
requiring mandatory use, delegation, and participation in interstate data exchanges
strengthens the negative effect of basic PDMPs on risky prescribing and doctor shop-
ping. Young et al. (2018) and Sacarny et al. (2016) show, however, that other PDMP
features, such as unsolicited notifications to prescribers either about a patient’s doctor
shopping behavior or about the physician’s own prescribing patterns, are not effective
at decreasing opioid utilization.
4Contrary to most other analyses, Sun et al. (2018) find no statistically significant effect on either
the opioid prescription rate or the dosage per prescription. Their study, however, differs in that it
takes advantage of the staggered introduction of automatic PDMP queries in emergency departments
in Washington state, rather than a typical multi-state difference-in-differences analysis, to evaluate
the impact of this program.
5Strickler et al. (2019) use the comparative interrupted time series approach to show that manda-
tory registration and use policies increase the use of PDMPs by prescribers and decrease the rate of
opioid prescribing and doctor shopping.
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2.2 Background
On October 26, 2017, the President of the United States declared the opioid crisis
a public health emergency. The pronouncement came after nearly two decades of
increasing numbers of drug overdoses and nearly half a million deaths, 60% of which
involved an opioid (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2020). The economic
cost of opioid abuse, including health care, mortality, productivity, and criminal jus-
tice costs, were estimated to be $55.7 billion in 2007 (Birnbaum et al., 2011) and
$170.9 billion in 2017 (Davenport et al., 2019).6 This section explains what opioids
are, how attitudes toward pain management changed over time, how the opioid crisis
unfolded, and how prescription drug monitoring programs were used to address the
crisis.
2.2.1 Opioids, Pain Management, and the Opioid Epidemic
Opiates are drugs derived directly from opium, the dried latex of the opium poppy
(Rosenblum et al., 2008). They act by binding to opioid receptors and inducing an
analgesic, or pain-numbing, effect. Morphine, codeine, and thebaine are naturally
occurring opiates which can be extracted from the poppy plant. Semi-synthetic opi-
ates, such as heroin, oxycodone, hydrocodone, oxymorphone, and hydromorphone,
are synthesized from naturally occurring opiates using simple chemical manipula-
tions. “Opioid” is a more general term that designates any substance that binds to
6The two numbers are not directly comparable because Davenport et al. (2019) include child and
family assistance and education costs as well. However, Davenport et al. (2019) estimate that even
between 2015 and 2018 the economic cost of opioid abuse increased substantially–from $124.3 to
$179.4 billion.
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opioid receptors. It encompasses naturally occurring and semi-synthetic opiates as
well as synthetic opioids. The latter include compounds that have chemical structure
unrelated to that of morphine but nevertheless bind to opioid receptors and have
opiate-like properties. Methadone, meperidine, tramadol, and fentanyl are the most
widely known synthetic opioids, although there are many others as well.7 Some of
these substances are better known under their names as branded prescription drugs:
Vicodin (hydrocodone with acetaminophen), OxyContin (oxycodone), and Percocet
(oxycodone with acetaminophen).
Opioids have had a long and controversial history in the United States.8 Morphine
was used for pain management during the Civil War. Continued use and abuse
by veterans led to restrictions on its use in the late 19th and early 20th century.
These restrictions were soon followed by the rise of heroin and, once its addictive and
deleterious properties became widely known, by more legislation curbing its use, the
Harrison Act of 1914 and the Heroin Act of 1924. Over the following years, attitudes of
physicians and patients shifted against the use of opiates for pain management. Even
cancer patients were encouraged to postpone opioid treatment as long as possible,
whereas other pain sufferers were discouraged from using opioids altogether.
This “opiophobia” continued well into the second half of the 20th century. Atti-
7In addition to how closely related they are to naturally occurring opiates, opioids are also
categorized based on their effect on opioid receptors. Agonists induce a full response after binding
to a receptor, partial agonists induce a partial response, while antagonists produce no response and
block agonists from binding with the receptors (Pathan and Williams, 2012). Opioid agonists are
used for pain management (and illegally for recreational purposes), partial agonists (buprenorphine)
is used in medication-assisted treatment of opioid use disorder, while antagonists (naloxone) are
used in reversing opioid overdoses.
8Bernard et al. (2018), Baker (2017), Jones et al. (2018), Alam and Juurlink (2016), Wilkerson
et al. (2016), and Rummans et al. (2018) provide a good overview of the changing attitudes toward
pain management and the opioid crisis in the United States. Schiff Jr (2002) reviews the history of
opium since ancient times.
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tudes started to change again when physicians began to point out the under-treatment
of pain in the 1970s and 1980s. Backed by two small (and, subsequently, highly con-
tentious) studies that claimed that addiction rarely arises from therapeutic use of
opiate analgesics, the consensus shifted and opioids began to be used for the treat-
ment of cancer and acute pain much more freely in the 1990s (Jones et al., 2018).
Given the success of opioids in treating cancer pain, proponents started advancing
their use for chronic pain and eventually succeeded (Bernard et al., 2018). The Amer-
ican Pain Society declared pain “the fifth vital sign” to highlight the need for better
pain management. This concept was soon after adopted by the Veterans Health
Administration and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organiza-
tions.9 As a result, pain management became an important component of patient
satisfaction scores, a proxy for patient experience in hospitals, creating incentives
for overly-aggressive pain treatment (Rummans et al., 2018). This shift was further
facilitated by a lower level of scrutiny on opioid prescribers by the DEA and local
authorities and by aggressive marketing on the part of pharmaceutical companies
(Jones et al., 2018).10
The pendulum had swung from under- to over-treatment of pain. The end of the
1990s marked the beginning of the opioid crisis, which progressed in three waves. The
first wave lasted from 1999 to 2010. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, it was characterized
by a 3.5-fold increase in the natural and semisynthetic opioid overdose death rate
9The Joint Commission certifies hospitals for Medicare reimbursement.
10Purdue Pharma got FDA approval for OxyContin, controlled-release oxycodone, in 1995 and
marketed the drug aggressively over the years. Alpert et al. (2019) provide evidence that Purdue’s
strategic promotional efforts led to higher growth rates in opioid overdose deaths.
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Figure 2.1: Opioid Overdose Death Rates, 1999-2018
Notes: Natural and semisynthetic opioids include drugs such as morphine, oxycodone, and hy-
drocodone. Synthetic opioids other than methadone include drugs such as fentanyl, fentanyl analogs
and tramadol. Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020).
– from 1 to 3.5 overdose deaths per 100,000 – after which it levelled off.11 These
deaths were caused by both prescription and non-prescription use of legal opioid pain
relievers such as morphine, oxycodone, and hydrocodone (Rummans et al., 2018).
The second waive was marked by a nearly 5-fold increase in the heroin overdose
death rate between 2010 and 2016. As various policies were introduced to curb
the spread of opioid prescription drugs, addicted individuals substituted to heroin,
an illegal opiate twice as potent as morphine. Alpert et al. (2017) and Evans et al.
(2019) provide evidence that one of these policies, the introduction of abuse-deterrent
OxyContin, led to large increases in heroin use and related overdose deaths.
Illegally manufactured fentanyl was the drug that defined the third, still ongoing,
wave of the opioid epidemic. Between 2013 and 2018 the fentanyl-related overdose
death rate shot up from 1 to 9.9 per 100,000.12 Fentanyl is 50-100 times more potent
11This equates to an increase from 2,749 to 10,943 in the number of overdose deaths per year.
12Fentanyl is a DEA Schedule II drug and has legitimate medical uses such as inducing anesthesia
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than morphine. It can also be synthesized in a lab, without the need to grow pop-
pies and harvest opium as is the case with heroin. These two characteristics make
it cheap and easier to smuggle, which is why fentanyl is increasingly popular with
drug traffickers (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2019). It is pressed into counter-
feit oxycodone, hydrocodone, and alprazolam (Xanax) pills and mixed with heroin,
cocaine, and methamphetamines, often unbeknownst to the users, which contributes
to its lethality. Powell and Pacula (2020) provide evidence that the introduction of
abuse-deterrent OxyContin led to long-term increases in overdose deaths related not
only to heroin but to fentanyl and cocaine as well.
2.2.2 History and Evolution of Prescription Drug Monitoring
Programs
In response to the opioid crisis, states and the federal government took various steps
aimed at prevention and treatment. One of these measures was the implementation
of prescription drug monitoring programs. A PDMP is a state-run database that col-
lects controlled-substance prescription information from pharmacies and dispensing
providers and distributes it to physicians, pharmacists, state licensing boards, and,
in certain situations, law enforcement.13
and treating cancer and other acute pain. As reported by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(2017), he number of prescriptions for fentanyl, typically in the form of transdermal patches and
lozenges, were stable or declining between 2013 and 2015, which suggests that illegally manufactured
fentanyl is behind the rise in overdose deaths.
13The Controlled Substances Act of 1970 provides the legal framework for government oversight
of certain substances. Schedule I drugs, such heroin, LSD, and marijuana, have no medical use and
high potential for abuse. Controlled substances with medical use are in Schedule II (high potential
for abuse; e.g., oxycodone, fentanyl, morphine) through Schedule V (low potential for abuse; e.g.,
cough syrups with a low dose of codeine).
72
Although these programs became widely known and adopted during the opioid
epidemic, some of them had been in operation for a long time. The first PDMP in
the United States was established in New York in 1918 in response to growing pub-
lic health problems associated with the unregulated prescribing of opiates (PDMP-
TTAC, 2018). Although it existed for only three years, it served as a blueprint for the
ones that followed it: California in 1939, which is the oldest continuously operating
PDMP, and eight more over the next 50 years.14 These programs used duplicate (one
copy for the pharmacy, one for the PDMP) or triplicate (one copy for the prescriber
as well) prescription forms to track the distribution and use of Schedule II substances.
The purpose of these early PDMPs was to assist law enforcement investigations and
deter drug diversion by creating an audit trail (GAO, 2002). They typically oper-
ated by responding to requests for information rather than by proactively referring
suspicious patient, prescriber, or dispenser behavior to law enforcement or licensing
boards.
The arrival of electronic transmission of data facilitated more timely reporting
as well as the wider adoption of PDMPs by obviating the need to manufacture,
sell, distribute, fill out, and mail paper duplicate and triplicate forms. Most of the
programs established in the 1990s and later years mandated electronic transfer of
prescription data.15 With the help of electronic reporting and the Internet, the focus
of PDMPs shifted towards providing physicians and pharmacists with direct access
14Hawaii introduced a PDMP in the 1940s, Illinois and Idaho–in the 1960s, Pennsylvania, New
York, and Rhode Island–in the 1970s, and Texas and Michigan–in the 1980s.
15Six of the seven PDMPs established in the 1990s and seventeen of the eighteen PDMP initiated
in the 2000s required electronic reporting. By mid-2017, all states and the District of Columbia had
functioning programs with electronic reporting and online access.
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to patients’ prescription drug histories. Online access, introduced for the first time
in the late 1990s, allowed prescribers and dispensers to get instantaneous access to
patients’ records, removing the need to put in requests with the PDMP and wait
several hours or days for the record to arrive by fax, further improving detection of
opioid misuse and doctor shopping behavior (GAO, 2002).
Table 2.1 presents the timing of PDMP implementation, as well as the introduc-
tion of electronic reporting, user access, and online access. Under the pressure of
having to counteract the opioid crisis, these programs continued evolving and acquir-
ing new features: mandatory registration and use by prescribers and pharmacists,
cross-border information sharing, high frequency reporting, proactive notifications,
and integration into electronic health records (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). Most
of these improvements, however, came after 2010, which allows me to evaluate the
impact of “plain-vanilla” PDMPs using data for 2008-2010 described in the next sec-
tion.16
16The timing of some of these additional PDMP features is discussed in Section 2.5.4.
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Table 2.1: PDMP Introduction and Modification Dates
State Law Passed Operational e-Reporting User Access Online Access
PDMPs Operational Before 2008
California 01/1939 01/1939 01/2007 09/2009
Hawaii 01/1943 01/1943 01/1992 01/1997
Idaho 01/1967 01/1967 01/2004 06/1999 06/1999
Illinois 01/1961 01/1968 01/2000 01/1984 01/2008
Pennsylvania 01/1972 01/1973 01/2016 01/2016
New York 01/1972 04/1973 01/1999 02/2010
Rhode Island 01/1978 01/1979 01/2006 07/2012
Texas 09/1981 01/1982 01/2001 01/1982 06/2012
Michigan 01/1988 01/1989 01/2003 01/2003
Oklahoma 05/1990 01/1991 01/1991 07/2006
Massachusetts 01/1992 01/1994 01/1994 01/2011
West Virginia 07/1995 07/1995 09/2002 12/2004
Utah 01/1995 01/1996 01/1996 01/1997 01/1997
Nevada 06/1995 01/1997 01/1997 07/1997 07/1997
Indiana 01/1997 01/1998 01/1998 12/2004
Kentucky 07/1998 01/1999 01/1999 07/1999 03/2005
Virginia 04/2002 09/2003 09/2003 06/2006 06/2006
Maine 06/2003 07/2004 07/2004 01/2005 01/2005
Wyoming 03/2003 07/2004 07/2004 10/2004 10/2004
Mississippi 01/2005 01/2005 01/2008 12/2005 12/2005
New Mexico 07/2004 01/2005 01/2005 08/2005 08/2005
Alabama 05/2005 01/2006 01/2006 06/2007 06/2007
Ohio 05/2005 07/2006 07/2006 10/2006 10/2006
Tennessee 01/2003 12/2006 12/2006 01/2007 01/2007
Colorado 06/2005 07/2007 07/2007 02/2008 02/2008
North Carolina 08/2005 07/2007 07/2007 10/2007 10/2007
North Dakota 12/2005 09/2007 09/2007 09/2007 09/2007
PDMPs Operational Between 2008 and 2010
South Carolina 06/2006 02/2008 02/2008 09/2008 09/2008
Connecticut 06/2006 07/2008 07/2008
Arizona 09/2007 10/2008 10/2008 12/2008 12/2008
Louisiana 07/2006 11/2008 11/2008 01/2009 01/2009
Iowa 05/2006 01/2009 01/2009 03/2009 03/2009
Vermont 05/2006 01/2009 01/2009 04/2009 04/2009
Minnesota 07/2007 01/2010 01/2010 04/2010 04/2010
PDMPs Operational After 2010
Kansas 07/2008 02/2011 02/2011 04/2011 04/2011
Nebraska 04/2011 04/2011 04/2011 04/2011 04/2011
Oregon 07/2009 06/2011 06/2011 09/2011 09/2011
Alaska 09/2008 08/2011 08/2011 01/2012 01/2012
Florida 06/2009 09/2011 09/2011 10/2011 10/2011
New Jersey 01/2008 09/2011 09/2011 01/2012 01/2012
Washington 07/2007 10/2011 10/2011 01/2012 01/2012
South Dakota 03/2010 12/2011 12/2011 03/2012 03/2012
Delaware 07/2010 03/2012 03/2012 08/2012 08/2012
Montana 07/2011 03/2012 03/2012 11/2012 12/2012
Arkansas 03/2011 03/2013 03/2013 05/2013 05/2013
Wisconsin 05/2010 04/2013 04/2013 06/2013 06/2013
Georgia 05/2011 07/2013 07/2013 07/2013 07/2013
Maryland 05/2011 08/2013 08/2013 12/2013 12/2013
New Hampshire 06/2012 09/2014 09/2014 10/2014 10/2014
District of Columbia 02/2014 08/2016 08/2016 10/2016 10/2016
Missouri 03/2016 04/2017 04/2017 04/2017 04/2017
Note: The table is sorted by the year-month in which a PDMP became operational. States in bold are
the ones used in the preferred specification of analysis in Section 2.4. Source: PDMP-TTAC (2019).
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2.3 Data
The primary source of data on opioid utilization is the Marketscan Commercial Claims
and Encounters Database. It contains all medical and prescription drug claims, as
well as demographic information, for individuals covered by private health insurance
plans provided by over 100 large employers across the United States over the 2008-
2010 period. Data are available for the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, Hawaii, and the
District of Columbia. Because the number of covered individuals in Hawaii is very
low, I drop it from the analysis.17
The number of individuals included in the Marketscan dataset changes over time
for two reasons. First, employees come and go as part of the natural staff turnover
at included companies. Second, entire firms start or stop contributing data to the
Marketscan database, typically in January of each year. To limit the noise that these
changes introduce, I use the cohort of enrollees that are in the data as of January
2008 and follow them until December 2010.
I focus on three main outcomes of interest: the number of opioid prescriptions,
the days supply of medication, and the morphine milligram equivalent (MME), all
per 1,000 adults aged 18-64.18 These measures provide a perspective not only on
the rate of prescribing but also on the “size” of the prescriptions and the intensity
of treatment.19 These dimensions of opioid use are important because large-supply
17On average across months, there are 983 covered individuals in Hawaii, compared to 4,100 in
the second least-covered territory (Washington D.C.) and over 155,000 on average across all states.
18Health outcomes such as heroin or other opioid poisonings and opioid dependence and abuse
hospital admissions are also of interest. However, the data on these measures are not suitable for
difference-in-differences analysis, and it is therefore difficult to draw conclusions about the causal
impact of PDMPs on them. I discuss these outcomes at greater length in Appendix 2.7.1.
19MME captures the potency of various opioids relative to morphine. For example, 1 mg of
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prescriptions facilitate diversion, while high-dosage treatment increases the risk of
overdose (Dowell et al., 2016a).
Each prescription drug claim in the Marketscan data identifies the therapeutic
class of the prescribed drug and its strength, as well as how many prescriptions,
days supply, and physical units (“pills”–typically tablets or capsules for opioids) were
dispensed. Using the identity of the active ingredient, the strength, the number of
pills, and the appropriate MME conversion factor, I calculate the MME for every
opioid claim.20 I then sum up the number of prescriptions, days supply, and MME to
the state-month level and calculate outcome variables in per 1,000 adults aged 18-64
terms. This yields a dataset with 50 states and 36 months of data for each state.21
To that, I add state-month demographics based on the demographic data for each
enrollee.
oxycodone is equivalent to 1.5 mg of morphine, whereas 1 mg of codeine is equivalent to 0.15 mg of
morphine. Sullivan et al. (2008) provide MME conversion factors for a wide variety of opioids.
20By number of prescriptions filled, the most popular opioid is hydrocodone (58.0% of all prescrip-
tions), followed by oxycodone (19.8%), propoxyphene (8.1%), codeine (5.1%), morphine, fentanyl,
methadone, and others.
21For ease of exposition, I call Washington D.C. a state.
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Prescriptions per 1k 52.9 12.3 18.8 46.7 51.8 58.1 107.2
Days Supply per 1k 750.8 222.3 197.8 600.7 753.0 880.8 1,719.6
MME per 1k 46,015.8 14,062.9 6,255.1 35,816.9 45,791.0 54,493.2 113,717.6
Demographics
Enrollees 155,158 204,431 2,908 28,481 81,299 196,018 1,343,211
Female 0.533 0.025 0.466 0.520 0.532 0.537 0.632
Average Age 44.92 1.46 38.78 43.84 44.95 45.98 48.50
Age 18-34 0.227 0.038 0.128 0.196 0.223 0.254 0.424
Age 35-44 0.220 0.019 0.174 0.212 0.217 0.234 0.273
Age 45-54 0.280 0.018 0.187 0.269 0.280 0.291 0.355
Age 55-64 0.273 0.042 0.147 0.244 0.269 0.298 0.389
HMO Plan 0.210 0.179 0.004 0.079 0.162 0.277 0.604
POS Plan 0.139 0.115 0.003 0.054 0.128 0.173 0.703
PPO Plan 0.520 0.138 0.243 0.454 0.515 0.611 0.837
Full-time Employees 0.808 0.057 0.646 0.783 0.824 0.845 0.915
Salaried Employees 0.312 0.150 0.074 0.154 0.327 0.427 0.586
Hourly Employees 0.304 0.134 0.072 0.155 0.349 0.387 0.613
Mining & Manuf. 0.340 0.170 0.098 0.186 0.367 0.444 0.792
Transp., Comm., Util. 0.184 0.095 0.052 0.094 0.174 0.250 0.461
Retail and Services 0.156 0.106 0.011 0.077 0.133 0.181 0.610
Fin., Ins., Real Estate 0.103 0.073 0.009 0.047 0.093 0.142 0.463
Cancer per 1k 8.192 2.466 2.842 6.248 7.535 9.790 17.165
Pain per 1k 0.681 0.259 0.000 0.503 0.671 0.829 3.247
Fracture per 1k 1.791 0.471 0.000 1.447 1.651 2.009 5.408
Heart Disease per 1k 18.373 7.005 6.681 12.526 16.867 22.110 41.346
Diabetes per 1k 7.176 3.377 0.598 4.780 6.087 8.615 22.283
Mental Illness per 1k 1.274 0.589 0.000 0.951 1.171 1.460 4.868
Notes: Statistics based on all 1,800 state-months, weighted by number of enrollees. Opioid use mea-
sures and diagnoses are per 1,000 enrollees aged 18-64. Demographics except average age, number
of enrollees, and diagnoses are shares. “MME” stands for morphine milligram equivalent. Other
insurance plan types include comprehensive, consumer-driven, and high-deductible health plans.
Employees can be full-time, part-time, or early retirees; salaried, hourly, or with unknown status.
Other industries include agriculture, construction, wholesale, and unknown. Mental illnesses in-
clude major depressive and bipolar disorders, schizophrenia, and other nonorganic psychoses.
Table 2.2 summarizes the distribution of opioid utilization and demographic char-
acteristics over all months, from January 2008 to December 2010, and geographic
locations, Washington D.C. and all U.S. states except Hawaii. On average, there are
155,158 enrollees in a state-month, with more than three quarters of state-months
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having more than 28,000, which provides a good basis for accurately measuring opi-
oid utilization rates. 53% of the enrollees covered in the median state-month are
female. The average age is 44.9, with each group of 18-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64
year-olds accounting for approximately a quarter of the sample, although there is a
fair amount of variation across states and time periods. The most widely used health
insurance plan type is the preferred provider organization (PPO), which covers at
least 24% of all enrollees in any state-month and 52% on average. It is followed by
health maintenance organization (HMO) and point of service (POS), covering 21%
and 14% on average, respectively. The rest of the enrollees are covered by a com-
bination of high-deductible, consumer-driven, exclusive provider, and comprehensive
health plans. 81% of enrollees are full-time employees, the rest being primarily part-
time and early-retirees. Salaried and hourly employees each make up roughly 30%
of the sample, with the payment arrangement for the rest being unknown. In the
average state-month, 34% of enrollees are employed in the mining and manufactur-
ing industries, which is substantially higher than the national average of 10.5% and
reflects the convenience sample nature of the Marketscan data.
The data reveal substantial variation in the health status of the covered individuals
across time and space. The average numbers of enrollees with heart disease, diabetes,
and mental illness are 18.4, 7.2, and 1.3 per 1,000, respectively, with sizeable standard
deviations.22 The number of people who are likely to need pain treatment also varies
22For every state-month pair, I count the number of enrollees who have an inpatient or outpatient
visit with a certain diagnosis. I use International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision, Clinical
Modifications (ICD-9-CM) codes beginning with 393-398 and 40-43 to identify heart disease and
beginning with 250 to identify diabetes. Mental illnesses include major depression, bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, and other nonorganic psychoses, which correspond to ICD-9-CM codes beginning
with 295, 2962-2968, and 297.
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significantly. On average, out of every 1,000 adults, between 2.8 and 17.2 receive
diagnosis and treatment for cancer; between 0 and 3.2 are diagnosed with pain; and
between 0 and 5.4 experience fractures.23
Overall health and pain-related diagnoses are some of the factors affecting opioid
usage. Between January 2008 and December 2010, every 1,000 adult enrollees filled
an average of 52.9 prescriptions for a total of 751 days’ supply and 46,016 MME of
opioid medication, which amounts to approximately 14 days’ supply per prescription
and 61 MME per day’s supply. There is substantial variation in the opioid utilization
measures, both across states and over time. Figure 2.2 shows average opioid utilization
measures for three groups of states: those that instituted a PDMP between 2008 and
2010, those that did that after 2010 (and had no PDMP during 2008-2010), and
those that already had a PDMP in place prior to 2008. All three graphs show a
significant increase in the per-capita use of opioids, consistent with national trends
for the period. The graphs also show variation across the groups based on PDMP
timing.
Figure 2.2 shows that in the first six months of data, when there were no newly-
introduced PDMPs, the rate of increase in monthly opioid use is approximately the
same in the three groups of states. Over the next 18 months, six new PDMPs become
operational: Connecticut (July 2008), Arizona (October 2008), Louisiana (November
2008), Iowa and Vermont (January 2009), and Minnesota (January 2010). Over this
time period, utilization measures between the treatment group (the six states with
23Cancer incorporates all ICD-9-CM codes beginning with 14-20 and 230-234, pain – beginning
with 338, and fractures – beginning with 80-82.
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Figure 2.2: Opioid Utilization over Time
Notes: The statistics for each group of states are the averages over all states within a group, weighted
by number of enrollees. The vertical lines indicate the months in which PDMPs became operational.
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newly introduced PDMPs) and the other two groups of states start to diverge.
The divergence is captured in Table 2.3, which shows average utilization measures
and demographics for the three groups of states for the periods January-June 2008 and
January-June 2010.24 The average number of prescriptions per 1,000 adult enrollees
increased by 2.8 in treated states and by 5.3 in states with no PDMP in 2008-2010.
The difference between the two differences, -2.5 (5.3% of the base value), is a rough
estimate of the effect of introducing a PDMP on the number of opioid prescriptions
per capita. Similar calculations suggest that PDMPs reduce days’ supply and MME
per capita by 12.3% and 8.4%, respectively.
Table 2.3 also shows demographic summary statistics for each group of states and
for the “before” and “after” periods. At baseline, all three groups look fairly similar.
The treated group has a lower share of enrollees on HMO plans and higher shares of
salaried employees and employees in the mining and manufacturing industries than
the other two groups. In a difference-in-differences analysis, these differences will
affect the estimates only if the demographics change differently in treated and control
states and if they are correlated with the outcome of interest. At first sight, it
seems that the demographic changes are similar across groups: the share of female
enrollees stays roughly constant, average age increases similarly across groups due
to significant declines in enrollees aged 18-34. Cancer cases increase slightly more
in treated than control states, but pain and fracture diagnoses increase slightly less.
Visually examining the rest of the changes does not reveal significant differential
24I focus on January-June rather than January-December 2010 to partial out any seasonal effects.
However, the patterns that emerge using January-December 2010 are very similar.
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changes.
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics, By PDMP Timing Group, Before and After
PDMP ’08-’10 PDMP Post-’10 PDMP Pre-’08
1-6/08 1-6/10 1-6/08 1-6/10 1-6/08 1-6/10
Opioid Use Measures
Prescriptions per 1k 46.9 49.7 49.6 54.9 49.3 54.5
Days Supply per 1k 569.5 656.4 611.6 768.3 681.3 821.7
MME per 1k 38,923.0 46,089.4 39,220.7 49,647.9 39,914.9 50,293.1
Demographics
Enrollees 91,400 66,551 136,474 103,094 237,157 179,805
Female 0.506 0.507 0.540 0.543 0.531 0.534
Average Age 42.52 45.45 43.22 45.95 43.36 46.09
Age 18-34 0.296 0.212 0.272 0.194 0.273 0.194
Age 35-44 0.220 0.216 0.228 0.223 0.219 0.218
Age 45-54 0.265 0.297 0.263 0.293 0.262 0.288
Age 55-64 0.219 0.274 0.236 0.290 0.246 0.300
HMO Plan 0.132 0.103 0.223 0.148 0.233 0.215
POS Plan 0.183 0.124 0.139 0.112 0.154 0.131
PPO Plan 0.519 0.566 0.534 0.541 0.496 0.503
Full-time Employees 0.851 0.838 0.829 0.809 0.816 0.793
Salaried Employees 0.389 0.407 0.305 0.303 0.306 0.304
Hourly Employees 0.318 0.323 0.300 0.300 0.308 0.300
Mining & Manuf. 0.468 0.505 0.321 0.332 0.335 0.335
Transp., Comm., Util. 0.151 0.148 0.218 0.215 0.176 0.167
Retail and Services 0.129 0.165 0.105 0.083 0.183 0.179
Fin., Ins., Real Estate 0.149 0.148 0.120 0.112 0.101 0.093
Cancer per 1k 6.871 8.433 7.013 8.310 7.606 8.891
Pain per 1k 0.340 0.495 0.494 0.818 0.507 0.799
Fracture per 1k 1.753 1.557 1.626 1.562 1.863 1.790
Heart Disease per 1k 14.737 17.920 15.101 17.707 17.256 20.713
Diabetes per 1k 5.900 6.973 5.453 6.601 6.765 8.278
Mental Illness per 1k 1.210 1.235 1.065 1.150 1.336 1.395
Notes: All statistics except number of enrollees are weighted averages based on the first six months
of 2008 and 2010. Opioid use measures and diagnoses are per 1,000 enrollees aged 18-64. Demo-
graphics except average age, number of enrollees, and diagnoses are shares. “MME” stands for mor-
phine milligram equivalent. Other insurance plan types include comprehensive, consumer-driven,
and high-deductible health plans. Employees can be full-time, part-time, or early retirees; salaried,
hourly, or with unknown status. Other industries include agriculture, construction, wholesale, and
unknown. Mental illnesses include major depressive and bipolar disorders, schizophrenia, and other
nonorganic psychoses.
The largest changes occur in the number of enrollees. Approximately a quarter
of enrollees drop out between the first half of 2008 and the first half of 2010, but
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the share of drop-outs is similar for all three groups of states. While attrition does
not necessarily affect the results of my analyses, changing demographics and the
possibility that they are correlated with opioid use remain a concern and are explored
in greater detail in the next section.
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Results
2.4.1 Difference-in-Differences Strategy and Choice of Control
States
I take advantage of the staggered implementation of PDMPs and use a difference-
in-differences identification strategy to estimate their effect on opioid use. Because
there are multiple states that introduce PDMPs in the 2008-2010 period, I employ
the generalized version of this empirical approach:
yit = δi + δt + βDit + εit (2.1)
where yit is the natural logarithm of the outcome variable, δi and δt are state and
year-month fixed effects, respectively, Dit is an indicator variable that equals 1 if state
i has an operational PDMP in month t, and εit is the error term. In this setup, the
coefficient β captures the average treatment effect of a PDMP in percentage terms.
To control for attrition-induced changes in demographics, including pain-related
diagnoses such as cancer, which might coincide with the introduction of the PDMPs,
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I include demographic variables in my preferred specification:
yit = δi + δt + βDit + Xitγ + εit (2.2)
where Xit includes age and the shares of female enrollees, HMO, POS, PPO plans,
full-time, salaried, hourly employees, and employees in each industry aggregation.
Introduction of PDMPs in some states but not others is not sufficient to ensure un-
biased estimation. Treatment and control states need to be sufficiently similar. In par-
ticular, the trends in the outcome variables must be the same in the pre-intervention
period. Since PDMPs were typically established to counteract the growing opioid
epidemic, this may not be the case. If state lawmakers pass PDMP legislation based
on the rate of increase in an outcome variable, then the parallel trends assumption
will not hold and difference-in-differences estimation yield biased results.25
While visual inspection of Figure 2.2 suggests that outcome variable trends are
the same in the pre-intervention period for the three groups of states, I also use a
restricted set of control states to alleviate concerns about potentially non-parallel
trends. Specifically, I use only those states that enacted PDMPs after 2010. The
reasoning is that outcome trends for states that adopted right after 2010 are very
similar to the trends of the 2008-2010 adopters, but idiosyncracies in the legislative
and implementation processes could have led to different PDMP timing. Such id-
iosyncracies could be the amount of time health officials need to notice a problem
with opioid abuse in their state and bring it up with lawmakers, the amount of time
25However, if state lawmakers introduce PDMPs based on the level of an outcome variable, then
estimation is still unbiased.
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legislators need to pass a law, and the amount of time it takes to set up the infrastruc-
ture for a PDMP. Further, to avoid bias from anticipation effects, I also drop states
in which a PDMP law had been passed but the program had not become operational
in 2008-2010.26
PDMPs that became operational prior to 2008 can also serve as a control group.
However, I do not use them because of the possibility of dynamic effects. Bao et al.
(2018) find that PDMP effects strengthen over time. If that is the case with pre-
2008 PDMPs as well, these dynamic effects can bias estimation by making 2008-2010
PDMP seem less effective since the control group would be experiencing the effect
of the older PDMPs. Given that 16 out of the 27 pre-2008 PDMPs either became
operational or got modified (by introducing electronic reporting, initial user access,
or internet access) in the three years before 2008, it is plausible that such dynamic
effects are present.27
2.4.2 Results
Panel A of Table 2.4 shows the results from the difference-in-differences regressions
using all states that did not experience a change in PDMP status between 2008
26Anticipation effects may arise if physicians reduce the number of opioid prescriptions they write
after the PDMP law is passed but before the PDMP becomes operational. If this happens in
control states, it will lead to an underestimation of the growth in opioid use without a PDMP,
which will underestimate the magnitude of the PDMP effect. If it happens in treated states, it will
underestimate the magnitude of the total (i.e. anticipation plus post-implementation) PDMP effect.
By restricting the set of control states, I eliminate bias from anticipation in control states, although
it is possible that the results still underestimate the total PDMP effect if there is anticipation in
treated states.
27I explore a variety of alternative treatment and control groups in Appendix 2.7.2. These sensi-
tivity analyses show that the conclusions drawn from the main specification used in the paper are
robust and that using an extended set of control states may introduce bias due to anticipation or
dynamic effects.
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and 2010 as a control group. The estimates suggest that establishing an operational
PDMP leads to a 2.0% decline in the number of opioid prescriptions per capita (albeit
not statistically significant at conventional levels), a 2.3% decline in the days supply
per capita, and a more sizeable 4.5% decline in the MME per capita. Thus, in addition
to fewer opioid prescriptions being filled, they are also for a shorter duration and lower
dosage, which is consistent with PDMPs reducing the highest-risk opioid prescribing.
These results are in line with the rough estimates based on Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3,
although of lower magnitude.








Panel A: All States, No Demographics
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0197 0.164 Yes Yes No 0.9850 1800
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0231* 0.070 Yes Yes No 0.9880 1800
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0446** 0.024 Yes Yes No 0.9716 1800
Panel B: States with Post-2010 PDMP Law as Control Group, No Demographics
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0362* 0.071 Yes Yes No 0.9774 504
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0576** 0.031 Yes Yes No 0.9830 504
Log(MME per 1k) -0.1053*** 0.005 Yes Yes No 0.9678 504
Panel C: States with Post-2010 PDMP Law as Control Group, Demographics Included
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0281** 0.036 Yes Yes Yes 0.9820 504
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0379* 0.056 Yes Yes Yes 0.9862 504
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0834** 0.039 Yes Yes Yes 0.9777 504
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. An observation is a state-month pair in the period of 2008-
2010. Dependent variables are natural log of opioid utilization measures per 1,000 adults aged 18-64.
Included demographic variables are cancer, pain, and fracture diagnoses per 1,000 enrollees, as well
as age, age squared, share female, HMO, POS, PPO plan type, full-time, salaried, hourly employee,
employed in mining or manufacturing, transportation, communications, or utilities, retail trade or ser-
vices, and finance, insurance, or real estate. Panel A shows p-values based on robust standard errors
clustered at the state level. Panels B and C show p-values based on the wild-bootstrap procedure in
Cameron et al. (2008). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
The existence of multiple pre- and post-treatment periods in the data allows me to
perform an event study. An event study compares the difference in outcomes between
treated and control states in a focal period and a base period. The focal period can
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be any lead or lag of the time period in which a PDMP was introduced. Event
studies are useful as they allow the researcher to assess whether the parallel trends
assumption holds and whether the policy’s effect becomes stronger or weaker over
time. I implement the event study by including leads and lags of ∆Dit, an indicator
for the time period in which a state introduced a PDMP:
yit = δi + δt +
7∑
s=−12
βs∆Dit+s + εit (2.3)
Because the first PDMP becomes operational in July 2008, I include six leads to keep
the set of states on which the estimates of these six leads are based the same.28 The
seventh lead aggregates all leads of order seven and higher.29 Based on analogous
reasoning, since the last PDMP was introduced in January 2010, I include 11 lags
and a twelfth aggregate lag. I drop the first lead to allow the period just before the
introduction of a PDMP to be the base period.
The idea of the parallel trends test is that if the assumption holds, the leads will
be statistically indistinguishable from zero. Panel A of Figure 2.3 plots the estimated
βs coefficients of the event study for each outcome measure and their 95% confidence
intervals, with leads to the left of the vertical reference line, which indicates the
period of PDMP implementation. The leads are all statistically insignificant, which
gives credibility to the parallel trends assumption. It is difficult to discern a clear
upward or downward trend. To the extent that there might be a slight downward
28If I were to include a seventh lead, its estimate would be based on states that introduced a
PDMP in August 2008 or later.
29The state composition of this seventh lead is not constant.
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(a) Panel A: All States, No Demographics
(b) Panel B: States with Post-2010 PDMP Law as Control Group, No Demographics
(c) Panel C: States with Post-2010 PDMP Law as Control Group, Demographics Included
Figure 2.3: Pre-trends Tests
Notes: The month before a PDMP becomes operational is the base period. The band is a 95%
confidence interval around each point estimate.
pre-trend in the plots for days supply and MME, this might reflect faster growing
opioid use in control states. If that were the case, it would make PDMPs seem more
effective at reducing opioid utilization than they are, i.e. there would be a negative
bias in the difference-in-differences estimates in Panel A of Table 2.4.
To alleviate concerns about non-parallel pre-trends, I restrict the set of control
states to only those that passed PDMP legislation after 2010. There are eight such
states: Nebraska, Montana, Arkansas, Georgia, Maryland, New Hampshire, Wash-
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ington DC, and Missouri. The estimates reported in Panel B of Table 2.4 indicate
larger PDMP effects on all three outcome measures. To account for the small num-
ber of states (14) used in these analyses, I use p-values based on the wild-bootstrap
procedure described in Cameron et al. (2008).30 Even based on the wild-bootstrap p-
values, all estimates are statistically significant at least at the 10% significance level.
The estimated coefficients of the event studies, plotted in Panel B of Figure 2.3, reveal
no clear pre-trend.31
The attrition-induced changing demographic composition of the sample is another
issue that raises concerns about the unbiasedness of the estimates. If, for example,
young people from treated states attrit more than their peers from control states and if
young people consume more opioids per capita, then this form of differential attrition
will lead to downward (negative) bias in the difference-in-differences estimate of the
effectiveness of PDMPs, i.e. it will make PDMPs seem better at reducing opioid
usage.32 However, if attrition rates among the young are the same in treated and
control states or if age is uncorrelated with opioid consumption, then attrition will
not affect the results.
To account for the changes in the demographics of the sample, I include the number
of cancer, pain, and fracture diagnoses per 1,000 adults, as well as age, age squared,
30The usual cluster-robust standard errors are an asymptotic result. Cameron et al. (2008) show
that they tend to over-reject when the number of clusters is less than 30 and provide alternative ways
to calculate standard errors that have better small-sample (in terms of number of clusters) properties.
Unlike a typical bootstrap procedure, the wild bootstrap keeps the values of the regressors the same
and creates new values of the dependent variable by resampling the residuals of the model and
assigning them a weight of −1 or 1 with equal probability.
31Even though the coefficient on the second lead is statistically different from zero, a joint test for
significance cannot reject the null hypothesis that all leads are jointly zero.
32Bias with the opposite sign will arise if the number of enrollees with cancer increase more in
treated than in control states and if cancer patients use more pain medication. This will make it
seem as if PDMPs are increasing opioid utilization.
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shares of female enrollees, HMO, POS, PPO plan types, full-time, salaried, hourly
employees, and shares of enrollees employed in mining or manufacturing, transporta-
tion, communications, or utilities, retail trade or services, and finance, insurance, or
real estate as control variables. The results appear in Panel C of Table 2.4. The
estimates are somewhat smaller in magnitude than those in Panel B, which suggests
that differentially changing demographics might have introduced some bias in the
estimates in Panel B. However, the results are qualitatively the same. In the period
after a PDMP becomes operational opioid prescriptions per capita decline by 2.8%,
days supply - by 3.8%, and MME - by 8.3%, consistent with PDMPs being partic-
ularly effective at reducing the highest-risk prescribing. Like Panel B, Panel C of
Figure 2.3 shows no clear differential trends between treatment and control states
prior to the introduction of PDMPs.
2.5 Robustness Checks and Sensitivities
To examine the robustness of the results of the previous section, I conduct multiple
checks. As a starting point, I use the model with included demographics with states
that passed a PDMP law after 2010 as a control group, i.e. the results in Panel C of
Table 2.4.
2.5.1 Falsification Tests
While the results of the previous section suggest that PDMPs had a causal effect
on opioid utilization, an alternative explanation could be that these changes, lower
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utilization of opioids after PDMP implementation in treated states relative to control
states, reflect broader trends in the health care field in these states. Perhaps overall
prescription drug or medical procedure utilization increased more slowly in treated
states, and opioid use simply tracked these larger trends. If this were the case, a
difference-in-differences analysis would find a similar negative effect of PDMPs on
the utilization of non-controlled-substance drugs and medical procedures.
The richness of the Marketscan data allows me to test this hypothesis. Instead
of focusing on any particular prescription drug, I take all non-controlled substances
except for other pain medications (to avoid substitution effects), for the sample of
enrollees used in the main analyses, aggregate the number of prescriptions and days
supply up to the therapeutic class level, and perform a difference-in-differences using
the preferred specification from the previous section.33 I follow the same approach for
medical procedures, excluding those related to alcohol or drug use and poisonings,
except I calculate the number of procedures per capita instead of the number of
prescriptions per capita.
There are 150 prescription drug therapeutic classes and 183 medical procedures
groups that I perform difference-in-differences analysis on. The histograms of the
estimates in Figure 2.4 show that they are centered fairly close to zero. The mean of
the estimates using prescriptions per capita is -0.0002. 10 of these 150 estimates, or
6.7%, are statistically significant at the 10% significance level using wild-bootstrap
inference as in Cameron et al. (2008). The mean estimate and share significant at
10% for prescription drugs days supply are -0.0035 and 10%, whereas the same for




Figure 2.4: Falsification Tests
Notes: Each panel shows a histogram of the estimated PDMP effects for each prescription drug
therapeutic class (a, b) or medical procedure group (c).
93
medical procedures per capita are 0.0024 and 8.7%.
Note that if PDMPs had no effect on non-controlled substances, roughly 10% of
the estimates would be statistically significant at the 10% significance level by chance–
these would be the type I errors or false positives. Therefore, finding estimates that
are centered at zero and that are significant roughly 10% of the time provides strong
support to the notion that PDMPs did not coincide with general trends in health care
that affected treated and control states differently. This conclusion is supported by
a closer examination of the regression results for each therapeutic class and medical
procedure group, available in Tables 2.11 and 2.12 in Appendix 2.7.3, reveals no
pattern in the positive and negative results.34
2.5.2 Attrition
Table 2.3 reveals that a substantial number of enrollees drop out of the sample over
time. To make sure that attrition is not driving the results, I perform two robustness
checks. First, I re-estimate the model in Panel C of Table 2.4 using data from “stay-
ers,” i.e. enrollees that were present for the full length of the sample. This minimizes
concerns about changes in observable and unobservable enrollee characteristics by
focusing on the same individuals in each period. Second, I use individual-level data
to estimate a Cox proportional hazards model to determine whether heavy use of
opioids is associated with higher attrition in treated states.
34Interestingly, PDMPs seem to have an effect on the utilization of various treatments for consti-
pation, which can be induced by opioid drugs. The use of stimulant and saline laxatives increases,
while the use of enemas decreases. However, the net effect on all laxatives, aggregated into one
category, is insignificant (zero for number of prescriptions, negative for days supply).
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Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0207 0.144 Yes Yes Yes 0.9709 504
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0218 0.315 Yes Yes Yes 0.9829 504
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0765 0.335 Yes Yes Yes 0.9606 504
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. An observation is a state-month pair in the period of 2008-
2010. Dependent variables are natural log of opioid utilization measures per 1,000 adults aged 18-64
who were present for the full length of the sample period. Included demographic variables are can-
cer, pain, and fracture diagnoses per 1,000 enrollees, as well as age, age squared, share female, HMO,
POS, PPO plan type, full-time, salaried, hourly employee, employed in mining or manufacturing,
transportation, communications, or utilities, retail trade or services, and finance, insurance, or real
estate. p-values are based on the wild-bootstrap procedure in Cameron et al. (2008). ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
The results of the difference-in-differences analysis using only enrollees that stay
for the entire period are shown in Table 2.5.35 The estimated effects of PDMPs on
prescriptions, days supply, and MME per capita are somewhat smaller than those of
the main specification. However, the qualitative interpretation of the results remains
unchanged - PDMPs reduce the overall number of opioid prescriptions per capita but
especially high-dosage prescriptions. The estimates are much less precise possibly
because they are based on a lower number of enrollees.36
Although the results are qualitatively very similar, the differences in magnitude
may raise some concerns. To investigate whether heavy users of opioids are more
likely to drop out in treated states, I estimate a Cox proportional hazards model
using individual-level data.37 It models the hazard rate, i.e. the probability that an
35This analysis uses demographics as controls. However, given that the enrollees that make up the
sample remain the same and that I include state and year-month fixed effects, there is no or very
little residual variation in some of the demographics. Thus, observable demographics play a much
smaller role in this specification.
36On average across state-months, there are 79,608 enrollees in the sample based on stayers versus
102,858 enrollees in the full 2008 cohort sample.
37To ease the computational burden associated with estimating this nonlinear model, I use a 10%
random sample of the adult enrollees in the 14 states of interest. This yields 176,609 individuals
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individual drops out in the current period conditional on having survived up to the
current period, as function of covariates.38 The covariates I use are the three-month
trailing average of opioid use (measured in MME per month), the PDMP indicator
variable Dit, an interaction between opioid use and Dit, as well as individual-level
demographics and state and time fixed effects.39
The estimated coefficients of the Cox model are reported in Table 2.6. The co-
efficient on the PDMP indicator is positive, which suggests that the probability of
dropping out of the sample increases after a PDMP becomes operational, but it is
insignificant. Furthermore, even if higher attrition was associated with PDMP im-
plementation, this would not introduce bias in the difference-in-differences analysis
unless attrition was also correlated with higher or lower use of opioids. While there
is some evidence that heavy opioid use is associated with higher attrition (regard-
less of whether the state the enrollee is in has a PDMP or not), the insignificant
coefficient on the interaction between the PDMP indicator and opioid usage implies
that attrition is not different for heavy users in states and time periods with PDMP.
Therefore, the attrition present in the data is unlikely to bias the estimates of the
primary difference-in-difference analysis.
and 4,751,890 enrollee-months.
38Proportional hazards models are a type of survival models in which covariates are multiplicatively
related to the hazard function, the conditional probability of “failing” in a period given survival up
to that period. Cox proportional hazards models are a semi-parametric variety in which the baseline
hazard function is left unspecified (Greene, 2012).
39In addition to the three-month trailing average of MME per month, I also explored other mea-
sures of opioid use. Two and three-month trailing averages of MME, days supply, and number of
opioid prescriptions yield qualitatively the same results.
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Table 2.6: Cox Proportional Hazards Model
Estimate p-value
PDMP 0.133147 0.294
MME 3-month tr. avg. 0.000012 0.106






Notes: An observation is an enrollee-month. The dependent variable is an indicator whether an
enrollee drops out after a given period, having survived up to that period. Included demographic
variables are current or prior cancer diagnosis, pain or fracture diagnosis in the current or past two
months, as well as age, age squared, share female, HMO, POS, PPO plan type, full-time, salaried,
hourly employee, employed in mining or manufacturing, transportation, communications, or utili-
ties, retail trade or services, and finance, insurance, or real estate. p-values are based on the robust
standard errors clustered at the state level. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
2.5.3 Cross-border Opioid Purchases
Potential out-of-state opioid purchases are a common concern when the analysis of
PDMP effects on opioid prescribing is done at the state level. The reason is that a
user (or an abuser) who finds it difficult to obtain opioids after the implementation
of a PDMP may travel to a neighboring state without a PDMP and obtain the drugs
there. If sales were tracked at the state level, this type of behavior would decrease
per-capita opioid consumption in the PDMP state and increase it in the neighboring
state, which will bias the results towards finding a negative effect of PDMP on opioid
use.
This problem is significantly attenuated in my analysis because the Marketscan
database tracks prescription drug purchases at the individual level. As long as en-
rollees pay for prescriptions through their insurance, the prescription drug will be
associated with a particular enrollee and her state of residence. Therefore, even if a
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person travels out of state to get a drug, this purchase will be counted toward the
PDMP state’s count and it will not bias the estimation.
A problem arises if an individual travels out of state and pays for the opioids
out-of-pocket (or obtains them on the black market in the PDMP state). This will
lower the observed opioid sales in the PDMP state and make the PDMP seem more
effective at curtailing opioid use. Roberts et al. (2016) provides evidence that when
patients are forced to obtain opioid prescriptions from a single physician, they are
much more likely to avoid using their insurance. Whether the combined cost of having
to travel out-of-state and pay out-of-pocket deters most opioid users from doing so is
an open question. Unfortunately, I am not able to address it with the available data
and, therefore, leave it for future research.
2.5.4 Other Policy Changes as Confounding Factors
States responded to the opioid crisis by adopting a multitude of policies, one of which
was the implementation of PDMPs. If other policies were driving differential changes
in the treated and control states between 2008 and 2010, a difference-in-differences
analysis that does not take them into account would yield biased estimates of the
effectiveness of PDMPs. In this subsection, I review the timing of some of these other
policies and argue that they are unlikely to affect my results.
Mandates requiring physicians and pharmacists to register and consult the state’s
PDMP prior to prescribing or dispensing controlled substances are among the most
commonly studied opioid-related policies. Mallatt (2017) provides the timing of these
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mandates. The first state to introduce them was Nevada in 2007, while the second
was Ohio in 2011. Given that Nevada is not part of my restricted control group and
that there were no changes between 2008 and 2010, registration and use mandates
are unlikely to be introducing bias into my estimation.
Pain clinics, pejoratively called “pill mills,” are facilities primarily focused on pain
treatment for patients with various ailments. Laws governing their operation are
another potential confounding factor. However, between 2008 and 2010 there were
only two such laws: the Louisiana one, introduced in July 2005 and unchanged during
the period of interest, and the Texas one, introduced in June 2009.40 Once again, my
preferred specification with a restricted set of control states should be unaffected.
For similar reasons, naloxone access laws, Good Samaritan laws, state policies
limiting high morphine equivalent daily dose (MEDD) prescribing, and state Medicaid
expansions are unlikely to affect my results. There were no changes in naloxone laws
during 2008-2010 and only one new Good Samaritan law passed in Washington state
in June 2010 (Doleac and Mukherjee, 2018). Similarly, Heins et al. (2020) document
that the earliest MEDD policy was enacted in Washington state in 2007 was not
changed until 2012, while other states implemented such policies in 2011 and later.
Medicaid expansions under the Affordable Care Act did not start until 2014 Maclean
and Saloner (2019).
Evans et al. (2019) and Alpert et al. (2017) study the effects of the introduction of
abuse-deterrent OxyContin in August 2010 and find a substantial increase in the use
of heroin. To the extent that reformulated OxyContin differentially affected treated
40Timing provided in Mallatt (2017).
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and control states in my sample, it may bias my estimation of PDMP effects. As
a sensitivity, I reestimate my main model on data only prior to August 2010. The
results are qualitatively the same and quantitatively very similar to my main results.41
The medical use of marijuana, treating severe and chronic pain among other ail-
ments and a potential substitute for opioid medications, started to get legalized in
the late 1990s. During the 2008-2010 period, medical marijuana laws came into effect
in Arizona (November 2010), Michigan (December 2008), New Jersey (July 2010),
and Washington DC (July 2010), and were amended in Colorado (June 2010), Maine
(November 2009), Rhode Island (June 2009), and Washington (November 2008).42
Out of these states, only Arizona and Washington DC are in my preferred specifi-
cation. Dropping Arizona and DC entirely or just the periods after these laws were
introduced does not significantly affect the estimates of my preferred specification.
Given all of these findings, I conclude that it is unlikely that other policies are
confounding my results.
2.6 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is to estimate the effect of plain-vanilla PDMPs for the
population of working-age adults that bore the brunt of the opioid crisis. PDMP with
no registration or use mandates were the predominant type of monitoring programs
until 2010. Many considered them to be ineffective. However, the results of the
41This sensitivity also takes care of the withdrawal of propoxyphene from the market on November
19, 2010 (Haffajee et al., 2018) .
42Description and timing of these marijuana laws are provided by ProCon.org (2019).
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current paper suggests that, to the contrary, these programs were effective at reducing
opioid use, especially prescriptions for longer-term supply and high dosage. Therefore,
even though modifications such as use mandates strengthened their effects, these early
PDMPs were a step in the right direction in the fight against the opioid crisis.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 PDMP Effect on Health Outcomes
In this section, I analyze the impact of PDMPs on health outcomes such as heroin
poisonings, poisonings with any opioids, and opioid dependence and abuse inpatient
and outpatient admissions.43 Given that Alpert et al. (2017) and Evans et al. (2019)
provide evidence that opioids and heroin are substitutes, it is possible that heroin
poisonings increase if PDMPs are successful in reducing opioid utilization and espe-
cially if they prevent those addicted to opioids from obtaining them. The effect on the
other two health outcomes is a priori ambiguous: any-opioid poisonings may increase
or decrease depending on whether the decline in opioid usage is larger or smaller than
the increase in possible substitutes like heroin and methadone. Similarly, treatment
for opioid dependence and abuse may increase or decrease depending on the changes
in utilization in prescription and other types of opioids.
Figure 2.5 shows the evolution of these health outcomes over time. Poisoning
events are fairly rare and panels (a) and (b) show very irregular patterns over time.
While the number of dependence and abuse admissions per capita in panel (c) is
higher, it is quite variable over time, especially in the treated states. The same applies
for panel (d), which combines the poisoning counts in panel (b) and the dependence
and abuse counts from panel (c). Compared to Figure 2.2, it is much more difficult
to claim that the parallel trends assumption is likely to hold for health outcomes.
43I identify these health outcomes using the following ICD-9-CM codes: 965.01 for heroin poisoin-





Figure 2.5: Health Outcomes over Time
Notes: The statistics for each group of states are the averages over all states within a group, weighted
by number of enrollees. The vertical lines indicate the months in which PDMPs became operational.
Therefore, any results from a difference-in-differences analysis of these data should
be treated with caution.
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Table 2.7: Difference-in-Differences Analysis, Health Outcomes
β̂ p-val R2 Obs
Panel A: All States
Log(Heroin Pois. per 100k) 0.0642** 0.025 0.200 1,800
Log(Any-Opioid Pois. per 100k) 0.2321** 0.050 0.196 1,800
Log(Opioid Dep. & Ab. Adm. per 100k) 0.0071 0.967 0.697 1,800
Log(Opioid Pois., Dep. & Ab. Adm. per 100k) 0.0579 0.723 0.680 1,800
Panel B: States with Post-2010 PDMP Law as Control Group
Log(Heroin Pois. per 100k) -0.0035 0.946 0.245 504
Log(Any-Opioid Pois. per 100k) 0.2521 0.192 0.261 504
Log(Opioid Dep. & Ab. Adm. per 100k) -0.0667 0.890 0.694 504
Log(Opioid Pois., Dep. & Ab. Adm. per 100k) -0.0372 0.935 0.684 504
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. An observation is a state-month pair in the period of
2008-2010. Dependent variables are natural log of health outcome measures per 100,000 adults aged
18-64. Demographic variables, year-month and state fixed effects are included in each regression. p-
values are based on the wild-bootstrap procedure in Cameron et al. (2008). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗p < 0.1.
Table 2.7 summarizes the difference-in-differences analyses of the health outcomes.
Even though the PDMP effect on any-opioid poisonings seems to be large and positive,
the patterns in Figure 2.5 make these estimates highly suspect. The estimated effect
on combined poisoning, dependence, and abuse admissions may be somewhat more
believable based on Figure 2.5, but they are highly insignificant, positive in one case
and negative in the other, based on the full and restricted set of states. Therefore, I
cannot make any strong conclusions about the effect of PDMPs on health outcomes.
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2.7.2 Alternative Control and Treatment Groups
In the main specification of the difference-in-differences model, I use states that have
not passed PDMP legislation as of the end of 2010 as a control group. I do that to
eliminate possible bias from dynamic effects of PDMPs passed in years prior to 2008
and from anticipation effects of PDMPs that were approved prior to 2010 but did not
become operational only after 2010. In this section of the Appendix, I explore the
sensitivity of the results with respect to different control and treatment groups.
Table 2.8 summarizes the first set of robustness checks. I proceed by including
South Carolina, which I had excluded in the main specification because it has only one
non-treated month, as part of the treatment group and then successively adding the
PDMPs that became operational in 2007, 2006, 2005, and in all years prior to 2005.
Adding South Carolina decreases the magnitude of the PDMP effect on prescriptions
but increases it for days supply and MME per capita, leaving the overall results very
similar to the baseline. Including the PDMPs of 2007 (Colorado, North Carolina, and
North Dakota) leads to much smaller coefficients. However, closer examination of the
data for North Dakota, shown in Figure 2.6, reveals that it is an outlier both in terms
of the magnitude and trends of opioid utilization. Adding only Colorado and North
Carolina, which are much closer to the typical treatment and control states, produces
results that are much more similar to the main results. The magnitudes are slightly
smaller, which suggests that the strengthening effects of these PDMPs over time may
be biasing the results by making the increase in opioid consumption in control states
seem smaller. Similar results arise from including PDMPs that became operational
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in 2006 and 2005. Finally, adding all PDMPs that were operational prior to 2005
significantly decreases the estimated effects possibly because these states saw smaller
increases in opioid utilization thanks to the well-established monitoring programs.
Table 2.8: Alternative Control Groups, Add Pre-2008 PDMPs
β̂ p-val R2 Obs
Panel A: Baseline (Panel C in Table 2.4)
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0281** 0.036 0.982 504
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0379* 0.056 0.986 504
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0834** 0.039 0.978 504
Panel B.1: Baseline + SC
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0258** 0.017 0.983 540
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0395** 0.011 0.987 540
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0868** 0.011 0.978 540
Panel B.2: Baseline + SC + PDMP-07
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0152* 0.080 0.98 648
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0105 0.521 0.984 648
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0136 0.742 0.969 648
Panel B.3: Baseline + SC + PDMP-07 (excl. ND)
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0244** 0.025 0.983 612
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0331** 0.036 0.987 612
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0706** 0.018 0.978 612
Panel B.4: Baseline + SC + PDMP-06-07 (excl. ND)
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0262*** 0.005 0.986 720
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0349*** 0.007 0.990 720
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0768*** 0.009 0.980 720
Panel B.5: Baseline + SC + PDMP-05-07 (excl. ND)
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0269*** 0.005 0.985 792
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0374*** 0.005 0.989 792
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0820*** 0.003 0.978 792
Panel B.6: Baseline + SC + PDMP-05-07 (excl. ND) + PDMP-Pre05
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0171 0.216 0.989 1440
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0177 0.189 0.992 1440
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0604*** 0.004 0.981 1440
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. An observation is a state-month pair in the period of
2008-2010. Dependent variables are natural log of opioid utilization measures per 1,000 adults
aged 18-64. “MME” stands for morphine milligram equivalent. Demographic variables, year-
month and state fixed effects are included in each regression. p-values are based on the wild-
bootstrap procedure in Cameron et al. (2008). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. PDMP-07 =
CO, NC, ND; PDMP-06 = AL, OH, TN; PDMP-05 = MS, NM; PDMP-Pre05 = CA, ID, IL,
PA, NY, RI, TX, MI, OK, MA, WV, UT, NV, IN, KY, VA, ME, WY.




Figure 2.6: Alternative Control Group (Add South Carolina, Colorado, North Car-
olina, and North Dakota)
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PDMPs that were approved by state legislatures before 2010 but came into effect
after 2010. Including the PDMPs of 2011 (Kansas, Oregon, Alaska, Florida, New
Jersey, Washington, and South Dakota) yields smaller effects on prescriptions and
days supply but a larger effect on MME. Overall, the results are quite similar to
the baseline, although there might be a slight anticipation effect as reflected by the
smaller coefficients on prescriptions and days supply.44 Adding the rest of the post-
2010 PDMPs (Delaware andWisconsin) lowers the magnitudes of the estimated effects
further, although this is largely driven by Delaware.
Table 2.9: Alternative Control Groups, Add Post-2010 PDMPs
β̂ p-val R2 Obs
Panel A: Baseline (Panel C in Table 2.4)
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0281** 0.036 0.982 504
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0379* 0.056 0.986 504
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0834** 0.039 0.978 504
Panel C.1: Baseline + PDMP-11
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0250 0.119 0.982 756
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0298 0.108 0.985 756
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0962*** 0.003 0.977 756
Panel C.2: Baseline + PDMP-11 + PDMP-Post11
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0177 0.271 0.981 828
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0175 0.358 0.985 828
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0755** 0.018 0.977 828
Panel C.3: Baseline + PDMP-11 + PDMP-Post11 (excl. DE)
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0215 0.144 0.982 792
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0236 0.185 0.985 792
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0853*** 0.005 0.976 792
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. An observation is a state-month pair in the period of
2008-2010. Dependent variables are natural log of opioid utilization measures per 1,000 adults
aged 18-64. “MME” stands for morphine milligram equivalent. Demographic variables, year-
month and state fixed effects are included in each regression. p-values are based on the wild-
bootstrap procedure in Cameron et al. (2008). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1. PDMP-11 =
KS, OR, AK, FL, NJ, WA, SD; PDMP-Post11 = DE, WI.
44An anticipation effect will lower opioid utilization in the later part of the 2008-2010 period,
making the increase in opioid use smaller for the control group, which will make the effect of PDMPs
seem smaller.
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Finally, in Table 2.10 I explore the robustness of the results with respect to the
states that are included in the treatment group. I drop each of the treated states, one
at a time, and re-estimate the model. The results are all very similar to the baseline
results, which suggests that there is no single state that is driving the overall results.
Table 2.10: Alternative Treatment Groups, Drop States One-by-One
β̂ p-val R2 Obs
Panel A: Baseline (Panel C in Table 2.4)
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0281** 0.036 0.982 504
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0379* 0.056 0.986 504
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0834** 0.039 0.978 504
Panel D.1: Drop CT
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0274*** 0.002 0.983 468
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0302* 0.080 0.987 468
Log(MME per 1k) -0.1052** 0.042 0.977 468
Panel D.2: Drop AZ
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0389*** 0.000 0.980 468
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0447** 0.013 0.985 468
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0961** 0.030 0.976 468
Panel D.3: Drop LA
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0272 0.138 0.98 468
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0311 0.149 0.985 468
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0989* 0.061 0.977 468
Panel D.4: Drop IA
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0375** 0.035 0.981 468
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0388* 0.061 0.986 468
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0951** 0.025 0.977 468
Panel D.5: Drop VT
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0347** 0.035 0.983 468
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0493* 0.089 0.987 468
Log(MME per 1k) -0.1027** 0.013 0.980 468
Panel D.6: Drop MN
Log(Presc. per 1k) -0.0295 0.196 0.981 468
Log(Days Supp. per 1k) -0.0366 0.230 0.985 468
Log(MME per 1k) -0.0794** 0.043 0.976 468
Notes: Each row is a separate regression. An observation is a state-month pair in the period of
2008-2010. Dependent variables are natural log of opioid utilization measures per 1,000 adults
aged 18-64. “MME” stands for morphine milligram equivalent. Demographic variables, year-
month and state fixed effects are included in each regression. p-values are based on the wild-
bootstrap procedure in Cameron et al. (2008). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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2.7.3 Falsification Test Results
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 contain the output from the falsification test regressions discussed
in Section 2.5.1.
Table 2.11: Falsification Tests, Prescription Drug Regressions
Log(Presc. per 1k) Log(Days Supp. per 1k)
Therapeutic Class β̂ p-val R2 β̂ p-val R2
Vitamin D, NEC -0.133*** 0.000 0.970 -0.131*** 0.002 0.956
Cath & Lax, Laxatives, Enemas -0.126*** 0.000 0.650 -0.132 0.196 0.537
Vitamin A & Derivatives -0.059*** 0.005 0.579 -0.294*** 0.009 0.519
Sulfones, NEC -0.050*** 0.004 0.470 -0.266* 0.069 0.390
Antimalarial Agents, NEC -0.047** 0.031 0.730 -0.110*** 0.009 0.646
S/MM, Soaps/Cleansers/Antiseptics -0.045 0.112 0.648 -0.076 0.172 0.603
Antiinflam S/MM Agnts & Comb, Misc -0.041** 0.031 0.813 -0.049** 0.042 0.845
Antichol/Antimuscarinic/Antispas -0.037 0.155 0.897 -0.051 0.345 0.802
Antiprut/Local Anest S/MM, NEC -0.035 0.182 0.741 -0.109* 0.064 0.717
Anticonvulsants, Misc -0.035** 0.020 0.914 -0.031* 0.094 0.889
Autonomic, Nicotine Preparations -0.035 0.247 0.881 -0.084 0.218 0.820
S/MM Miscellaneous, NEC -0.034 0.148 0.748 -0.093** 0.032 0.797
Eye/Ear/Nose/Throat Misc, NEC -0.034 0.158 0.845 -0.062* 0.062 0.832
Antidiabetic Agents, Insulin -0.032* 0.070 0.867 -0.066*** 0.008 0.825
Antituberculosis Agents, NEC -0.030* 0.100 0.686 -0.159 0.210 0.570
Antiallergic Agents -0.028 0.318 0.877 -0.048 0.574 0.728
Psychother, Tranq/Antipsychotics -0.027 0.165 0.838 -0.016 0.584 0.799
Repl Preps, Sodium Chlor Preps -0.026* 0.097 0.602 -0.062 0.510 0.541
Antihistamines & Comb, NEC -0.025 0.280 0.933 -0.001 0.970 0.847
Thy/Antithy, Antithyroid Agents -0.025 0.303 0.561 -0.056 0.583 0.534
Diuretics, Loop Diuretics -0.025 0.192 0.919 -0.028 0.318 0.882
Anti-infectives, Misc -0.024 0.325 0.843 -0.046 0.341 0.685
Cardiac, Alpha-Beta Blockers -0.022 0.317 0.728 -0.081 0.352 0.496
Antichol/Antiparkinsonian Agents -0.022 0.170 0.611 -0.139 0.234 0.645
Antibiot, Cephalosporin and Rel. -0.021 0.339 0.900 -0.047* 0.095 0.878
Alkalinizing Agents, NEC -0.021 0.257 0.564 -0.075 0.547 0.442
(260-Missing Description) -0.019 0.265 0.530 -0.135 0.317 0.524
Leukotriene Modifiers -0.018 0.351 0.830 -0.047* 0.073 0.748
Antiifect, Sulfonamides EENT -0.017 0.305 0.412 -0.026 0.811 0.348
Cell Stim/Proliferant S/MM, NEC -0.016 0.517 0.827 -0.032 0.547 0.802
(254-Missing Description) -0.016* 0.052 0.433 -0.295** 0.037 0.398
Antiinf S/MM, Antibiotics & Comb -0.016 0.442 0.894 -0.009 0.760 0.863
Antihelmintic, NEC -0.015 0.370 0.202 -0.110 0.170 0.214
Fluoride Preparations, NEC -0.015 0.518 0.798 -0.103 0.285 0.675
Oxytocics, NEC -0.013 0.355 0.347 0.007 0.872 0.543
Urinary Anti-infectives, NEC -0.013 0.567 0.834 0.011 0.833 0.694
Caloric Agents, Nutrition Preps -0.013 0.100 0.773 -0.114 0.300 0.768
Muscle Relax, Skeletal Central -0.012 0.418 0.955 -0.044** 0.038 0.947
Histamine (H2) Antagonists, NEC -0.012 0.597 0.909 -0.052 0.199 0.850
Muscle Relax, Skeletal, Misc -0.012 0.508 0.743 0.004 0.970 0.723
Thy/Antithy, Thyroid Hormones -0.011 0.220 0.962 -0.024** 0.046 0.954
Miotics, EENT, NEC -0.011 0.173 0.189 -0.164 0.192 0.242
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Log(Presc. per 1k) Log(Days Supp. per 1k)
Therapeutic Class β̂ p-val R2 β̂ p-val R2
Coag/Anticoag, Anticoagulants -0.011 0.611 0.688 -0.016 0.563 0.718
Antiplatelet Agents, NEC -0.011 0.552 0.946 -0.024 0.387 0.920
Cardiac, Antiarrhythmic Agents -0.009 0.674 0.817 0.043 0.615 0.718
Estrogens & Comb, NEC -0.008 0.508 0.980 -0.030* 0.062 0.967
Parasympathomimetic, NEC -0.008 0.668 0.685 -0.075 0.500 0.541
(257-Missing Description) -0.008 0.603 0.931 -0.026 0.252 0.869
Biological Response Modifiers -0.008 0.706 0.815 0.039 0.446 0.779
Cholelitholytic Agents, NEC -0.008 0.621 0.564 -0.007 0.949 0.567
Vitamin Bs w/Vitamin C, NEC -0.007 0.450 0.590 -0.131 0.274 0.585
Hypotensive Agents, NEC -0.007 0.720 0.935 -0.045 0.131 0.892
Antiinfect, Antibiotics, EENT -0.007 0.778 0.410 0.018 0.643 0.424
Multivit Prep, Multivit Minerals -0.007 0.610 0.934 0.155 0.120 0.909
Antiinf S/MM, Antivirals & Comb -0.007 0.799 0.470 -0.054 0.605 0.402
Vasodilating Agents, NEC -0.007 0.778 0.861 0.023 0.749 0.704
Depig/Pig/S/MM Depigment Agents -0.007 0.645 0.432 -0.098 0.401 0.455
Hematopoietic Agents, NEC -0.006 0.764 0.391 -0.089 0.555 0.439
Antiinfect, Antiinflam EENT -0.005 0.848 0.686 -0.003 0.963 0.598
Vitamin K Derivatives, NEC -0.005 0.390 0.222 0.000 0.994 0.360
Digestants & Comb, NEC -0.005 0.746 0.531 -0.107 0.346 0.651
Vaccines, NEC -0.005 0.934 0.747 0.004 0.974 0.589
Sympatholytic Agents NEC -0.005 0.662 0.390 -0.057 0.597 0.461
Mydriatics, EENT, NEC -0.004 0.741 0.171 0.024 0.847 0.239
Sulfonamides & Comb, NEC -0.004 0.847 0.894 -0.007 0.858 0.679
Antiinfect, Antivirals, EENT -0.004 0.670 0.176 -0.040 0.639 0.229
Antibiot, Aminoglycosides -0.003 0.858 0.588 0.030 0.730 0.639
Folic Acid & Derivatives, NEC -0.003 0.894 0.747 0.018 0.652 0.717
Adrenals & Comb, NEC -0.003 0.833 0.876 -0.029* 0.057 0.881
Ammonia Detoxicants, NEC -0.003 0.893 0.509 0.046 0.742 0.366
Antianemic, Iron Preparations -0.002 0.878 0.812 0.038 0.781 0.737
S/MM Misc, Vaginal Lubricants -0.002 0.771 0.728 -0.071 0.489 0.648
Antiinflam Agents EENT, NEC -0.002 0.914 0.867 -0.005 0.798 0.834
Antidiarrhea Agents, NEC -0.002 0.842 0.507 -0.038 0.699 0.573
Diuretics, Carb Anhydrase Inhib -0.002 0.919 0.553 -0.120 0.386 0.408
Immunosuppressants, NEC -0.001 0.945 0.844 -0.030 0.432 0.692
Antiinf S/MM, Antiinf Local Misc -0.001 0.965 0.725 -0.005 0.921 0.678
Antiemetics, NEC -0.001 0.973 0.655 0.061 0.185 0.659
Antidiabetic Agents, Misc 0.000 0.992 0.956 -0.026* 0.062 0.950
Antibiotics, Misc 0.000 0.998 0.478 0.004 0.931 0.453
Roentgenography, NEC 0.000 0.914 0.365 0.000 0.916 0.410
Antihyperlipidemic Drugs, NEC 0.001 0.912 0.973 -0.017* 0.076 0.966
Eyewash/Eyestrm/Lubr/Tear, NEC 0.001 0.967 0.674 0.001 0.987 0.570
Hemorrheologic Agents, NEC 0.002 0.87 0.456 -0.014 0.917 0.482
Gonadotropins, NEC 0.002 0.958 0.682 -0.014 0.908 0.566
Multivit Prep, Multivit Plain 0.002 0.917 0.814 0.047 0.674 0.675
Antiinfectives, Misc EENT 0.002 0.766 0.201 0.063 0.363 0.236
Antibiot, Penicillins 0.002 0.896 0.880 -0.014 0.509 0.850
Phosphodiesterase Inhibitors 0.002 0.900 0.946 0.024 0.438 0.880
Anxiolytic/Sedative/Hypnotic NEC 0.002 0.914 0.820 0.013 0.721 0.754
Contraceptive, Oral Comb, NEC 0.003 0.700 0.978 -0.011 0.322 0.962
Serums, NEC 0.004 0.429 0.688 -0.037 0.578 0.685
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Falsification Tests, Prescription Drug Regressions (continued)
Log(Presc. per 1k) Log(Days Supp. per 1k)
Therapeutic Class β̂ p-val R2 β̂ p-val R2
Keratoplastic Agents S/MM, NEC 0.004 0.81 0.338 0.014 0.904 0.403
Vascular 5HT1 Agonist, NEC 0.005 0.776 0.854 -0.017 0.650 0.721
Anesthetics, Local EENT, NEC 0.006 0.730 0.532 -0.034 0.737 0.487
Pituitary Hormones, NEC 0.006 0.672 0.462 0.045 0.733 0.493
Unclassified Agents, NEC 0.006 0.719 0.918 -0.024 0.330 0.904
(261-Missing Description) 0.007 0.705 0.769 0.009 0.793 0.737
Gastrointestinal Drugs Misc, NEC 0.007 0.536 0.968 0.008 0.586 0.962
Keratolytic Agents S/MM, NEC 0.008 0.637 0.611 0.035 0.776 0.571
Caloric/Nutrition/Dietary Misc 0.009 0.388 0.806 0.212* 0.068 0.775
Vitamin Bs & B Complex, NEC 0.009 0.688 0.860 0.128 0.209 0.708
Cardiac, Calcium Channel 0.009 0.407 0.983 -0.012 0.370 0.971
Cardiac, Beta Blockers 0.010 0.355 0.961 -0.016 0.156 0.959
Cardiac Drugs. NEC 0.010 0.346 0.985 -0.003 0.772 0.980
Antivirals, NEC 0.010 0.734 0.911 -0.015 0.541 0.969
Cough/Cough/Cold Comb, NEC 0.011 0.759 0.937 -0.018 0.867 0.905
Cardiac, ACE Inhibitors 0.011 0.234 0.967 -0.019* 0.059 0.969
Anticholinergic, NEC 0.011 0.617 0.765 0.030 0.591 0.687
Antibiot, Antifungal 0.011 0.601 0.887 -0.038 0.318 0.741
Potassium Removing Resins, NEC 0.011* 0.064 0.341 0.075 0.298 0.454
Enzyme Preps, Topical S/MM, NEC 0.011 0.188 0.259 0.067 0.332 0.354
Caloric Agents, Amino Acid Preps 0.012 0.188 0.454 0.225 0.121 0.467
Progestins, NEC 0.013 0.552 0.731 -0.015 0.618 0.743
Antimanic Agents, NEC 0.013 0.591 0.663 0.017 0.777 0.639
S/MM Misc, Astringents 0.014 0.457 0.428 0.081 0.523 0.429
Multivit Prep, Multivit Iron 0.014 0.234 0.821 -0.069 0.54 0.852
Antiinf S/MM, Antifungals & Comb 0.015 0.501 0.914 0.003 0.923 0.877
Mucolytics, Cold Comb, NEC 0.016 0.134 0.329 0.232* 0.057 0.341
Sympathomimetic Agents, NEC 0.016 0.434 0.751 -0.004 0.838 0.778
Repl Preps, Potassium Supp 0.018 0.341 0.956 0.001 0.978 0.934
Antiinf S/MM, Scabic/Pediculic 0.019 0.387 0.447 0.059 0.577 0.401
Parathyroid Hormones, NEC 0.020 0.131 0.575 0.073 0.602 0.571
Muscle Rel, Smooth-Genitour NEC 0.020 0.322 0.846 0.024 0.510 0.791
Vitamins & Comb Misc, NEC 0.021*** 0.004 0.631 0.250*** 0.008 0.666
Antibiot, Erythromycin & Macrolide 0.022 0.434 0.915 -0.012 0.692 0.895
Diuretics, Potassium-Sparing 0.023* 0.099 0.953 -0.024 0.258 0.898
Quinolones, NEC 0.023 0.237 0.897 0.018 0.432 0.872
Antigout Agents, NEC 0.024 0.305 0.802 0.027 0.436 0.757
Muscle Rel, Smooth-Respiratr NEC 0.025 0.107 0.803 0.175 0.185 0.631
Repl Preps, Calcium Supp 0.025** 0.044 0.349 0.187 0.172 0.414
Psychother, Antidepressants 0.026*** 0.001 0.975 0.005 0.584 0.969
Emoll/Moist/Demul/Protect S/MM 0.027 0.281 0.712 0.033 0.753 0.587
Multivit Prep, Multivit Prenatal 0.027 0.185 0.951 0.022 0.567 0.907
Diuretics, Thiazides & related 0.028** 0.025 0.964 0.006 0.692 0.959
Phosphorus Removing Agents, NEC 0.029** 0.025 0.677 0.106 0.428 0.600
Antidiabetic Ag, Sulfonylureas 0.029* 0.098 0.931 -0.011 0.630 0.885
(263-Missing Description) 0.032*** 0.008 0.651 0.201** 0.045 0.645
Cath & Lax, Laxatives, Saline 0.032 0.110 0.778 0.073 0.397 0.711
Ovulation Stimulants, NEC 0.034* 0.077 0.544 0.044 0.572 0.586
CNS Agents, Misc. 0.038 0.104 0.874 0.045 0.294 0.834
(262-Missing Description) 0.040* 0.098 0.683 0.074 0.183 0.440
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Falsification Tests, Prescription Drug Regressions (continued)
Log(Presc. per 1k) Log(Days Supp. per 1k)
Therapeutic Class β̂ p-val R2 β̂ p-val R2
Antitussives/Cold Comb, NEC 0.041 0.213 0.882 0.000 0.999 0.849
Anticonv, Hydantoin Derivatives 0.043* 0.059 0.737 0.139 0.196 0.568
Antibiot, Tetracyclines 0.052** 0.012 0.698 0.042* 0.069 0.722
Pharmaceutical Aids/Adjuv, NEC 0.053* 0.071 0.743 0.068 0.533 0.735
Vitamin Bs w/Iron/Other Min NEC 0.056*** 0.002 0.803 0.419*** 0.000 0.815
Cardiac, Cardiac Glycosides 0.060*** 0.003 0.839 -0.004 0.959 0.662
Antineoplastics S/MM, NEC 0.070*** 0.002 0.493 0.435*** 0.001 0.468
Cath & Lax, Laxatives, Stimulant 0.170*** 0.000 0.730 0.133 0.256 0.700
Notes: Each row shows the regressions of the number of prescriptions per capita and the days supply
per capita for a given therapeutic class of drugs. Demographic variables, year-month and state fixed
effects are included in each regression, which is estimated on 504 observations. An observation is a
state-month pair in the period of 2008-2010. p-values are based on the wild-bootstrap procedure in
Cameron et al. (2008). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 2.12: Falsification Tests, Medical Procedure Group Regressions
Log(Procedures per 1k)
Medical Procedure Group β̂ p-val R2
Other home health services -0.183*** 0.003 0.903
Other medicine procedures -0.160*** 0.001 0.777
Destruction, facial lesion -0.134*** 0.000 0.540
Other preventive medical services -0.127** 0.014 0.701
Durable medical equipment -0.120*** 0.000 0.883
Psychiatric diagnostic services -0.117*** 0.001 0.774
Blood chemistry, Rx monitor -0.116*** 0.003 0.723
Other ENT services (non-surgical) -0.105** 0.026 0.943
Physical medicine: unlisted/other -0.102* 0.073 0.841
Injections: immunizations -0.101** 0.011 0.969
Other lab & path procedures -0.100* 0.090 0.827
Chemotherapy injections -0.099* 0.081 0.789
Ophthalmic diagnostic services -0.088*** 0.002 0.913
Physical medicine: manipulation -0.081** 0.021 0.842
Transurethral surgery -0.076 0.201 0.264
Other toxicology tests -0.074** 0.013 0.943
Blood test: Hgb/Hct -0.074** 0.028 0.941
Home health PT/OT/ST -0.068 0.353 0.681
EKG stress test -0.061* 0.082 0.724
Other minor respiratory procedures -0.054* 0.092 0.646
Minor hemic & lymphatic procedures -0.053 0.183 0.156
Other chemistry tests -0.053*** 0.002 0.974
Laparoscopy, hysteroscopy -0.052 0.472 0.812
Dental: basic restorative -0.050 0.127 0.444
Chiropractic services -0.049** 0.024 0.974
Transportation services -0.046 0.304 0.764
Psychotherapy, family -0.043 0.283 0.888
Nerve conduction tests/EMG -0.043 0.549 0.583
Allergy therapy -0.04* 0.065 0.973
CT scan, extremities -0.039 0.206 0.170
Other urinalysis -0.038 0.105 0.896
Physical medicine: other modes -0.036 0.273 0.913
Blood test: sedimentation rate -0.032 0.230 0.899
General eye exams -0.031 0.400 0.981
Performance tracking codes -0.029 0.373 0.652
Physical medicine: hot/cold packs -0.029 0.544 0.916
X-ray, abdomen -0.028 0.388 0.760
Anesthesia services -0.026 0.253 0.899
Other radioimmunoassays (RIA) -0.025 0.702 0.963
Arthrocentesis, large joint -0.025 0.442 0.762
Nail debridement/avulsion -0.025 0.363 0.778
Echocardiogram -0.025 0.453 0.882
Dx ultrasound, pregnancy -0.024 0.454 0.857
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Falsification Tests, Medical Procedure Group Regressions (continued)
Log(Procedures per 1k)
Medical Procedure Group β̂ p-val R2
Decompression, carpal tunnel -0.023 0.433 0.498
Destruction of warts -0.022 0.397 0.809
Destruction, non-facial lesion -0.021 0.614 0.803
Dx ultrasound, other -0.019 0.387 0.864
Bacterial culture, screening -0.019 0.545 0.863
Preventive care visits -0.018 0.252 0.942
Specialty drugs -0.017 0.715 0.802
Office visits, new patient -0.017 0.263 0.927
Speech/hearing therapy -0.016 0.693 0.336
Physical medicine: other procedures -0.015 0.390 0.956
Spirometry -0.015 0.593 0.853
Cystourethroscopy -0.015 0.644 0.547
Mammograms -0.014 0.480 0.899
Office visits, established patient -0.014* 0.086 0.950
Acne surgery -0.013 0.329 0.581
Other major ear/auditory procedures -0.013 0.678 0.212
Other radiology procedure -0.013 0.693 0.604
Other minor cardiovascular procedures -0.013 0.754 0.850
Venograms -0.012 0.490 0.230
Nuclear medicine, diagnostic -0.012 0.786 0.870
Major hemic & lymphatic procedures -0.011 0.802 0.171
PTCA- percutaneous angioplasty -0.010 0.656 0.379
Major maternity procs & related care -0.010 0.801 0.279
Other neurology dx services -0.009 0.799 0.755
CT scan, abdomen/pelvis -0.008 0.795 0.644
Thyroid function tests (RIA) -0.008 0.664 0.954
Pulmonary function tests -0.007 0.848 0.725
Blood count, automated -0.007 0.638 0.973
Excision of breast tissue -0.007 0.868 0.169
Other microbiology tests -0.007 0.807 0.938
Bronchoscopy -0.006 0.839 0.152
Other minor musculoskeletal surgery -0.005 0.906 0.720
Repair of inguinal hernia -0.004 0.939 0.19
Medical supplies and devices -0.004 0.869 0.849
X-ray, extremities -0.003 0.853 0.783
Allergy testing -0.003 0.941 0.530
Lymphangiograms -0.003 0.851 0.149
Pap smear -0.003 0.889 0.932
EKG monitoring -0.002 0.970 0.471
Minor endocrine system procedures 0.000 0.882 0.159
Routine urinalysis 0.000 0.980 0.971
Vaginal deliveries 0.000 0.985 0.216
Surgical pathology 0.000 0.995 0.864
Dental: diagnostic & preventive 0.000 0.985 0.364
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Falsification Tests, Medical Procedure Group Regressions (continued)
Log(Procedures per 1k)
Medical Procedure Group β̂ p-val R2
Nuclear medicine, therapeutic 0.001 0.961 0.252
Respiratory therapy 0.001 0.988 0.566
Physician telephone/online visits 0.001 0.855 0.305
Other hematology tests 0.002 0.965 0.813
Dilation & currettage 0.002 0.930 0.191
Dental: other 0.002 0.468 0.222
Other consults, location unspecified 0.002 0.351 0.316
Lab tests, organ/disease panel 0.002 0.874 0.974
Psychotherapy, individual 0.003 0.835 0.987
Case management services 0.003 0.850 0.714
Physical medicine: elec stimulation 0.004 0.853 0.869
Other minor ear/auditory procedures 0.005 0.876 0.602
Immunology tests 0.005 0.854 0.960
Other minor urinary procedures 0.005 0.905 0.677
Magnetic resonance (NMR/MRI) 0.006 0.808 0.758
Myelograms/discograms 0.006 0.793 0.500
Blood test: prothrombin time 0.007 0.774 0.862
Dx radiology, misc/other 0.007 0.828 0.766
Blood chemisty tests, automated 0.007 0.331 0.279
Bacterial culture, urine 0.007 0.763 0.952
Incision & drainage of cyst 0.007 0.829 0.517
Injections: therapeutic/IV 0.007 0.781 0.931
Dental: major restorative 0.008 0.341 0.226
Aortograms 0.009 0.358 0.426
Other maternity procs & related care 0.010 0.839 0.718
PET scan 0.010 0.751 0.501
Minor male genital procedures 0.011 0.690 0.407
Other major cardiovascular procedures 0.011 0.853 0.328
Other minor digestive procedures 0.011 0.783 0.204
Other major breast surgery 0.012 0.795 0.33
Bronchospasm evaluation 0.012 0.700 0.673
Gastroenterology services (non-surgical) 0.012 0.695 0.548
Major endocrine system procedures 0.013 0.734 0.169
Other minor skin & breast surgery 0.013 0.606 0.778
Other major respiratory procedures 0.015 0.822 0.461
Skin lesion injection 0.016 0.502 0.811
CT scan, spine 0.018 0.602 0.526
Cesarean section deliveries 0.018** 0.028 0.278
Major nervous system procedures 0.018 0.770 0.561
Other major urinary procedures 0.019 0.700 0.211
Definitive bacterial culture 0.020 0.502 0.909
X-ray, spine/pelvis 0.020 0.360 0.876
Major male genital procedures 0.021 0.517 0.250
Venipuncture (draw blood) 0.022 0.116 0.975
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Falsification Tests, Medical Procedure Group Regressions (continued)
Log(Procedures per 1k)
Medical Procedure Group β̂ p-val R2
X-ray, chest 0.022 0.306 0.891
Other major surgery procedures 0.022 0.563 0.282
Other major eye/ocular procedures 0.024 0.618 0.332
Non-invasive peripheral vascular studies 0.025 0.445 0.745
Arthrocentesis, sm/med joint 0.026 0.404 0.588
Thyroid function tests (non-RIA) 0.027 0.306 0.962
Minor female genital procedures 0.028 0.396 0.541
X-ray, OB/Gyn 0.028 0.203 0.318
Cholecystograms/cholangiograms 0.029 0.135 0.476
Other anatomic pathology services 0.029 0.659 0.511
Therapeutic radiology 0.030 0.778 0.433
Antibiotic sensitivity studies 0.031 0.256 0.861
Blood count, manual 0.032 0.252 0.814
Other minor eye/ocular procedures 0.033 0.276 0.480
EKG 0.033 0.107 0.950
Dx ultrasound, abdominal 0.033 0.290 0.692
Angiograms 0.033 0.426 0.430
Cataract removal 0.034 0.487 0.459
Upper GI endoscopy 0.039 0.428 0.496
Major female genital procedures 0.040 0.446 0.540
X-ray, GI tract 0.041 0.189 0.564
Colposcopy 0.041 0.104 0.473
Clinical path, consultation 0.042** 0.012 0.580
ENT diagnostic services 0.042 0.270 0.963
Other major musculoskeletal surgery 0.043 0.488 0.457
Laryngoscopy 0.045 0.134 0.666
Unmapped codes 0.046 0.586 0.702
Colonoscopy 0.046 0.194 0.652
X-ray, head & neck 0.047 0.137 0.797
Office visits, emergency 0.050 0.161 0.949
Physical medicine: ultrasound 0.052 0.112 0.777
CT scan, head & neck 0.053 0.112 0.650
Cardiac catheterization 0.056 0.451 0.640
Specimen handling 0.058 0.176 0.934
CT scan, chest 0.059* 0.086 0.473
Therapeutic psychiatric services 0.059* 0.076 0.924
Physical medicine: testing 0.061** 0.026 0.910
Minor nervous system procedures 0.063* 0.055 0.575
Other medical services 0.066 0.206 0.692
Other non-surgical pulmonary services 0.067* 0.081 0.788
Outpatient consults 0.072** 0.028 0.873
Inpatient consults 0.088*** 0.002 0.595
Other major digestive procedures 0.091 0.195 0.485
Other major skin surgery 0.096** 0.040 0.576
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Falsification Tests, Medical Procedure Group Regressions (continued)
Log(Procedures per 1k)
Medical Procedure Group β̂ p-val R2
Emergency room visits 0.098*** 0.000 0.933
General ophthalmology services 0.110*** 0.000 0.957
Office visits, other 0.127** 0.034 0.678
Other cardiovascular procedures 0.128** 0.031 0.509
Psychotherapy, group 0.129** 0.028 0.726
Other injections/noninjectables 0.194*** 0.000 0.893
Facility visits 0.262*** 0.000 0.682
Dialysis 0.325*** 0.000 0.834
Notes: Each row shows the regression of the number of procedures per capita for a given
medical procedure group. Demographic variables, year-month and state fixed effects are
included in each regression, which is estimated on 504 observations. An observation is
a state-month pair in the period of 2008-2010. p-values are based on the wild-bootstrap
procedure in Cameron et al. (2008). ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Evidence on Conditional
Pricing Practices: A Review ∗
(Co-authored with Julie Holland Mortimer)
3.1 Introduction
Conditional pricing practices (CPPs) allow the terms of sale between a producer and
a downstream firm to vary based on whether the downstream firm meets a set of
conditions that the producer specifies. The conditions may require a downstream
firm to accept minimum quantities or multiple products, to purchase a minimum
share of its requirements, or even to deal exclusively with one producer. Payment
from the producer to the downstream firm may take the form of a discount at the time
∗This essay was first published in 81 Antitrust Law Journal No. 2 (2017). Copyright 2017 Amer-
ican Bar Association. Reproduced by permission. All rights reserved. This information or any
portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or
stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the Amer-
ican Bar Association. The authors thank Tim Lee and Xiaojie Li for excellent research assistance.
Any errors or omissions are our own.
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of purchase, a rebate paid after a period of time, or marketing support and training.
CPPs cover a wide variety of arrangements and are in widespread use throughout
many industries.
CPPs have often been challenged in court over the years, but there is no consensus
among lawyers, judges, or academics on how they should be analyzed. Fundamentally,
adjudication seeks to determine whether a given CPP harms or benefits competition.
Under U.S. law, this means determining whether a practice reduces or improves con-
sumer welfare. To a large degree practitioners’ efforts to evaluate this question have
rested on two approaches: applying theoretical models of the potential mechanisms
behind CPPs or using prior litigated arrangements as precedent. In this article, we
consider the effects of CPPs through a third lens: empirical research analyzing a
variety of CPPs across several different industries.
Empirical research provides unique insight into understanding the effects of CPPs
that is complementary to the insights gained through theoretical analysis and liti-
gated arrangements. Theoretical models predict a wide range of mechanisms through
which CPPs may affect welfare, and there may be multiple theoretical models that
could be relevant for analyzing any given CPP. Court cases are selected through the
process of litigation and may not be representative of the wider population of such
arrangements. Empirical research addresses these limitations, while simultaneously
highlighting the wide variety of settings in which CPPs are used. A limitation of the
empirical literature, however, is that it cannot necessarily address the full range of
potential settings or arrangements that one may ultimately want to analyze. Relat-
edly, the heterogeneity highlighted in this literature does not necessarily lend itself to
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a single unifying framework to adjudicate future CPPs.
Some arrangements that can be described as CPPs include: vertical rebates, which
can be structured as “loyalty discounts” or “all units discounts” (AUDs); vertical
bundling, which includes “full-line forcing” (FLF) contracts and bundled discounts;
and exclusive dealing.1 The term “exclusive dealing” may be used to describe a loyalty
discount with a 100 percent market share requirement.2
Table 3.1 presents a selected group of CPPs and the range of industries they cover,
based on a review of judicial decisions and empirical research. Vertical rebates have
been used, for example, in the truck transmission, microprocessor, and confections
industries. Vertical bundling has been employed in markets for video rentals, tape
products, and some pharmaceutical products, among others. Exclusive dealing has
been used in the video game, smartphone, and auto refrigerant equipment industries.3
A much richer set of arrangements is employed across many more industries in reality.
A brief review of cases involving CPPs illustrates the difficulties that courts have
faced in adjudicating these legal disputes and the concomitant lack of consensus on
an appropriate analytical framework. In LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 3M was the dominant
player in the market for branded tape products but was facing competitive pressure
1We refer to a vertical rebate as a loyalty discount if it is conditional on a customer buying a
specified share of its overall requirements from the supplier (i.e., a market-share requirement) and
an AUD if it is conditional on a quantity requirement.
2The Third Circuit defines exclusive dealing as “an agreement in which a buyer agrees to purchase
certain goods or services only from a particular seller for a certain period of time.” The Third Circuit
further clarifies that even though an agreement to deal exclusively is a prerequisite to exclusive
dealing, an express exclusivity requirement is not necessary. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696
F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012). Some authors also require that an exclusive dealing arrangement include an
explicit or implicit threat that the seller will refuse to deal with the buyer unless the buyer accepts
the arrangement, an “all-or-nothing” clause (Klein and Lerner, 2016).
3An arrangement with a very high, but not 100%, market share requirement can be considered
de facto exclusive dealing.
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Table 3.1: Analyses of Conditional Pricing Practices
Product Nature of Downstream
Coverage Restriction Competition
Judicial Decisions:
Truck Transmissions (ZF Meritor v. Eaton Corp.) Single Share Standard
Auto Refrigerant Equip. (SPX Corp. v. Mastercool Inc.) Single Exclusive Standard
Tape Products (LePage’s v. 3M) Multiple Quantity Standard
Boat Engines (Concord Boat v. Brunswick Corp.) Single Share Standard
Anticoagulants (Eisai v. Sanofi-Aventis) Single Share [1]
Cephalosporins(SmithKline v. Eli Lilly) Multiple Quantity [1]
Microprocessors (three Intel cases)∗ Single§ Share Standard
Hospital Services (Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth) Multiple Share [2]
Catheters (Southeast Missouri Hospital v. C.R. Bard Inc.) Multiple Share [2]
Airline Reservations (two British Airlines cases)† Single Quantity Standard
Mobile Phones (Korean Fair Trade Commission fine)‡ Multiple Share Standard
Empirical Research:
Confections (Conlon and Mortimer (2019a)) Multiple Quantity [3]
Video Rentals (Ho et al. (2012a,b)) Multiple Quantity Standard
Video Games (Lee (2013)) Single Exclusive [4]
Smartphones (Sinkinson (2020)) Single Exclusive [5]
Beer (Sass (2005), Asker (2004, 2005), Chen (2014)) Multiple Exclusive Standard
Notes: “Product coverage” indicates whether the arrangement governs purchases of a single product or requires the
purchase of multiple products. “Nature of the restriction” describes the condition that a downstream firm must meet
to qualify for payment. “Share” indicates a market share requirement. “Quantity” indicates a minimum (or maximum)
quantity requirement used in AUDs, FLF contracts, or other arrangements. “Exclusive” indicates exclusive dealing.
“Downstream competition” is noted as “Standard" when downstream firms compete on price. Alternative forms of
downstream competition vary by industry and are described as follows:
1 Product administered to patients in hospitals. Insurers reimburse hospitals for a patient’s treatment.
2 Insurers reimburse hospitals for services associated with patient treatment.
3 Retail prices rarely vary across products or time.
4 Gaming consoles are durable; consumer demand responds to current and expected future prices.
5 Service providers subsidize the purchase price of a handset when a consumer agrees to a two-year service plan.
∗ Cases are: FTC v. Intel, AMD v. Intel, and Intel v. Commission.
§ The FTC Intel case has a multiproduct aspect to it.
† Cases are: Virgin Atlantic v. British Airlines and British Airlines v. Commission.
‡ Fine levied against Qualcomm. See press release “Qualcomm’s Abuse of Market Dominance,” Korea Fair Trade Com-
mission, July 23, 2009, available at http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do.
from private label tape manufacturer LePage’s.4 3M responded by entering the private
label tape market and offering retailers discounts on bundles consisting of private
label tape and other of its office products. LePage’s could not match this strategy
because of its limited product line, and claimed that its rival’s pricing scheme was
exclusionary. 3M argued that its conduct was not anticompetitive because it did not
sell transparent tape below cost. The Third Circuit rejected 3M’s argument and ruled
in favor of LePage’s despite the absence of below-cost pricing. However, the ruling
4LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
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has been criticized for failing to provide sufficiently clear guidance regarding when
bundled rebates violate antitrust law.
The Ninth Circuit adopted a different approach in Cascade Health Solutions v.
PeaceHealth.5 There, the plaintiff and the defendant were the only health care
providers in Lane County, Oregon. Whereas Cascade Health offered only primary
and secondary care, PeaceHealth offered tertiary care as well. PeaceHealth offered
insurance companies substantial discounts if they made it their sole provider of all
three levels of health services. In response, Cascade Health challenged the practice as
exclusionary. In a break with the Third Circuit’s reasoning, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the conduct could not be condemned as anticompetitive absent a showing
that the defendant had lowered prices below “an appropriate measure of cost.” Us-
ing a “discount attribution test,” it ruled in favor of the defendant and reversed the
district court’s decision.
The lack of agreement on the correct principles for adjudicating conditional pric-
ing practices applies not only to multiproduct discounts but to single-product loyalty
discounts as well. ZF Meritor v. Eaton Corp. was a lawsuit brought against the
dominant manufacturer of heavy-duty truck transmissions by a rival firm.6 The con-
tention was that long-term contracts that the defendant signed with the four major
truck manufacturers amounted to de facto exclusive dealing. These contracts pro-
vided rebates to the truck manufacturers if they satisfied a high minimum-share
purchase requirement, treated Eaton’s products preferentially in their sales catalogs,
5Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2008).
6ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
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and priced Eaton’s products lower than the plaintiff’s products. The Third Circuit
ruled against the defendant after applying a rule-of-reason analysis and declining to
employ a price-cost test because it found that price was not the primary method of
exclusion.
The outcome was different in Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis.7 In that case, the
defendant offered hospitals a discount on its drug Lovenox if they made 90 percent
or more of their total anticoagulant drug purchases from Sanofi. Eisai had exclusive
distribution rights to Pfizer’s competing product, Fragmin, and alleged that Sanofi’s
conduct bundled customers’ contestable and incontestable demand for Lovenox and
amounted to de facto exclusive dealing. Because Eisai’s claims related primarily
to the alleged de facto exclusive dealing aspect of Sanofi’s conduct and not to its
pricing practices, the Third Circuit analyzed the conduct under the rule of reason
rather than applying a price-cost test. It concluded that there was no evidence of
either restriction of consumer choice or substantial anticompetitive effect and upheld
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
One reason for the lack of agreement on the appropriate framework of analysis of
CPPs is that there is no consensus in the theoretical literature either. Economists have
found both procompetitive and anticompetitive justifications for these arrangements.
However, empirical analyses that give more credibility to one theory or another are
relatively scarce.
In this article, we provide background regarding the theoretical literature address-
ing CPPs and review the existing empirical literature. We identify market features
7Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394 (3d Cir. 2016).
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that affect the likelihood that a CPP will have an adverse impact on consumer wel-
fare. We find that anticompetitive effects are more likely when CPPs are used by
a dominant firm and when buyers have limited capacity to carry multiple products
from suppliers. The existence of substitute products or alternative distributors can
also influence the effect of conditional pricing on competition. These market charac-
teristics are just a few of the factors that should be considered in analyzing CPPs.
Furthermore, the empirical analyses reveal that different arrangements have different
exclusionary effects and should be studied in conjunction with the characteristics of
the specific markets in which they are used. The wide array of arrangements and
market settings precludes broad generalizations and suggests that the effects of con-
ditional pricing can differ case by case, based on the specifics of the CPP and the
market.
3.2 Theoretical Background
Interest in CPPs has generated a large volume of scholarly work, but there is no
consensus on their predominant competitive effect or on an appropriate analytical
framework to use in a litigation setting. In this section, we review the prevalent
points of view on these questions in the theoretical literature, first for single-product
and then for multiproduct CPPs.
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3.2.1 Single-product Conditional Pricing Practices
Klein and Lerner (2016) view single-product loyalty contracts as a commitment device
that allows a seller and a buyer to achieve a mutually beneficial equilibrium off the
demand curve.8 Without commitment, a seller facing a downward-sloping demand
curve sells the quantity at which marginal cost equals marginal revenue and charges
the price indicated by the demand curve. However, it can do better by writing
a contract that offers a lower price only if the buyer agrees to purchase a larger
quantity. The seller is better off because it sells a sufficiently larger quantity to offset
profit forgone through the lower price. The buyer also benefits because the discount
it receives on the units it would purchase absent the contract and the additional
units it buys at the discounted price outweighs the negative surplus on units that it
values at less than the discounted price. The buyer can move off the demand curve
because it is not a final consumer but rather a downstream firm that subsequently
resells the product as a component in a different product or service. The Klein-Lerner
model assumes that final consumers are unlikely to substitute to a competing product
based on a preference for a single component, thus conferring a degree of loyalty on
the buyer.9 The buyer can exploit this loyalty to shift purchases from one seller to
another. Sellers compete for these sales-shifting services and compensate the buyer
through the loyalty discount.10
8A similar procompetitive justification for conditional pricing is given in Murphy et al. (2015).
9For instance, patients will not change the hospital they go to because it does not carry the
patient’s preferred brand of blood-clotting drug. Similarly, a truck buyer will not go to a rival
manufacturer only because it offers different transmissions.
10The authors assume that any disadvantages to consumers from increases in the list (non-contract)
price, by either the seller or its competitor, are outweighed by the benefits from the contract. In order
for the contract to be procompetitive, the model must implicitly assume that at least some portion
of the discount is passed on to consumers. This need not always be the case (e.g., if consumers are
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Despite this procompetitive justification for loyalty contracts, Klein and Lerner
acknowledge that such contracts can also be used anticompetitively. In their prescrip-
tive analysis, they distinguish between two types of contract terms: performance and
incentive. Performance terms stipulate the conditions that a buyer needs to meet,
such as market share, preferential treatment of certain products, and retail pricing
requirements. Incentive terms specify what happens if the buyer does not satisfy the
performance requirements: for example, it may forfeit the discount or may even face
restricted supply. The authors argue that if a discount is the only incentive mech-
anism, the contract resembles predatory pricing, and a “discount attribution test”
safe harbor can be applied.11 However, if the loyalty contract includes non-price in-
centive terms, such as a threat to restrict or terminate supply, or if the list price is
much higher than what would prevail absent the contract, the authors recommend a
rule-of-reason analysis.12
Other scholars, such as Salop (2017) and Wright (2013), recognize that many
CPPs resemble both predatory pricing (through discount terms) and exclusive deal-
ing (through exclusivity or near exclusivity requirements), but argue that a rule-of-
reason standard better captures the various mechanisms through which CPPs may
affect consumer welfare. In a predatory pricing setting, a firm lowers its price below
locked in).
11The test applies the full amount of discounts on the contestable portion of sales and compares
the discounted price to marginal cost, where contestable sales are those for which the rival can
“reasonably compete.” If the discounted price is lower than marginal cost, the loyalty discount is
likely predatory, and the next step in the analysis is to determine if the dominant firm will be able
to eventually recoup its “investment.”
12The authors explain that before weighing pro- and anticompetitive effects, the analysis needs to
determine whether the contractual arrangement constitutes de facto exclusive dealing, which is the
case when the contract gives the buyer no economic choice but to accept the offered terms if the
buyer wants to deal with the seller.
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cost, drives equally efficient rivals out of the market, then raises its price to a supra-
competitive level and recoups the profit lost while it was pricing below cost. The
mechanisms that harm consumer welfare are the exclusion of rivals and subsequent
higher prices. This is why predatory pricing analyses proceed by comparing price
to cost and, if price is lower, assessing whether the alleged predator can recoup its
“investment.”
Unlike predatory pricing, exclusive dealing can lead to exclusion of rivals without
below-cost pricing.13 Moreover, exclusive dealing can also impair competition with-
out inducing full exclusion in the market. By restricting rivals’ access to vital inputs
or a sufficient customer base, exclusive dealing may effectively raise their costs, forc-
ing them to increase their prices and reducing the competitive constraint they can
impose.14 Similarly, rivals’ ability to compete can be limited if they are relegated to
a niche position in the market with limited access to customers. A reduced customer
base can also diminish rivals’ incentives to invest and innovate, which in turn may
lead to less investment and innovation by the dominant firm. Exclusive dealing re-
quires a different analytical framework than predatory pricing because it can lead to
competitive harm in more varied ways. Steven Salop follows this logic to argue that a
rule-of-reason standard of adjudication is appropriate because it can account for the
13The theoretical literature on the exclusionary effects of exclusive dealing is sizeable. Authors in
the tradition of the “Chicago School” have argued that exclusive dealing cannot lead to exclusion of
an equally efficient rival because compensating the downstream firm for accepting the arrangement
makes it unprofitable for the upstream firm to offer it in the first place. See, e.g., Bork (1993) and
Posner (1976). Other authors have used models with scale economies and externalities across buyers
to show that anticompetitive exclusion is possible. See, e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1987), Rasmusen
et al. (1991), Segal and Whinston (2000), and Whinston (2008).
14Through these effects, exclusive dealing arrangements fit into the “raising rivals’ costs” paradigm
Salop (2017).
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various mechanisms through which harm can occur.15
While exclusive dealing can induce foreclosure or raise rivals’ costs, this need not
automatically translate into consumer harm. For consumer harm to result, the seller
employing the arrangement needs to have “power over price.” Such power may not
exist if competitors are not significantly disadvantaged by the conduct, if there is suffi-
cient competition from non-foreclosed competitors, or if there are substitute products.
Another reason why consumers may not be harmed by exclusive dealing is that such
arrangements can induce efficiencies. For example, exclusive dealing can intensify
competition among suppliers, provide incentives for better products, service, or in-
creased promotion, or reduce free riding (Salop, 2017). These procompetitive effects
should be accounted for when evaluating the overall competitive effect of exclusive
dealing.
There is also a growing theoretical literature that focuses specifically on the effects
of CPPs that are not as restrictive as exclusive dealing.16 This literature has found
conditions under which loyalty discounts, among a broader group of vertical prac-
tices, can lead to foreclosure (Asker and Bar-Isaac, 2014; Chen and Shaffer, 2014).
However, conditional pricing, and AUDs in particular, need not necessarily reflect an
exclusionary motive but may instead provide a more effective way to price discrim-
15Salop (2017) also discusses various reasons why the price-cost test can give too many false
positives and false negatives, which make it unsuitable as a method to analyze alleged anticompetitive
conduct related to CPPs.
16Although it is often assumed implicitly that loyalty discounts are a weaker, but also cheaper,
way of foreclosing rivals than exclusive dealing, the opposite may be true under some circumstances.
In particular, loyalty discounts may allow an incumbent firm to achieve a desired level of foreclosure
more flexibly but also at a higher cost because it needs to over-compensate buyers that accept the
arrangement. Thus, there are situations in which loyalty discounts are preferred to exclusive dealing
and can achieve a higher level of foreclosure (Chen and Shaffer, 2016).
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inate than a menu of two-part tariffs (Kolay et al., 2004). Furthermore, AUDs can
mitigate moral hazard and improve efficiency by providing incentives to upstream
and downstream firms to make investments that boost both firms’ profits.17 The con-
ditional discount may encourage a retailer to expand output while still compensating
the upstream firm for its investment (O’Brien, 2017). Similarly, upstream firms can
use market share discounts to induce selling effort from downstream retailers (Mills,
2010).
3.2.2 Multiproduct Conditional Pricing Practices
Multiproduct CPPs (or bundled discounts) condition a buyer’s discount on its pur-
chase of multiple different products.18 As with single-product CPPs, there is no es-
tablished consensus on how multiproduct CPPs should be analyzed. Some courts and
scholars have recommended using a predatory pricing-based price-cost test (Greenlee
et al., 2008). Others, however, have pointed out that multiproduct CPPs can have
exclusionary effects even without below-cost pricing and are best assessed as forms of
tying (Carlton et al., 2008).19
Tying can have both exclusionary and nonexclusionary rationales and can either
increase or decrease consumer welfare. Firms can tie products to attain efficiencies in
production stemming from scale economies, to price discriminate, or to achieve greater
product differentiation (Carlton et al., 2008). While these exemplify nonexclusionary
17For example, these investments can take the form of advertising by the upstream firm and
in-store promotional effort by the downstream firm.
18Some authors use the term “bundling” to describe selling packages of multiple units of the same
product and the term “tying” for selling packages of different products. Others do not stick to this
convention and use “bundling” for selling different products together (Shy, 1995).
19Carlton et al. (2008) point out additional weaknesses of the price-cost test.
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uses of tying, bundled discounts can also be used anticompetitively in a variety of
ways. For instance, a firm with a monopoly in a market for a primary good that
also supplies a complementary good in a duopoly market can use tying to extend its
monopoly power to the complementary good market by denying scale to its rival.20
A firm can also use tying to strengthen its market power in the primary market
by excluding producers of complementary goods, thus making it harder for firms
that need access to the complements to compete in the primary market.21 Finally, an
incumbent firm may tie its products in an effort to deter the entry of a firm producing
a superior good in the complementary market, thus eliminating the threat that the
(potential) entrant may eventually challenge the incumbent in the primary market.22
3.3 Empirical Evidence
Economic theory suggests that conditional pricing can have both positive and neg-
ative effects on competition. In reality, both types of effects are likely to occur
simultaneously, so that the net impact of a given CPP becomes an empirical ques-
tion. Empirical work is also helpful for establishing the means by which CPPs affect
consumer welfare. As discussed in the preceding section, below-cost pricing is one
mechanism that can lead to rival exclusion, but not the only one. Furthermore, even
20An important requirement is that the complement can be used without the monopoly good.
Otherwise the monopolist can achieve the same or higher profit without tying, i.e., tying is a feasible
but not necessarily profitable monopolization strategy. This is an example of the “one monopoly
rent” critique (Carlton et al., 2008).
21This can also be seen as an example of raising rivals’ costs.
22Carlton et al. (2008) examine the conditions under which a bundled discount is likely to be
anticompetitive. These include situations in which rivals face economies of scale, the discounting
firm has market power, the price of the tied good increases for consumers that do not buy the tying
good, and rivals exit or face increased marginal costs because of the bundled discount. Greenlee et al.
(2008) examine the impact of bundled discounts when the adjacent market is perfectly competitive.
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in the presence of foreclosure, consumer welfare may not be harmed. Thus, empirical
work that investigates the net impact and the different mechanisms through which
CPPs affect competition can inform both the courts’ general attitude towards these
types of arrangements and the particular framework for analyzing their impact.
Although existing case law illustrates the issues raised by CPPs and the methods
used to analyze them, it does not necessarily reflect the competitive effects of CPPs
in general because of sample selection bias.23 For this reason, independent empirical
research is essential for shedding light on the impact of these practices. Such inquiries,
however, face a variety of challenges, which makes them scarce. First, data are
often proprietary and difficult to obtain. Second, when data are available, lack of
variation in prices and choice sets often hinders demand estimation. Third, supply-
side estimation becomes problematic when agents’ actions are endogenous or difficult
to observe. Finally, the extremely wide variety of arrangements and institutional
settings makes it difficult to generalize results and extrapolate from one industry or
type of arrangement to another.
Despite these challenges, economists have made progress in empirically assessing
the impact of CPPs. Earlier work primarily consists of “reduced-form” analyses.
But more recently researchers have used “structural” models, which allow one to
conduct counterfactual experiments and study more closely the mechanisms that
23That certain instances of conditional pricing end up in court suggests that these cases may be
more likely to be anticompetitive, because plaintiffs expend the effort to litigate. Possible selection
bias from relying on litigated cases is discussed in Ippolito (1991). Sample selection bias is an issue
independent of whether courts reach the correct conclusion about alleged anticompetitive effects.
There is a tradeoff between maximizing the probability that courts adjudicate a given practice
correctly and having predictable and easily implementable, albeit more frequently incorrect, court
decisions. A thorough evaluation of this tradeoff is beyond the scope of this article.
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affect consumer welfare.24 There have been empirical studies of the effects of CPPs,
including loyalty discounts, AUDs, and exclusive dealing. We organize the discussion
of these studies by industry and other market features that have implications for the
competitive effects of CPPs.
3.3.1 Confections and Beer
Confections and beer are traditional food and beverage manufacturing industries.
New product introductions are relatively infrequent, but there are plenty of imper-
fect substitutes. In the studies we consider, CPPs are offered by dominant firms,
and there is evidence that the arrangements may foreclose rivals under certain condi-
tions. However, the estimated impact on consumer welfare is positive in the case of
confections and negative but small in the case of beer.
Confections
Conlon and Mortimer (2019a) study the efficiency and foreclosure effects of an AUD
used by the dominant firm in the vending channel of the confections industry. The
main upstream players are Mars, Nestle, and Hershey. The dominant firm, Mars,
offers a per-unit rebate on the total quantity purchased in a given fiscal quarter. To
qualify for the rebate, a vending operator needs to meet or exceed a quarterly purchase
24Structural models typically specify the behavior for both firms and consumers. If these be-
havioral models are correct, the researcher can estimate parameters of the objective functions of
firms and consumers that are robust to policy changes. Knowledge of these “primitives” allows the
researcher to conduct counterfactual analyses; thus, one can change a particular feature of the world
and predict what market outcomes will be. The parameters estimated in reduced-form models may
lack policy robustness and need not reveal anything about agents’ objective functions, ruling out
the ability to explore counterfactual simulations. However, reduced-form analyses do not require
explicit behavioral models of agents in the market.
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target customized for that vendor, which applies to the total across all varieties of
Mars candy; it must also satisfy a facing requirement, which specifies that it carry at
least six Mars products in each vending machine.
The effect of the AUD on firm profits and consumer utility is theoretically am-
biguous. On one hand, the AUD requirements can induce the retailer to restock its
vending machines more frequently and reduce the likelihood of a product stocking
out.25 The increased level of effort increases consumer welfare because it ensures cus-
tomers can buy their top choice of candy. The AUD also mitigates downstream moral
hazard, which occurs when the retailer lacks the incentive to exert the level of effort
optimal for the manufacturer. For example, if a Mars product is out of stock and
customers are forced to substitute to a competing product with a higher margin, the
retailer will not restock. This leaves Mars worse off and the retailer and the competing
manufacturer better off. The AUD rebate effectively increases the retailer’s margin
on the Mars products, creating an incentive for it to restock more frequently.26
On the other hand, AUDs can also have anticompetitive effects. The rebate,
quantity threshold, and facing requirement can induce a retailer to replace Hershey or
Nestle products with Mars candy bars. Such foreclosure reduces the profits of Mars’s
competitors, but the impact on consumers is unclear. Whether consumer welfare
25A stockout occurs when no units of a product remain available for purchase. When the vendor
restocks a machine, it replenishes all products, not just the ones that the firm offering the AUD
manufactures.
26The increased level of retailer effort tends to increase the profits of the dominant manufacturer,
whose products are likely to stock out first, and decrease the profits of competing manufacturers.
However, this may not be true under all circumstances. If the initial frequency of restocking is so
low that Mars, Hershey, and Nestle products all stock out between visits, then an increase in the
level of retailer effort can increase the profits of all upstream firms. Conlon and Mortimer (2019a)
provide evidence that this does not occur in the market they study, so that increased retailer effort
increases Mars profits, while decreasing Nestle and Hershey profits. Mars can induce a similar effect
with an unconditional discount, but this approach is not as profitable.
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increases or decreases depends on whether consumers like the Mars product(s) better
than the Nestle or Hershey products that are displaced.
An important feature of the setting, as it relates to the impact of the AUD on
consumer welfare, is that downstream prices are the same across products and rarely
vary over time. The reasons for the lack of pricing variation are technical difficulties
in providing change and the fact that service contracts sometimes require the vendor
to commit to a price structure over a multi-year period. Thus, the AUD can affect
consumer welfare through product availability and assortment, but not through retail
prices.
To assess the impact on consumer welfare and firm profits, Conlon and Mortimer
(2019a) combine a model of demand for different candy bars and a model of restocking.
The demand model estimates consumer preferences for different products, while the
restocking model estimates the optimal time between restocking visits for the retailer,
weighing the cost of a visit against the benefits of extra sales from avoiding a stockout.
The authors focus on a representative vending machine carrying five base candy
products of the seven supplied and estimate the optimal level of retailer effort and
the optimal assortment choice for the last two candy products under different vertical
payment structures.27
Based on this model, the authors analyze the welfare impact of the AUD. Absent
the AUD, the retailer’s optimal assortment is to carry two Hershey products, Reese’s
Peanut Butter Cups and Payday, in addition to the five base products. The motivating
27The base products are Snickers, Peanut M&Ms, Twix, Plain M&Ms (owned by Mars), and
Raisinets (owned by Nestle).
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factor is that even though demand for the Hershey products is slightly lower than
for the Mars replacement products, the profit margin on the Hershey products is
higher. When Mars offers the AUD, the combination of the per-unit rebate, the
quantity threshold, and the facing requirement induces the retailer to increase its
restocking frequency and to stock two Mars products (Three Musketeers and Milky
Way) instead of Hershey products in the last two slots. This increases the profits
realized by the retailer and Mars, but decreases Hershey’s and Nestle’s profits. The
impact on Hershey’s bottom line is especially stark because it loses distribution for
two products. Further analysis reveals that as long as the marginal cost per candy
bar is above 13 cents, there is no price above marginal cost that Hershey can charge
in the presence of the AUD that would convince the retailer to carry its products.
Furthermore, Hershey has no incentive to offer an AUD of its own because this will
only decrease its profits in the event that the retailer accepts it. Thus, there is
evidence of foreclosure.28
Despite the presence of foreclosure, the authors find that consumers are not
harmed by the AUD. Retail prices are assumed to be fixed, so consumer welfare
is affected only by the increased level of effort and by the changed assortment. While
more retailer effort has an unambiguously positive effect for consumers (by decreas-
ing the number of stockouts and thus increasing availability), the effect of changes
28These analyses assume that wholesale prices remain unchanged in the counterfactual world
without the AUD. While all three firms can adjust their prices in real life, such adjustments make
finding an equilibrium a very difficult problem computationally. The authors conduct an additional
analysis in which Hershey’s and Nestle’s wholesale prices are fixed, but Mars’s is not. In this case,
Mars lowers its price to undercut Hershey and ensure that the retailer carries two Mars products in
the last slots. Once again, Hershey is foreclosed, since it cannot offer a price above marginal cost
that would induce the retailer to carry its products.
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in product assortment can be either positive or negative. In the Conlon and Mor-
timer setting, consumers are better off when the retailer carries Three Musketeers
and Milky Way (Mars products) than when it carries Reese’s and Payday (Hershey
products) and maintains the same restocking frequency. Thus, the estimate of the
overall effect of Mars’s AUD on consumer welfare is positive.29
Beer
The beer industry is another traditional manufacturing industry dominated by a small
number of major producers and many smaller ones. Products are differentiated,
but there are many close substitutes. The market is characterized by a three-tier
vertical structure composed of brewers, distributors, and retailers.30 Some of the
largest brewers, such as Anheuser-Busch and Miller, enter into exclusive agreements
with their distributors.31 The effects of these arrangements are studied in three
articles. Sass (2005) summarizes the theoretical literature on exclusive dealing and
uses reduced-form analyses to determine which theory best describes the observed
market outcomes. Using structural models, Chen (2014) and Asker (2016) study the
welfare effects of exclusive dealing and analyze whether such arrangements lead to
foreclosure of rivals.
29Price-cost tests are not designed to shed light on product availability and consumer preferences,
which in this case determine the effect of conditional pricing on consumer surplus. Therefore, a
price-cost test would be uninformative about the competitive impact of the AUD in this setting.
30In most states, owning firms across different tiers is either expressly prohibited or restricted
(Chen, 2014; Asker, 2016).
31Perhaps the most famous campaign to boost a company’s number of exclusive distributors is
Anheuser-Busch’s “100% share of mind.” This campaign was started in 1997 and offered distributors
discounts, extended credit, and marketing support in exchange for carrying only Anheuser-Busch
products (Sass, 2005; Asker, 2016).
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Sass (2005) organizes the rationales for using exclusive dealing into three types: to
align distributors’ incentives with those of the upstream firm; to foreclose rivals; or to
dampen competition among producers. Each of these rationales leads to predictions
about the effect of exclusivity on prices and output, which the author evaluates using
data from a survey of 391 U.S. beer distributors. Reduced-form analyses indicate that
exclusive dealing tends to increase the prices charged by the implementing brewers
and distributors, as well as total quantity sold. At the same time, there is no evidence
that exclusivity increases the prices of rival brewers and distributors. These results
suggest that efficiency-enhancing motives are an important rationale for the use of
exclusive dealing in this industry.32
Asker (2016) provides further evidence on the effects of exclusive dealing in the
market for beer. He focuses on the greater Chicago area, in which the exclusive con-
tracts used by Anheuser-Busch and some other upstream firms raised concerns about
the potential foreclosure of rival brewers. Combining a model of consumer demand for
beer and a supply-side model of brewer profit maximization, Asker calculates brewer
and distributor marginal costs.33 The results show that brewers that use exclusive
dealing enjoy both a cost and a service advantage over their rivals. These advantages
can stem from investments that the brewers make in their exclusive distributors or
from two types of foreclosure: cost-based or promotion-based.34 The article develops
32The analysis in Sass (2005) does not include a formal evaluation of the impact of exclusive
dealing on consumer welfare. The findings suggest an efficiency-enhancing motivation, but it is
unclear whether the net effect of higher prices (if higher wholesale prices are passed on to consumers)
and increased quantity will be positive or negative.
33Distributors in the model are “passive” in that it is not them, but brewers, that set the prices
charged to retailers. This feature of the model is supported by the fact that brewers provide strong
guidelines to distributors about preferred wholesale prices.
34Cost-based foreclosure occurs if a rival cannot access low-cost distributors because of the exclu-
sive arrangement, while promotion-based foreclosure occurs if a rival cannot access the distributors
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tests for each type of foreclosure. The idea behind the test for cost-based foreclo-
sure is to compare the distribution costs of brewers that do not employ exclusives,
in markets with and without exclusive distributors. Assuming distribution costs are
identically distributed across markets (in the statistical sense), if foreclosure occurs,
these brewers will face higher costs of distribution on average in markets with exclu-
sives. Specifically, they will not be able to access the most cost-efficient distributors.35
By contrast, this will not necessarily be the case if brewers use exclusive arrangements
to protect investments they have made in their distributors.36 The test for promotion-
based foreclosure is based on the same reasoning. Once implemented, the two tests
indicate that cost and promotional advantages are not caused by exclusivity-induced
foreclosure and support the conclusion that exclusive beer distribution in metropoli-
tan settings should not raise antitrust concerns.
Asker (2004) also conducts two counterfactual analyses in which exclusive dealing
is banned. In the first, the cost advantage from using exclusive dealers is attributed
entirely to additional brewer investment in the distributor. A ban on exclusives in
such a case eliminates the cost benefits brewers enjoyed by using exclusive dealers. As
a result, Anheuser-Busch’s and Miller’s prices to distributors and retailers increase.
These increases are passed on to consumers. Overall, Asker estimates that the ban
would lead to a 20 percent decrease in consumer welfare, retailer profits, and total
brewer profits. In the second counterfactual, the cost advantage is attributed entirely
most adept at selling its product.
35The distribution of distributor costs will be truncated from the left.
36Brewers may use exclusives both to foreclose rivals and to protect their investments in their
distributors. Even if this is the case, it will not affect the underlying logic of the proposed foreclosure
tests because they focus on the distributors used by brewers that do not use exclusive contracts.
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to foreclosure. Removing exclusive dealing leads to lower costs for brewers that do
not use exclusives, increasing consumer surplus, retailer profits, and brewer profits
by 40 percent. The results indicate the potential benefits that an intervention by an
antitrust authority can bring if foreclosure is present. However, given that the test
results provide no support for the foreclosure hypothesis, the author concludes that
the most likely outcome of an intervention is a welfare loss.
Chen (2014) offers additional insights into the impact of exclusive dealing by
examining the effect of Anheuser-Busch’s exclusive arrangements on microbrewers’
entry decisions in northern California markets. This setting allows her to consider
foreclosure effects in both metropolitan and rural areas, which complements Asker’s
results.37 Chen’s analysis uses a model of consumer demand for beer combined with a
model of a microbrewer’s decision to enter a market, which depends on the expected
demand for its product and on the entry decisions of other microbrewers.38 The
demand and entry models recover the impact of exclusivity on the fixed cost and
probability of entry. The results highlight two facts. First, the interdependence of
firms’ entry decisions is important. There are substantial spillover effects of entry
into a market: the more microbrewers there are in a market, the easier it is for others
to enter, and the harder it is for another firm to deter entry. Strategic interactions
are also important because they affect the estimates of the impact of Anheuser-
Busch’s exclusive arrangements. Chen finds that if strategic interactions are not
37Foreclosure in this setting occurs if a microbrewer cannot obtain distribution at a particular store
because of exclusive dealing. This definition differs from Asker’s, which focuses on the cost-efficiency
or marketing aptitude of distributors.
38The article studies only the entry decisions of specialty brewers. The large national brewers
enter essentially all markets.
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taken into consideration, there are no estimated foreclosure effects from exclusivity.
However, when such interactions are accounted for, the results provide a more nuanced
picture: foreclosure is present in rural areas, outside of the Bay Area and Sacramento
counties. Where a foreclosure effect is present, exclusivity decreases the probability of
a specialty beer producer’s entry by six percentage points–a substantial effect given a
base entry probability of 28 percent. A possible reason for the presence of this effect is
that there are relatively fewer distributors in rural counties compared to metropolitan
areas.39
Despite finding foreclosure in some areas, Chen concludes that foreclosing rivals
is not the main motivation behind the use of exclusive distributors. Counterfactual
simulations show that banning exclusivity does not have a big impact on entry be-
havior because at most one additional brewer enters a market. Furthermore, the
consumer welfare benefit of the expanded product variety is negligible. Even if all
specialty beers are stocked, the potential increase in consumer welfare remains fairly
inconsequential.40 The likely reason for such a limited impact is the presence of many
substitute products and the fact that many of the specialty brewers are fringe firms
that cater to a small segment of the market. Moreover, as small players in the market,
microbreweries have minimal impact on equilibrium prices. Finally, demand substitu-
tion estimates indicate that by foreclosing a specialty brewer, Anheuser-Busch can sell
39Thus, the existence of a foreclosure effect does not contradict Asker (2016), who finds no fore-
closure in greater Chicago. In that area, it seems that the relative abundance of distributors helps
prevent foreclosure. In particular, even though Anheuser-Busch uses eight and Miller uses five
exclusive distributors, there are 29 other distributors to serve the rest of the brewers.
40In particular, a ban on exclusives will lead to a $15 increase in consumer surplus per store per
quarter. The potential increase if all specialty brewers are stocked at a given store is $510 per store
per quarter. These results assume exclusive dealing has no procompetitive effects. If it does, banning
exclusive dealing may increase consumer welfare less or may even decrease it.
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at most 31 additional six-packs per store per quarter, a negligible amount for a firm of
its size. Such a strategy to increase sales seems inefficient. Together with the rest of
the results, this suggests that foreclosure is more likely to be a side effect rather than
the main rationale for using exclusive dealing, and suggests an efficiency-inducing
motivation.
It is possible to draw some conclusions from the analyses of AUDs in the con-
fections industry and exclusive dealing in the beer industry. First, CPPs can lead
to foreclosure of rivals, but need not cause substantial (or any) harm to consumers.
Second, the dimensions on which consumer welfare can be affected are retail prices,
product availability, and product variety. Third, foreclosure is more likely when there
are fewer distributors available. Thus, even though Hershey is foreclosed by Mars’s
AUD from accessing a particular retailer, it may be able to find other distributors in
the same area. Fourth, the existence of many close substitutes attenuates the effect
of changes in product variety and availability on consumer welfare. For instance, in
Conlon and Mortimer’s article, the change in product variety actually benefits con-
sumers, while in Chen’s article the exclusion of specialty beers decreases consumer
surplus only minimally.
3.3.2 Video Rentals
The movie industry differs from traditional manufacturing industries in that the prod-
uct is an information good. Having “consumed” the content of the product, a con-
sumer does not need to obtain it again (Ho et al., 2012b). This feature forces producers
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to continually update their products. Given this constant “churn,” firms are only as
good as their last few products. As their product lines change, firms face different
incentives to use conditional pricing.
The use of a “full-line force” (FLF) contract in the video rental industry and its
welfare impacts are the focus of Ho et al. (2012a) and Ho et al. (2012b). The wide
spread of the Internet and advances in information technology in the late 1990s, which
facilitated tracking transactions from a distance, allowed movie distributors to offer
rental stores two new contract types, revenue sharing (RS) and FLF, in addition to
traditional linear pricing. RS and FLF contracts are similar in that they offer lower
upfront prices per tape in exchange for a portion of the revenue and a commitment
to buy a minimum (or a maximum) number of tapes. The difference between the
two arrangements is that an FLF contract offers more generous per-tape prices and
revenue-sharing terms in exchange for the rental store’s agreeing to carry all movies
that the distributor releases over a year. This bundling feature, together with the
minimum and maximum purchase requirements, is what makes an FLF contract a
form of conditional pricing.41
The authors estimate a flexible demand system and a model of retailers’ choices
of titles and vertical arrangements, and use these to analyze the competitive effects
of an FLF contract.42 Theoretically, there are three potential effects. An efficiency
41Minimum and maximum purchase requirements specify the number of tapes a rental store must
purchase to satisfy the contract. Such quantity requirements have similar effects as resale price
maintenance (RPM). In particular, under certain conditions, a seller can use a minimum purchase
requirement to achieve the effect of a maximum RPM, or a maximum purchase requirement to
achieve the effect of a minimum RPM (Tirole, 1988).
42Ho et al. (2012a) also analyze the distributors’ decisions to offer FLF contracts and finds that,
for all but one distributor, their real-world decisions are profit-maximizing. Ho et al. (2012b) discuss
the welfare implications of using FLF contracts.
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effect occurs when an FLF contract allows a rental store to keep a higher level of
inventory of a given title, increasing its availability to consumers. A market coverage
effect is observed when a store signs an FLF contract with a distributor and carries
more titles from that distributor than it would otherwise. Finally, a leverage effect is
present if a rental store drops titles from one distributor when it enters into an FLF
contract with another.
The findings indicate that FLF contracts have a positive effect on consumer sur-
plus.43 First, the results indicate that the leverage effect is negligible; the number of
titles that a rental store takes from competing distributors barely changes when it
signs an FLF contract. This is not obvious and is perhaps a bit surprising because
one might expect the costs of holding the tapes of the additional movies taken under
the FLF contract to force rental stores to drop titles by rival distributors. However,
the empirical evidence suggests that the advantageous terms of the FLF contract
generate savings that stores use to purchase additional titles from competing distrib-
utors. Second, the article finds that the market coverage effect is substantial. The
bundling aspect of the FLF contract induces stores to carry more movies by an FLF
distributor than they would otherwise. The effect is bigger for relatively “weak” film
distributors because stores carry many of the stronger distributors’ titles even with-
out an FLF contract.44 The negligible leverage effect and the strong market coverage
43We focus on the impact on consumer surplus because it is the measurement relevant for antitrust
analysis under U.S. law. However, the effect on total welfare can be negative if the profit losses to
a distributor are larger than the gains to rental stores and consumers. This can happen if the dis-
tributors that do not offer FLF contracts in the real world offered FLF contracts in a counterfactual
scenario. In such a case, the losses from lower upfront tape prices may outweigh the gains from
selling more titles (Ho et al., 2012b).
44Indeed, it is these relatively weak distributors that benefit from offering FLF contracts. The
stronger movie distributors do not benefit and do not offer FLF contracts in the real world.
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effect expand the assortment of titles, which increases consumer surplus.45
Third, the analysis also finds that there is a positive efficiency effect, driven by
the fact that lower upfront per-tape prices ameliorate the double marginalization
problem.46 The impact of this efficiency effect is particularly large for titles that
a store would have taken under linear pricing in the absence of an FLF contract.47
Furthermore, the efficiency effect under an FLF contract is much larger than what
revenue-sharing terms can achieve, because stores purchase the most popular titles
under linear pricing to avoid sharing the revenue. The increased holdings of invento-
ries induced by an FLF contract improve the availability of products, which further
increases consumer surplus.48
Amore detailed look at the FLF contract reveals the different mechanisms through
which its terms affect consumer welfare. The bundling aspect is the main factor
driving the market coverage effect. By forcing a store to forgo taking a title under
linear pricing, bundling also strengthens the efficiency effect. The lower upfront price,
the revenue-sharing terms, and the minimum purchase requirement also induce firms
to buy larger inventories. Finally, the bundling term strengthens the leverage effect,
while the lower upfront price and revenue sharing weaken it.
45The effect on consumer surplus is nevertheless constrained by the fact that rental stores are
predicted to carry the most popular titles even without FLF contracts. Thus, the additional movies
that stores take as a result of the FLF contract tend to cater to smaller audiences with idiosyncratic
preferences, which contributes only marginally to the estimate of overall consumer surplus
46Double marginalization occurs when an upstream firm sells inputs to a downstream firm with
a markup and the downstream firm charges final consumers a markup as well. This is suboptimal
for the upstream firm because the downstream firm purchases fewer inputs compared to what a
vertically integrated firm would choose.
47This is true because the drop in the upfront price is much larger under linear pricing than under
RS.
48The authors assume that retailers do not re-optimize their rental prices when they adopt an FLF
contract. This assumption rules out impacts on consumer surplus through the retail price channel.
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Aside from the terms of the FLF contracts, there are a few other factors that
determine their overall competitive effect. First, movie distributors introduced the
FLF contract to augment existing pricing options available to rental stores rather
than to replace them. As long as rental stores can obtain the same linear prices, the
additional vertical pricing option likely benefits rental stores and final consumers.49
Furthermore, linear prices can “discipline” the terms of the FLF contract because
stores can choose linear pricing if they are not satisfied with their terms. Second, one
of the factors driving the negligible leverage effect is the low cost of holding inventory.
The authors explain that a store effectively faces no capacity constraints because it
can display titles spine-forwards or put additional tapes in a storage room. If this
were not so, the cost of storage would be higher, possibly giving rise to a leverage
effect that could harm consumers. Last, the lack of anticompetitive effect, together
with the fact that non-dominant distributors offer FLF contracts, reinforces the idea
that such contracts are less likely to harm competition when used by weaker, rather
than dominant, players.
3.3.3 Ocean Shipping
Ocean shipping differs from all other industries considered in this article because it
enjoys partial exemption from antitrust laws. In particular, ocean carriers are allowed
to participate in legal cartels, called “conferences,” and to engage in price and quantity
49Of course, it is also possible that distributors simultaneously introduce an FLF contract and
raise linear prices to force rental stores to accept the FLF contract. Such a strategy can have
anticompetitive effects. A similar situation is analyzed by Greenlee et al. (2008).
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fixing.50 The impact of the conferences’ preferred form of pricing, dual-rate loyalty
contracts, is analyzed by Marín and Sicotte (2003). Under this form of conditional
pricing, a cartel offers its customers a lower rate for shipping services as long as
they do not use the services of non-cartel carriers. If customers do not satisfy the
exclusivity requirement, they must pay the higher, non-contract rate.51
The use of dual-rate contracts was the focus of a protracted legal and legislative
battle that lasted from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. Proponents of the contracts
argued that they allowed carriers to provide stable rates and regular shipping services
of high quality. Opponents, on the other hand, claimed that the main purpose of the
contracts was to deter entry and augment cartel members’ market power.
The authors identify seven court actions and legislative developments that affected
the likelihood of the dual-rate contracts remaining legal. If the purpose of the con-
tracts was to prevent entry and raise rates without providing a substantial benefit
to customers, any event that casts doubt on the continuing legality of dual-rate con-
tracts should harm the financial prospects of cartel members and improve them for
customers (i.e., exporting firms). This in turn should be reflected in these firms’ stock
returns. The authors conduct an event study and confirm that the stock indexes of
ocean shippers and net exporting industries moved in opposite directions during the
seven selected periods.52 This leads them to conclude that loyalty contracts enhanced
50Ocean shipping benefits from antitrust exemptions not only in the United States but in European
and other countries as well.
51In some cases, customers that break the contract must pay even larger damages.
52The authors focus on net exporting industries because they surmise that a decrease in rates
brought about by a ban on dual-rate contracts should benefit exporting firms but harm importing
firms, thus benefiting the industry on net.
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market power but did not lead to efficiencies that were passed on to customers.53 Even
though these results may not currently apply to the ocean shipping industry because
the legal framework has been amended since the 1960s, they provide evidence of the
potential negative effect of conditional pricing on competition in an industry that
enjoys some protection from antitrust laws.54
3.3.4 Smartphones and Video Games
Network effects are a distinctive feature of the mobile telecommunications and video
games industries.55 This characteristic encourages rivals to compete for larger cus-
tomer bases. The competition for customers can be a motivating factor in firms’
decisions to use conditional pricing.
Smartphones
Sinkinson (2020) analyzes the competitive effects of exclusive contracts in the telecom-
munications industry. His study focuses on the agreement between AT&T and Apple
for exclusivity for the first-generation iPhone, which attracted a lot of attention when
it was announced in 2007. Opponents of the deal were concerned that it would lead
to higher prices and limited choice for consumers, while proponents claimed that it
53The authors conduct a similar analysis with net importing industries, whose stock indexes
should move in the same direction as those of the ocean shippers. It provides weaker support for the
hypothesis that loyalty contracts are used for exclusionary purposes. The authors speculate that a
possible reason for this is that the largest firms in net importing industries drive movements in the
industry indexes and are also large exporters who might benefit from abolishing dual-rate contracts.
54Cartel members can coordinate their actions and achieve the outcome of a much larger firm
or even a monopolist (Tirole, 1988). Thus, it may be possible to extend the results for the ocean
shipping industry to other industries dominated by a single large firm under certain conditions.
55Positive network externalities, or network effects, exist when a good or service becomes more
valuable as more people use it (Tirole, 1988).
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would encourage wireless carriers to innovate.
Sinkinson builds a model in which exclusivity allows a carrier to differentiate the
handset-network bundles it offers consumers not only through the quality of wireless
service but also through product variety.56 This additional differentiation may allow a
carrier to charge a higher markup. Furthermore, if prices are strategic complements,
the higher price on the differentiated bundle leads to higher prices on all other bundles
in equilibrium.57 This effect is known as “softening of price competition.” If demand
for handsets is less sensitive to price than demand for wireless service, softened price
competition for wireless service can increase a carrier’s profits sufficiently to compen-
sate the handset manufacturer for the forgone opportunity to sell to other wireless
carriers.
The author estimates a model of consumer demand that accounts for the durable
nature of the good and uses it to simulate counterfactual scenarios and measure the
effects of exclusivity. The first analysis calculates AT&T’s and Verizon’s willingness
to pay for the exclusive contract by comparing each firm’s profits when it obtains
exclusive rights to sell the iPhone to its profits when its rival obtains the exclusive
rights. The outcome is that AT&T has higher willingness to pay only after equi-
librium price adjustments are taken into account, which underscores the importance
of modeling the equilibrium price changes. The results are driven by the fact that
AT&T offers lower quality service than Verizon and without the iPhone it attracts
56The model in Sinkinson (2020) builds on the theoretical model developed in Rey and Stiglitz
(1995).
57In game theory, players’ actions (usually choice of price or quantity) are strategic complements
if an increase by one player leads the other players to increase their strategic variable as well (Tirole,
1988).
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fewer customers and has to cut its monthly service fees. At the same time, Veri-
zon’s higher quality network insulates it from price competition and makes it less
dependent on the iPhone in the counterfactual. Thus, exclusivity raises retail prices
and limits consumer choices, which decreases consumer welfare. Restricting choice
by making the iPhone available on only one carrier harms consumers that switch to
AT&T to get the iPhone by forcing them to pay early termination fees (if they are
on a two-year contract) and by reducing the quality of their network (if they switch
from a carrier with a higher-quality network). Non-AT&T consumers who would have
purchased the iPhone from their carrier absent the exclusive deal are also harmed by
being constrained to using a less preferred handset.58
Another counterfactual reveals that manufacturers of Android-based smartphones
would make approximately $1.4 billion less in profits if the iPhone were available on
all carriers. This demonstrates that the exclusive contract between AT&T and Apple
created strong incentives for entry into the smartphone market. The article does not
estimate the net welfare effect of exclusivity because the change in the likelihood of
entry brought about by the exclusive contract cannot be estimated given the avail-
able data. The counterfactual analyses, however, demonstrate that exclusivity can
generate powerful competing forces by restricting choice and softening price competi-
tion, which harms consumers in a static setting, and by creating entry and innovation
incentives, which benefit consumers in a dynamic setting.
58The exclusive dealing arrangement between Apple and AT&T can be seen as a way to raise rivals’
costs by foreclosing their access to an important input, which limits their ability to differentiate the
network-handset bundles they offer. However, the existence of substitute handsets and the ability
of the other carriers to differentiate their offerings through exclusive contracts of their own limits
the impact of AT&T’s exclusivity.
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Video Games and Consoles
Lee (2013) conducts another study of the effects of exclusivity in an industry with
network effects–video games. The industry is comprised of console manufacturers,
which produce the platforms needed to play games; developers, which create games;
and publishers, which bring games to market. A title can become exclusive to a
particular console as a result of vertical integration, a contract, or a voluntary decision
by the developer.59 The author focuses specifically on the industry’s sixth generation,
during which Sony released PlayStation 2 (PS2), the successor to the highly successful
PlayStation, while Nintendo and Microsoft entered the market a year later with their
own platforms, Game Cube (GC) and Xbox (XB).60 This setting allows the author
to empirically analyze the possible pro- and anticompetitive effects of exclusivity. In
the context of the video game industry, theory predicts that exclusive arrangements
can limit consumer choice and lead to entry deterrence and rival foreclosure but also
that they can encourage investment, solve coordination problems, and help entrants
gain a foothold in an established industry.
The author estimates a model of dynamic consumer demand for both video games
and consoles that takes into account the fact that consumers are forward looking and
platforms are durable goods; and a model of hardware adoption by software develop-
ers that weighs the costs and benefits of exclusivity and multihoming. Modeling both
59Video games created by a vertically integrated entity are called “first-party” titles, while those
produced by independent developers are called “third-party” titles. In some cases, the console
manufacturer and the developer sign a contract that makes a title exclusive to the particular console
in exchange for financing. In other cases, the developer voluntarily makes the title exclusive if
the “porting” costs of making the title compatible with other platforms (“multihoming”) exceed the
benefits of reaching a wider audience.
60Over that year Sony sold 5 million PS2 consoles.
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sides of the market allows agents to react to past and future actions of other agents,
which is an important feature of consumer and firm behavior. Based on these mod-
els, the author analyzes the set of market outcomes that would have been obtained
absent exclusive arrangements. The counterfactuals indicate that a ban on exclusives
benefits the incumbent firm at the expense of entrants, while also increasing con-
sumer surplus.61 Hardware and software sales increase by 7 percent and 58 percent,
respectively, both driven by higher PS2 and lower GC and XB sales of consoles and
titles. Consumer welfare increases by $1.5 billion.
Two facts are driving the counterfactual results. First, in the real world GC and
XB have a higher-quality stock of exclusive titles than PS2. As a result, PS2 benefits
more by gaining access to its rivals’ exclusive titles than by retaining exclusivity over
its own. Second, as the incumbent, PS2 has a larger installed base, which attracts
developers that want to reach a wider audience. As almost all hit titles become
available for PS2 following the ban on exclusives, the incentive to purchase competing
consoles disappears. The two factors together lead to a large increase in sales of PS2
consoles and titles at the expense of GC and XB. The same mechanisms also drive the
gains in consumer surplus. PS2 owners get access to a much wider range of hit titles,
while most consumers who own multiple platforms can play their preferred games on
PS2 without needing to purchase additional consoles.62
61We focus on the results from the counterfactual in which all titles are free to re-optimize the
set of consoles to support. In addition, Lee considers two other counterfactuals as well: one in
which PS2 loses its exclusive titles while GC and XB keep theirs; and another in which all titles are
forced to be compatible with all consoles. In all three counterfactuals, banning exclusives increases
consumer welfare.
62The counterfactual analysis is “partial,” which means that the quality and set of products are
kept fixed and that platform manufacturers are not strategic. Modeling all these decisions is com-
putationally infeasible, but the author conducts robustness checks in which he varies the price of
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The telecommunications and video game industries illustrate how firms can use
exclusivity to differentiate themselves and expand their customer base. In particular,
exclusive arrangements can lead to higher prices and limit choice, while also creating
entry incentives and helping entrants compete against an incumbent. Evaluating
the impact of such conduct is particularly challenging because it requires weighing
short-term harm against possible long-term benefits to consumers.
3.4 Conclusion
The reviewed empirical articles demonstrate the range of competitive effects that
CPPs can have. FLF contracts are estimated to have a positive effect on consumer
welfare in the video rental industry. In the confections industry, AUDs can have ex-
clusionary effects, but they also motivate the downstream firm to exert more effort
and may benefit consumers through better availability and variety of products. Ex-
clusive dealing can similarly foreclose rivals in the beer industry, but only in rural
areas where there are presumably fewer available distributors. Despite the presence
of foreclosure, this conduct has only a very small negative impact on consumer wel-
fare and is likely to have an important efficiency-inducing motivation. The impact of
exclusivity is more difficult to evaluate in the video game and smartphone industries
because it leads to short-run consumer harm while simultaneously creating entry in-
centives that can have beneficial effects in the long run. Finally, loyalty discounts can
consoles, the quality of first-party titles, and the magnitude of the porting costs. The results indi-
cate that the prohibition of exclusives is still detrimental to entrants and beneficial to consumers,
although consumer welfare gains are substantially diminished in some cases.
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have anticompetitive effects as suggested by the case of ocean shipping.
The reviewed articles reveal not only the variety of possible competitive effects,
but also the importance of the specific form of the arrangement at issue and the par-
ticular market characteristics in influencing these effects. CPPs are more likely to be
anticompetitive when dominant firms employ them, when market features force firms
to drop competitors’ products to comply with the arrangement, and when substitute
products or alternative distributors are not widely available. This list of character-
istics that affect the likelihood and degree to which CPPs can have anticompetitive
effects is by no means exhaustive. Rather, it points out only some of the market
features that should be considered when evaluating the impact of conditional pricing.
Although the wide variety of arrangements and the diversity of market characteristics
makes reaching general conclusions about the competitive effects of CPPs very chal-
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